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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates dirty surplus accounting practice in different countries and its 
implications for performance measurement and equity valuation. First, I examine the 
characteristics of dirty surplus accounting permitted by accounting regulation and 
reported by companies in four countries: France, Germany, the U.K and the U.S 
during the period 1993 to 2 0 0 1 .1 find that dirty surplus flows are negative on average. 
I also find substantial cross-country variation in dirty surplus accounting both in 
accounting rules and in companies’ reporting practice. Dirty surplus accounting seems 
more severe in France and Germany than in the U.K and the U.S.
Second, I analyse the implications of dirty surplus accounting and cross­
country variation therein for accounting-based measures of abnormal performance. I 
find that the omission of dirty surplus flows creates inaccuracy in abnormal 
performance measurement for all classes of dirty surplus flows and across the four 
accounting regimes studied. Bias in abnormal performance measurement is largely 
caused by goodwill-related flows.
Third, I explore the valuation implications of dirty surplus accounting. I 
demonstrate that the residual income valuation model (RIVM) and the abnormal 
earnings growth model (AEGM) should yield identical intrinsic value estimates 
provided there is consistency in projections of accounting numbers. Accordingly, 
omission o f dirty surplus flows from these projections results in identical valuation 
error in both models. I then perform empirical tests of the relationship between 
valuation errors and dirty surplus flows, both in terms of bias and inaccuracy. Only in 
the case o f the U.S. do I find some evidence of such relationship. For this country, I 
also find evidence of industry differences in the relationship between financial and 
non-financial companies. Finally, results suggest cross-country differences in the 
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This thesis investigates the practice of dirty surplus accounting in different countries 
and its implications for measurement of business value and performance.
The concept of earnings and how to report it has long been a source o f debate 
among accounting prepares and users. Because earnings is viewed as a summary 
indicator of company financial performance and value-creation, the decision about 
which items to include in earnings and how to disclose earnings information is of 
major importance to investors, managers, creditors and regulators. Historically, two 
extreme definitions of earnings have been advocated by academics and regulators: 
One view considers only the recurring operations o f the company and hence regards 
earnings as a measure of current operating performance; The other view assumes an 
all-inclusive concept where all changes in equity during the period, except 
transactions with owners, are included in the earnings figure. This second approach is 
often referred to as clean surplus earnings or comprehensive income. Under the clean 
surplus earnings concept, there exists complete articulation between the balance sheet 
and the income statement (known as the clean surplus relationship or CSR). By 
contrast, dirty surplus earnings exclude certain transactions, (so-called dirty surplus 
flows) which represent violations of the CSR. Transactions that give rise to dirty 
surplus flows, such as asset revaluations, currency translation differences, goodwill 
write-offs on business acquisitions and disposals, are reported directly as movements 
in shareholders’ funds, bypassing the income statement. Such an accounting procedure 
might have implications for measures of company value and performance based on 
earnings, as certain gains and losses are excluded from the earnings figure. Moreover, 
implications might vary across accounting regimes as accounting standards across the 
world vary with respect to the degree of dirty surplus accounting that is allowed. For
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example, Frankel and Lee (1999) state that in Anglo-Saxon countries, especially the 
U.S., accounting is closer to clean surplus than in Continental-European countries 
such as France and Germany and this might cause problems when accounting-based 
measures of value are used for international comparisons. Although the academic 
literature and standard-setting entities have long acknowledged these problems (e.g. 
Black, 1993; Frankel and Lee, 1999; Francis, Olsson and Oswald, 2000; Chen, 
Jorgensen and Yoo, 2004; International Accounting Standards Board, 2005 -  
Financial Performance Reporting Project), no conclusive evidence currently exists 
concerning either the magnitude and nature of dirty surplus accounting in different 
countries, or the potential impact on valuation and performance measures that rely on 
accounting numbers. This research seeks to address these questions.
Previous studies, such as Dhaliwal, Subramanyam and Trevezant (1999) and 
Wang (2003), have addressed the question of the magnitude of dirty surplus flows by 
applying algorithms to machine-readable data from commercial databases. However, 
after comparing the measures of dirty surplus flows based on these algorithms with 
the dirty surplus flows reported in the companies’ financial statements, I conclude that 
algorithm-based measures do not accurately capture the amount and nature o f dirty 
surplus flows. This failure is often a consequence of imprecise financial reporting 
from the companies’ side, which sometimes reflects the lack of clear accounting 
standards on how to treat and disclose such flows. I seek to overcome this problem 
and obtain an accurate measure of the magnitude and nature o f dirty surplus by 
collecting information directly from published financial reports. This is a complex and 
labour-intensive assignment given the opacity of certain financial reports and the fact 
that non-U.K. companies often report in their native language. For that reason, I 
restricted certain parts of my analysis to a sub-sample of companies from four
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countries (France, Germany, the U.K. and the U.S.). I ensure that the sample 
represents different industries and size groups, as well as capturing substantial 
variation in the range of permitted dirty surplus accounting practices. I complement 
this data with algorithm-based measures of dirty surplus flows from large datasets 
obtained from commonly used commercial databases.
Based on data gathered from companies’ financial reports during the period 
1993 to 2001 ,1 present evidence that dirty surplus flows are negative on average, and 
that there exists significant cross-country variation in such flows. French and German 
companies report larger dirty surplus transactions while such practices are less 
common among U.K. and U.S. companies. However, if  goodwill write-offs resulting 
from merger accounting (pooling-of-interests) are included as a dirty surplus category, 
U.S. companies become responsible for most o f the dirty surplus accounting flows. 
This is mainly attributed to companies from the financial sector where merger 
accounting has been frequently applied in the U.S. Overall, the most important 
category o f flows in the sample are goodwill-related items, which regulators are now 
eliminating. For example, the pooling-of-interests method is not permitted in the U.S. 
after June 2001. Other relevant dirty surplus practices used by the companies in the 
sample include asset revaluations in France and in the U.K., adjustments due to 
currency translation and consolidation in Germany, and currency translation 
differences and adjustments for marketable securities in the U.S.
Based in these findings, I investigate the impact o f dirty surplus accounting on 
accounting-based measures of performance. Specifically, I assess the effect of 
disregarding dirty surplus flows on a measure of abnormal performance denoted 
Excess Value Added (EVC). EVC corresponds to the terminal value o f the realised 
clean surplus residual income cumulated over a multi-period interval, adjusted by
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beginning- and end-of-interval differences between economic value and accounting 
book value (O'Hanlon and Peasnell, 2002). Comparing clean surplus EVC with dirty 
surplus EVC enables me to examine the effect of disregarding dirty surplus flows 
when using accounting earnings to measure abnormal economic performance. 
Empirical results indicate that disregarding dirty surplus flows from earnings results in 
bias (signed measurement error) in the EVC measure o f abnormal performance and 
that the effect varies across the four countries. However, bias in EVC is largely driven 
by goodwill-related flows that, as mentioned above, are being eliminated in some 
jurisdictions. Omission of dirty surplus flows also creates significant inaccuracy 
(absolute measurement error) in abnormal performance measurement for all classes of 
dirty surplus flows and in all accounting regimes studied.
I continue my analysis of the implications of omitting dirty surplus flows by 
exploring the effects of such omissions on equity valuation. Equity value is typically 
defined as the present value of expected future dividends (PVED). PVED can be 
expressed as the residual income valuation model (RIVM), provided that the CSR 
holds for projected accounting numbers, and projected closing and opening book 
values o f  equity are consistent across accounting periods. PVED can also be expressed 
as the abnormal earnings growth model (AEGM), provided that there is consistency in 
projected earnings, earnings changes and retained earnings across periods. It has been 
argued in previous studies that intrinsic value estimates from the RIVM might be 
distorted i f  projections of accounting earnings used to implement the model violate the 
CSR (Francis, et a l,  2000). Further, it has been acknowledged that implementations 
o f the models using analysts’ forecasts of earnings as proxy for projections of future 
flows might result in valuation errors because analysts’ forecasts usually do not 
include dirty surplus flows (Cheng, 2005). Furthermore, the problem becomes more
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acute when using accounting-based value estimates in international comparisons since 
the magnitude and nature of dirty surplus accounting practices vary across countries 
(Isidro, O'Hanlon and Young, 2004). As a response, recent studies have proposed the 
use o f the AEGM, which does not rely on the CSR (Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 
2000; Ohlson, 2003; Gode and Mohanram, 2003; Chen, et al., 2004; Daske, 2005). 
The importance of dirty surplus flows in equity valuation depends on whether market 
participants believe that such flows are associated with expected future dividends. If 
this is the case, then omission of expected dirty surplus flows in standard applications 
o f the accounting-based models might result in important valuation errors. I 
investigate this issue by exploring the relationship between valuation errors in the 
RIVM and AEGM and expected future dirty surplus flows. I demonstrate analytically 
that both models yield identical intrinsic value estimates and identical valuation errors 
from omission of dirty surplus flows, as long as there is consistency in projections of 
accounting numbers. I then investigate empirically the relationship between valuation 
errors (difference between intrinsic value estimates and the observed price, scaled by 
price) and total dirty surplus flows, both in terms of bias (signed valuation errors) and 
inaccuracy (absolute valuation errors), in four countries: France, Germany, the U.K. 
and the U.S. Overall, empirical results provide limited evidence of a significant 
relationship. Only in the case of the U.S. do I find some supporting evidence o f a 
negative (positive) relationship in terms of bias (inaccuracy). For this country, I also 
find evidence of differences in the relationship relative to that observed in the other 
three countries, as well as cross-industry differences with respect to companies in the 
financial sector.
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1.2 Structure of the thesis
This thesis is organised in six chapters. The next chapter reviews the debate and 
research findings relating to income measurement and disclosure. I start by presenting 
the arguments in favour and against the two extreme definitions of income: current 
operating performance and comprehensive income. I review the historical debate 
among academics and the position adopted by regulators in the recent decades in four 
accounting regimes: France, Germany, the U.K. and the U.S. Given the increasing 
importance of international accounting standards, I also include the IASB position on 
the issue o f income reporting.1 In this context, I present the CSR and show the type of 
CSR violations found in the accounting rules and in practice within the four countries 
during the period 1993 to 2001. I also review the main empirical findings on the 
usefulness of net income versus comprehensive income, and on the value relevance of 
CSR violations.
Chapter 3 provides evidence on the magnitude and nature o f dirty surplus 
accounting flows in France, Germany, the U.K. and the U.S. during the period 1993 to 
2001. I show the level and characteristics of dirty surplus accounting reported by a 
sample o f companies from each of the four countries. The chapter also provides 
evidence on the accuracy of different data sources and methods o f measuring dirty 
surplus flows. I explore the reliability of the algorithm-based methods used in 
previous studies to determine dirty surplus flows by comparing the dirty surplus flows 
reported in the companies' financial statements with those computed using algorithms.
1 The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) was established as the standard-setting body o f 
the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) Foundation as from 1 April 2001. The IASB 
issues International Financial Accounting Standards (IFRS) but also endorses the previous standards, 
the International Accounting Standards (IAS), issued by the International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC). Throughout this thesis, I refer to international accounting standards as to the 
complete set o f  IAS and IFRS.
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Chapter 4 reports findings on the implications and cross-country variation 
therein, of dirty surplus accounting practices on accounting-based measures of 
performance. Using the sample and data from chapter 3, I analyse the bias and 
inaccuracy created in a measure of abnormal performance (EVC) by omitting dirty 
surplus flows from clean surplus earnings. I investigate different classes of dirty 
surplus flows responsible for bias and inaccuracy in EVC and I test for differences 
across the four countries considered (France, Germany, the U.K. and the U.S.). I then 
explain the link between the EVC measure of abnormal performance and the RIVM, 
through the CSR.
Chapter 5 studies the implications o f omitting dirty surplus flows in intrinsic 
value estimates obtained from the RIVM and AEGM. I explore the link between the 
PVED and the accounting-based valuation models and develop an analytical 
expression of the valuation error caused by omitting dirty surplus flows from 
projected accounting numbers. I then perform a series of empirical tests that explore 
the relationship between valuation errors and expected future dirty surplus flows.
Finally, chapter 6 presents the main conclusions of this thesis.
Chapter 2
Reporting Income and the Clean Surplus Relationship
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter I present the concepts of clean surplus income and dirty surplus 
income. I also review the historical and on-going debates concerning these concepts 
within the context of reporting income. The debate on the definition and disclosure of 
income was particularly lively in the U.S. during the 1930s. Since then, the discussion 
spilled over to other jurisdictions and involved several financial statement user groups. 
Because the income figure is of particular importance in the measurement of business 
value and performance, academics, regulators, investors and other users o f financial 
information have been particularly active in this debate. I review that debate and show 
how regulators in different accounting regimes have dealt with the topic o f reporting 
income. I also review the main findings of empirical studies on the usefulness of 
comprehensive income and net income.
The chapter is organised as follows. The next section introduces the concept of 
income. Section three presents the clean surplus relationship and illustrates violations 
o f that relationship. Section four presents the debate surrounding the all-inclusive and 
operating income concepts. An historical overview of the regulators position in 
different accounting regimes is presented in section five. Section six reviews the main 
findings o f the empirical literature on the usefulness o f net income and comprehensive 
income. Section seven concludes.
2.2 The concept of income
The objective of accounting numbers is to provide information about the financial 
position and performance of an enterprise that is useful for economic decision-making 
{International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) framework, point 12). During the
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1930s, particularly in the U.S., the emphasis of financial reporting moved from 
providing financial information for managers and creditors to providing information 
for shareholders. The market crash of 1929 and the economic depression that followed 
generated widespread concern about financial disclosure, and market participants 
questioned whether certain accounting practices led to poor investment decisions 
(Wolk, Teamey and Dodd, 2001). As a result, the professional accountants’ 
association (the American Institute of Accountants - AIA, the predecessor of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants - AICPA) and the stock market 
authority (the New York Stock Exchange - NYSE) began joint work to develop a set 
o f accounting principles and rules, including ones on income reporting, designated to 
protect investors’ interests.2
Income plays a central role in evaluating companies’ financial performance 
and value-creation. As a summary measure, it condenses information that is disclosed 
separately, thus requiring less time and knowledge to analyse (Black, 1993). As a 
financial indicator, income is often the core figure in business decisions such as 
executive compensation, debt covenants and IPO’ valuations (Dechow, 1994). Often 
considered the most important figure in the financial statements (Arthur Anderson & 
Co., 1962; Kiger and Williams, 1977), the concept of income has attracted a lot of 
discussion among users, researchers and regulators.
Two extreme positions can be identified regarding the definition of income: a 
focus on ‘current operating performance’ and a focus on ‘all-inclusive income’. The 
current operating performance concept focuses on the ordinary and recurring 
operations of the company. Any extraordinary and non-recurring items are excluded 
from net income. In contrast, the all-inclusive concept requires net income to include
2 In 1930, the AIA started collaborate work with the NYSE, which led to the first document dealing 
with ‘generally accepted accounting principles’.
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all items affecting the net change in equity of the company during the period, with the 
exception o f transactions with owners. The all-inclusive income concept is sometimes 
referred to as clean surplus or comprehensive income. According to the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), Statement o f  Financial Accounting Concepts 
(SFAC) 3: Elements o f  Financial Statements o f  Business Enterprises) and SFAC 6: 
Elements o f  Financial Statements, comprehensive income is defined as:
“ .... the change in equity of a business enterprise during a period from 
transactions and other events and circumstances from non-owner sources. It 
includes all changes in equity during a period except those resulting from 
investments by owners and distributions to owners.”
The FASB distinguishes earnings from comprehensive income in SFAC 5\ 
Recognition and Measurement in Financial Statements o f  Business Enterprise, issued 
in 1984. Both earnings and comprehensive income have the same broad components -  
revenues, expenses, gains and losses. However, earnings is a narrower concept than 
comprehensive income.
2.3 The clean surplus relationship and violations
2.3.1 The clean surplus relationship
If  the all-inclusive concept is adopted, all revenues, expenses and other gains and 
losses are included in income. As a result, there is a complete articulation between the 
balance sheet and the income statement, and the lifetime net income o f the business 
equals the aggregate net distributions to shareholders over the company’s life, 
independent of accounting policy choices. This articulation is referred to as the ‘clean 
surplus relationship’ (CSR). In equation form the book value o f shareholders’ funds 




B Book value of the shareholders’ funds;
Net income defined as comprehensive income or clean surplus earnings; 
Dividends net of equity issues.D
2.3.2 Dirty surplus accounting
Regulators have often defended the concept of clean surplus income but in practice 
they have allowed certain transactions to be reported directly in equity, thereby 
bypassing the income statement. That practice is known as ‘dirty surplus accounting’ 
and the transactions responsible for the CSR violations are referred to as ‘dirty surplus 
flows’. Examples of dirty surplus accounting include revaluations of assets, unrealised 
gains and losses from marketable securities, differences from currency translation, 
consolidation adjustments, and prior-year adjustments.
Accounting standards across the world allow for violations o f the CSR, but the 
degree to which the relationship is violated varies from country to country. It is 
believed that in Anglo-Saxon accounting regimes, especially in the US, accounting is 
closer to clean surplus than in Continental-European countries such as France and 
Germany (Frankel and Lee, 1999, p.2).
Table 2.1 documents the dirty surplus accounting practices allowed in different 
GAAP regimes. Table 2.1 also documents international differences in dirty surplus 
accounting practices found by directly observing the financial reports of eighty 
companies from France, Germany, the U.K. and the U.S. during the period 1993 to 
2001. I refer to these countries because they are usually identified in the international 
accounting literature as representatives of different accounting systems (Nobes and
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Parker, 2002). These countries are also economically significant and characterised by 
substantial cross-country variation in the amount o f dirty surplus accounting practices 
permissible under domestic GAAP. I also report sources of dirty surplus accounting 
under the IASB international accounting standards, given the increasing importance of 
these standards. For example, in France and Germany, legislation introduced in 1998, 
allows companies to switch to international accounting standards or U.S. GAAP and I 
found that some companies actually choose to do so .3 In addition, it is also expected 
that more European companies will adopt international standards since the European 
Union requires listed companies to apply international accounting standards in the 
consolidated accounts from 2005 onwards.4
Under French GAAP during the period 1993 to 2001, the most common dirty 
surplus accounting practices are goodwill write-offs, asset revaluations, foreign 
currency translation differences, and other dirty surplus flows such as certain 
investment subsidies, special provisions required by legislation, consolidation 
adjustments due to variations in the scope of consolidation and adjustments resulting 
from changes in accounting methods. This last type of adjustment is economically 
significant for some companies, especially post-1999, as a consequence of changes in 
the accounting rules regarding consolidation introduced by Comite de Reglementation 
Comptable (CRC) 99-02 effective after January 1999. For example, the French 
company BNP Paribas reports adjustments to reserves due to changes in accounting 
methods o f -19%  of net income for the fiscal year 1999. French GAAP also allows 
for other dirty surplus flows, namely prior-year adjustments and provisions for
3 O f a total o f  eighty companies in each country, I found that fourteen French companies and sixteen 
German companies adopted international accounting standards or U.S. GAAP in 2001.
4 Regulation (EC) 1606/2002 o f the European Parliament and the European Council requires listed 
companies to apply international accounting standards in the consolidated accounts by 2005. In the 
following cases the implementation can be delayed until 2007: (1) companies that have issued debt, but 
not equity securities, on a regulated market of a member state; and (2) companies that already use other 
international standards for the purpose o f a listing outside a regulated market o f a member state.
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pensions when constituted for the first time. However, direct charging of these flows 
to equity is only allowed in exceptional situations and is rarely found in practice.
Under German GAAP during the period 1993 to 2001, dirty surplus 
accounting can arise from goodwill write-offs, foreign currency translation 
differences, restatements of previous years’ figures and consolidation adjustments. 
Contrary to the situation in France and in the U.K., asset revaluations are not 
permitted. In practice, the most commonly found sources of dirty surplus accounting 
are goodwill write-offs, foreign currency translation differences, and consolidation 
adjustments resulting from changes in the scope of consolidation and in the 
consolidation method. For example, the company Wella AG  reported dirty surplus 
flows (mostly resulting from foreign currency translation differences) corresponding 
to 64% of net income and 5% of shareholders’ funds in 1997. Another potentially 
important category of dirty surplus flows in Germany concerns the so-called 
Sonderposten mit Rucklageanteil (special items with an equity portion).3 These special 
items usually result from differences between tax accounting and financial accounting. 
For example, the depreciation expense allowed by tax rules may be higher than the 
economic depreciation. In order to be tax deductible, the tax depreciation should be 
charged to the income statement, the economic depreciation should be deducted from 
the asset value and the excess should be disclosed in the liabilities side o f the balance 
sheet, as ‘special item with an equity portion.6 However, the special item is usually 
reported as a single total, without distinguishing between the tax effect (liability) and 
the equity effect. Another common transaction that gives rise to a special item in the 
balance sheet is the gain resulting from the disposal of assets. This gain is tax 
deductible if  reinvestment is undertaken and a special item is reported. The special
5 Also referred as ‘special item with a reserve component’ (TRANSACC, 2001, p. 1287).
6 This is required both by the German Commercial Code, where German accounting regulation is 
codified (Handelsgesetzbuch -  HGB), and the Income Tax Act (Einkommensteuergesetz -  EstG).
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item may also include investment grants and tax benefits from promoting regional 
economy. The case of the German company Creaton AG  illustrates how important the 
special items might be. In 2001, the company reported special items, representing 
more than 50% of shareholders’ equity before special items (see appendix 2.1). There 
is no consensus on how to classify these special items: as equity item, as liability item, 
or partly equity and partly liability. The decision where to draw the line separating 
equity from liabilities is left to the user of the financial reports, as the reports often do 
not contain detailed information about the transactions underlying the special items.
In the U.K. during the period 1993 to 2001, the most important types of dirty 
surplus flows are asset revaluations, currency translation differences, and prior-year 
adjustments resulting from changes in accounting policies and fundamental errors. 
Until 1998, goodwill write-offs were the most important dirty surplus practice but the 
introduction of Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 10: Goodwill and Intangible 
Assets eliminated this practice. The remaining dirty surplus items can still be large in 
magnitude. For example, for the fiscal year 2000, the U.K. company Hammerson Pic 
reported asset revaluations and prior-year adjustments corresponding to 250% and 
40% of net income, respectively.
In the U.S., SFAS 130: Reporting Comprehensive Income, issued in 1997, 
recognises three dirty surplus items: unrealised gains and losses in marketable 
securities, currency translation differences, and adjustments related to additional 
minimum pension liabilities. But U.S. GAAP permits other dirty surplus accounting 
practices. Penman (2001) identified the following dirty surplus flows in addition to the 
ones in SFAS 130: certain adjustments resulting from changes in accounting policies, 
changes in accounting for contingencies, certain tax benefits, and deferred 
compensation related to employee stock options and stock. Nevertheless, from
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analysis of a small sample of U.S. financial reports during the period 1993 to 2001, I 
concluded that these other types of dirty surplus flows occur only rarely. Another 
source o f dirty surplus accounting frequently found in the U.S. relates to the pooling- 
of-interests method used in accounting for business combinations. Under this method, 
goodwill, which represents the difference between the market value and the fair value 
o f the net assets acquired, is not recognised and amortised as it is under the purchase 
method. Instead, the pooling-of-interests method effectively treats any goodwill as an 
immediate write-off against reserves, thereby creating a dirty surplus item. This 
category of goodwill is usually not referred to in the dirty surplus accounting literature 
but it gives the same result as writing-off goodwill to reserves (Penman, 2004). The 
pooling-of-interests method may have an important impact on earnings and could 
interfere with measures of performance or measures of value that rely on clean surplus 
earnings (Ohlson, 2000). The pooling-of-interests method of accounting has been 
allowed by the accounting standards in the four countries and by the IASB. However, 
contrary to the European countries where the pooling-of-interests method is rarely 
used in practice, it has been widely used in the U.S., particularly in the financial sector 
(Moehrle and Reynolds-Moehrle, 2001).7 For example, the U.S. company Union 
Platers Corporation reported several mergers between 1993 and 1998 accounted for 
using the pooling-of-interests method. The aggregate amount of unrecognised 
goodwill in that period represents approximately three times the aggregate amount of 
net income over the same period. It is important to note that after June 2001, the 
pooling-of-interests method was eliminated as a method o f accounting for business 
combinations in the U.S. (SFAS 141: Accounting fo r  Business Combinations).
7 Some reasons pointed out to justify the low frequency of pooling-of-interests mergers in Europe are: 
(1) restricted conditions to apply the method, (2) the low frequency o f acquisitions by exchange o f 
shares and (3) the relatively low benefits o f using pooling compared to the purchase method since 
goodwill can be written-off against reserves and so bypassing the profit and loss account 
(TRANSACC, 2001).
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Finally, the IASB international accounting standards during the period 1993 to 
2001, allow for the following items to bypass the income statement: asset 
revaluations, foreign currency translation differences, gains and losses on available for 
sale financial assets, and prior-year adjustments.
2.4 The debate on clean surplus versus dirty surplus accounting
For more than sixty years, regulators and academics have been debating the issue of 
clean surplus accounting. The debate has been particularly active in the U.S. and 
usually relates to two aspects of financial reporting: (1) definition and measurement of 
income and (2) reporting of income.
According to Brief and Peasnell (1996), the first discussion about clean surplus 
accounting started in the beginning of the 20th century with the increasing interest in 
the role o f the income statement. The discussion became more active during the 1930s 
with the increasing interest on the information provided by the income statement. In 
the 1980s and 1990s, some analytical research explored the relationship between 
residual income and the properties of accounting numbers for valuation using a clean 
surplus framework (Ohlson, 1989; Peasnell, 1982; Ohlson, 1995; Feltham and Ohlson, 
1995). This work linked the discussion of the clean surplus relationship to the 
usefulness of accounting numbers for equity valuation. However, the debate on clean 
surplus earnings versus dirty surplus earnings is not only relevant to equity valuation. 
Accounting information, in particular the income number, has other roles in addition 
to valuation. The choice of net income or comprehensive income is also likely to have 
implications for performance measurement and reward systems (Biddle and Choi, 
2002; Holthausen and Watts, 2001). Debate over whether the assessment of the 
company’s past and future performance can be best achieved by current operating net
18
income or comprehensive income is ongoing. In the next sections I review the 
arguments for and against the current operating and all-inclusive definitions of 
income.
2.4.1 The current operating performance concept
Some authors propose that non-recurring items should be removed from income and 
that the income statement should report only recurring operations (Dickinson, 1908; 
Paton and Stevenson, 1916 and 1976; Paton, 1922; May, 1937). Often, the argument 
presented to support this position is based on the usefulness o f earnings for equity 
valuation. In particular, stripping non-recurring, abnormal items from earnings makes 
it a measure o f permanent earnings, which is a better predictor o f future permanent 
cash flows. For example, Black (1993) states that non-recurring items such as dirty 
surplus flows impair the ability of income to predict future cash flows and 
consequently earnings figures become less useful for valuation. Therefore, we should 
choose accounting rules that minimise variation in earnings to maximise the 
association between earnings and value. A similar statement is made by Arthur 
Anderson & Co. (1962). The former auditing company argued that the statement of 
income is more useful if net income represents only current operating performance. 
The argument is that users are better served by a figure of income that represents net 
results o f operations because the inclusion o f non-recurring items could impair the 
usefulness of income and give misleading inferences.
Another argument in favour of the current operating performance is that some 
users might not be capable of analysing the income statement and identifying 
extraordinary items and prior-year adjustments. Instead, managers are in a better 
position to eliminate the effect of these items from earnings because they possess
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superior information about the business. Opponents of this idea advise that smoothing 
earnings to have a permanent earnings figure might result in manipulations of earnings 
by managers (Hepworth, 1953). Black’s (1993) answer to that argument is that a set of 
frequently revised accounting rules on how to construct earnings would reduce the 
scope for managers’ manipulations. In Black’s view, the right amount of smoothing 
makes earnings figure more objective and more informative. Another idea in favour of 
the current operating performance concept considers inter-period and inter-company 
comparability. It is argued that reporting non-recurring transactions directly in equity 
makes the earnings figure more meaningful for comparisons because it removes any 
distortion in earnings caused by abnormal events (Littleton, 1940; Davies, Paterson 
and Wilson, 1999).
Finally, some authors advocate the current operating performance approach 
because comprehensive income creates the possibility for double counting (Johnson 
and Reither, 1996). That possibility arises because certain unrealised gains and losses 
would be recognised in comprehensive income in one period and in income in a 
subsequent period when they are realised, which can mislead users o f financial 
statements.
2.4.2 The all-inclusive (comprehensive income) concept
Supporters of comprehensive income claim that earnings should include all 
transactions that affect the net change in equity. One o f the first authors who 
supported this concept was Littleton (1940). He advocated the presentation o f all 
items o f income, expense, and profits and losses in a single income statement because 
‘only in this way does the income statement fulfil its role of conveying information to 
absentee interests on the business’. More recently, Robinson (1991) added that
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financial statements should provide information about all facts, and managers should 
not be given discretion to decide what to include in net income. This way shareholders 
and users of the financial statements would be given all the information to make their 
own judgments.
It has also been argued that non-recurring items are more likely to be 
considered and understood by users if included in current income figures. The 
argument is presented in Johnson, Reither and Swieringa (1995) in their discussion of 
the FASB project on comprehensive income. The authors point out that adoption of 
the all-inclusive definition of income would make items that are usually not presented 
in the income statement more transparent and that this would facilitate understanding. 
This approach would bring to the income statement items that are often reported 
directly in equity such as unrealised gains and losses.
Some supporters of the comprehensive income concept emphasise the 
articulation between inter-period income figures. Littleton (1940) states that 
aggregated income reported each period should equal the total income over the life of 
the company because the company operates in a continuum with regular and irregular 
transactions throughout its life. Linsmeier, et al. (1997) also stress the importance o f a 
clean articulation between the financial statements and hence the need for 
comprehensive income. With comprehensive income, the balance sheet will articulate 
with the income statement and that will articulate with the cash flow statement: cash 
items can be calculated by identifying the corresponding income statement item and 
the related changes in the balance sheet. The argument that comprehensive income 
impairs inter-period and inter-company comparability is contested by Littleton (1940). 
He counters this argument stating that properly organised statements will still allow 
comparability between income statement components. A similar point is made in
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Linsmeier, et al. (1997). They argue that reporting comprehensive income in a single 
statement of income complemented with a proper component classification facilitates 
the reconciliation of accounts across jurisdictions. Linsmeier, et al. (1997) also defend 
the role o f comprehensive income in equity valuation and performance measurement. 
They argue that both equity valuation and performance evaluation can only be 
complete if  based on a measure that shows all sources of wealth creation. In order to 
enhance the usefulness of comprehensive income, Linsmeier, et al. (1997) defend the 
desegregation of comprehensive income into separate components.
Another argument introduced in Linsmeier, et al. (1997) is that comprehensive 
income disciplines users and preparers of financial statements. First, evaluating and 
rewarding managers based on comprehensive income would force them to focus on all 
sources o f wealth creation. Secondly, targeting a comprehensive income number 
would force analysts to consider all sources of profitability when constructing 
forecasts. Finally, a comprehensive income approach would help standard setters in 
solving some recognition issues.
2.5 The position of the accounting regulators
The concept and presentation of income has been a major concern o f regulators. They 
usually try to answer three general questions: (1) what should be included in net 
income? (2) should a measure of comprehensive income be reported? (3) where 
should it be reported? Regulators’ answers have sometimes favoured the all-inclusive 
approach and other times have favoured the current operating performance approach. 
Currently a hybrid solution is adopted in most jurisdictions. In this section, I analyse 
the position of regulators in four accounting regimes: France, Germany, the U.K. and 
the U.S. For completeness, I also present the position adopted by the IASB.
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2.5.1 The U.S.
The controversy regarding the definition and reporting o f income has a long history in 
the U.S. accounting standard-setting process. According to Kiger and Williams 
(1977), during the period between 1940 and 1975 U.S. accounting standards moved 
from an all-inclusive approach to an extreme position o f current operating 
performance, to end in a moderate concept closer to the all-inclusive. The Accounting 
Research Bulletin (ARB) 8: Combined Statement o f  Income and Earned Surplus, 
issued in 1941 by the Committee on Accounting Procedures of the AIA (currently the 
AICPA), showed a clear preference for a comprehensive income:
‘...Over the years it is plainly desirable that all costs, expenses, and losses of 
a business, other than those arising directly from its capital stock 
transactions, be charged against income’.
The ARB 32, issued in 1947, defended a similar position but determined that material 
items not identifiable with typical business operations were to be excluded from net 
income. Special items should either be presented in the income statement following 
the amount labelled as net income or in the statement of retained earnings. This mixed 
position reveals an intention to include all items in income but to have at the same 
time an operating measure of income. The ARB 35 (1948) and ARB 41 (1951), further 
revealed a preference for an operating performance concept, where it was argued that 
net income should not include items such as extraordinary items and contingency 
reserves and the most prominent figure in the income statement should reflect 
operating performance. ARB 43: Restatement and Revision o f  Accounting Research 
Bulletins Nos. 1 -  42 (1953) followed the position expressed in ARB 35 and ARB 41. 
Although accepting the inclusion of special items in the income statement, the
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Committee indicated a preference for their presentation in the statement of retained 
earnings.
The next standard issued on this topic was Accounting Principles Board 
Opinion (APB) 9: Reporting the Results o f  Operations, issued in 1966. This 
pronouncement defined two levels of income: ‘income before extraordinary items’ 
and ‘net income’ to be placed at the bottom of the income statement with 
extraordinary items between them. This way, net income moves closer to the all- 
inclusive concept (prior-year adjustments are excluded from income) while users can 
still obtain a figure of income on the basis of operating activities. But in practice 
companies reported extraordinary items and other special items in a variety o f ways 
leading to considerable public discontent. Kiger and Williams (1977) analyse 
companies’ reporting practices regarding special items during the period 1953 to 1966 
and find that presentation of special items varied considerably. At the end of the 
period, 70% of companies reported the special items in the income statement while the 
remainder reported in the retained earnings statement. The companies that chose the 
income statement disclosed special items in various ways: (1) among other income 
items but disclosed separately, (2) aggregated with other income items but reported in 
notes and descriptive sections of the financial reports, (3) in a separate section in the 
income statement before net income, and (4) in a separate section in the income 
statement but after net income. In order to improve the concept of income, the APB 
issued opinions APB 20: Accounting Changes (1971) and APB 30: Reporting the 
Results o f  Operations. Reporting the Effects o f  Disposal o f  a Segment o f  a Business 
and Extraordinary, Unsual and Infrequently Occuring Events and Transactions 
(1973). These standards introduced the following changes: corrections of errors in 
previous financial statements constituted a prior period adjustment; a new figure o f
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‘net income from continuing operations’ was created; extraordinary items were 
defined in a more specific way; and discontinuing operations were to be included in 
net income before extraordinary items.
The FASB, the successor of the APB, made another step towards 
comprehensive income with SFAS 8: Accounting fo r  the Translation o f  Foreign 
Currency Financial Statements (1975) and SFAS 16: Prior Period Adjustments 
(1977). With these two statements, the regulator changed the definition of prior-year 
adjustments as defined in APB 9 and established that all items recognised during the 
period (with some exceptions) should be presented as part of net income.8 At the same 
time, the concept of comprehensive income was formally introduced in accounting 
standards in a way consistent with the all-inclusive philosophy via SFAC 3: Elements 
o f  Financial Statements o f  Business Enterprises (1980). This statement was later 
replaced by SFAC 6: Elements o f  Financial Statements (1985).
The concept of income introduced in the statements discussed above gave rise 
to some debate regarding the components of net income, namely gains and losses 
resulting from currency translation, accused of introducing volatility in reported 
earnings. The FASB response appeared in 1981 with SFAS 52: Foreign Currency 
Translation, which allowed gains and losses resulting from currency translation to be 
taken to shareholders’ funds rather than being included in net income. According to 
Walsh (1995), this turnaround of the all-inclusive concept of income expressed in 
SFAS 8 had important implications. First, it linked the debate with the concepts of 
income measurement and capital maintenance defined in SFAC 3. Second, it created a 
precedent for direct entries to owners’ equity. In fact, SFAS 87: Employers’
8 The only gains and losses included directly in shareholders’ funds were: (1) holding gains and losses 
recognised as part o f quasi-reorganisation; (2) corrections of errors in the financial statements o f a prior 
period; (3) adjustments arising from the realisation o f tax benefits o f pre-acquisition operating loss 
carry forwards o f purchased subsidiaries; (4) items associated with certain industry specific accounting 
practices; and (5) adjustments arising from certain changes in accounting method (Walsh, 1995).
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Accounting fo r  Pensions (1985) and SFAS 115: Accounting fo r  Certain Investments in 
Debt and Equity Securities (1993)9, permitted certain pension adjustments and gains 
and losses on marketable securities to be written off to shareholders’ funds. 
Furthermore, in the framework of the time, the FASB project on financial instruments, 
which resulted in SFAS 133: Accounting fo r  Derivative Instruments and Hedging 
Activities (1998), would introduce new dirty surplus flows. About the same time, users 
o f financial statements revealed some discontent about the amount of transactions 
bypassing the income statement. In 1993, the Association for Investment Management 
and Research (AIMR), one of the most influential user groups of financial statements 
according to Johnson, et al. (1995), issued a report expressing concerns about the 
increasing number of transactions bypassing the income statement. They proposed the 
introduction of comprehensive income and the disclosure of the components of 
comprehensive income. This position coincided with concerns expressed in the 
accounting research literature about the value-relevance of reported income and the 
possibility that the components of income have different predictive ability about 
future payoffs (Johnson, et al., 1995). Internally, the FASB was also suffering 
pressures stemming from the project on financial instruments. Some members were 
concerned with the amount of transactions on financial instruments reported ‘off- 
balance sheet’ and intended to bring them into the financial statements. However, 
because these transactions were to be recognised at fair value, the impact in the 
financial statements could be dramatic. In response to these claims and considerations, 
in 1995 the FASB introduced in its agenda a project on reporting comprehensive 
income that later gave rise to SFAS 130: Reporting Comprehensive Income, applicable 
for fiscal year-ends beginning after 15 December 1997. The project assumes the
 ^Following the previous SFAS 12: Accounting fo r Certain Marketable Securities, issued in 1975.
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existing definition and measurement of comprehensive income and focuses on the 
question o f presentation of comprehensive income (Johnson, et al., 1995). A similar 
approach had been used earlier in the U.K. with the introduction o f the Statement of 
Total Recognised Gains and Losses. SFAS 130 requires that comprehensive income 
and its components should be reported in a financial statement that is displayed with 
the same prominence as other financial statements that are part of a full set of 
financial statements. Preference was given to the display in the income statement 
below net income or in a separate statement of comprehensive income, which begins 
with net income. Alternatively, the changes in components o f comprehensive income 
can be presented in the statement of shareholders’ equity. Under SFAS 130, the 
components of comprehensive income are: (1) unrealised gains and losses related to 
marketable securities, (2) foreign currency translation differences and (3) changes in 
additional minimum pension liability in excess of unrecognised prior service costs.
2.5.2 The U.K.
Compared to the U.S., a much wider use of dirty surplus accounting practices has 
been traditionally allowed in the U.K., including goodwill write-offs and asset 
revaluations.
The Accounting Standards Committee (ASC), the predecessor o f the 
Accounting Standards Board (ASB), first dealt with the topic o f reporting income in 
1974 through the issue of Statement o f Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP) 6: 
Extraordinary Items and Prior Adjustments. Confronted with a variety of practices 
regarding non-recurring items, the Committee adopted an all-inclusive position. The 
view o f the ASC was that all expenses and revenues should be reported in the income 
statement because: (1) inclusion of all items in the profit and loss account gives a
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better view of the companies’ profitability; (2) exclusion of non-recurring items 
requires the use of subjective judgements that can impair comparability across 
companies; and (3) systematic exclusion of non-recurring items may result in a 
distorted view of the company’s profitability in the long run. Although in favour of 
the all-inclusive concept, the statement did not reject dirty surplus accounting when it 
is useful for users. The statement accepted that prior-year adjustments and items that 
either by law or as a result of accounting standards were specifically permitted or 
required to be taken directly to shareholders’ funds could be treated in this way. It also 
advocated the separation between operating activities and non-recurring activities 
(extraordinary and exceptional items) within the income statement.
SSAP 6 was revised in 1986 and later superseded by Financial Reporting 
Standard (FRS) 3: Reporting Financial Performance (1992). Like SFAS 130 in the 
U.S., FRS 3 focuses on disclosure issues. It requires the disclosure of dirty surplus 
flows in a more transparent way. A Statement of Total Recognised Gains and Losses 
must be presented as a primary financial statement, including profit and loss for the 
period and all other movements in reserves reflecting gains and losses attributable to 
shareholders. A reconciliation of movements in shareholders’ funds is also required 
combining the performance of the period as shown in the statement of total recognised 
gains and losses with all changes in shareholders’ funds in the period, including 
capital transactions with owners. FRS 3 is currently under revision in a joint project 
with the IASB in the area of reporting financial performance (IASB, 2005 -  Financial 
Reporting Project). The main aim of the project is to develop a single statement of 
performance combining the current profit and loss account and statement of total 
recognised gains and losses and showing all gains and losses recognised during the 
period. According to Financial Reporting Exposure Draft (FRED) 22, issued in
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December 2000, the revision of FRS 3 follows the international move towards 
reporting comprehensive income.
In addition to FRS 3, the ASB issued other statements regarding specific dirty 
surplus items such as goodwill, asset revaluations and foreign currency translation. In 
the case of goodwill, SSAP 22: Accounting fo r  Goodwill (1984) provided managers 
with a choice of how to account for purchased goodwill: direct write-off to 
shareholders’ funds or a capitalisation approach without depreciation. In 1991, the 
ASB issued Urgent Issues Task Force (UITF) 3: Treatment o f  Goodwill on Disposal 
o f  a Business which required that previously written-off goodwill should be accounted 
for when reporting the gain or loss on the sale of a business. This eliminated one 
particularly important abuse whereby an acquirer could buy and sell a subsidiary for 
the same price, debit the acquired goodwill to reserves and book the same amount as 
‘profit on disposal’. Finally, in 1997, FRS 10: Goodwill and Intangible Assets 
eliminated the dirty surplus treatment of purchased goodwill in favour o f the 
capitalisation option.
As with goodwill, the ASB attempted to eliminate discretionary practices 
regarding revaluation of assets and foreign currency translation. FRS 15: Tangible 
Fixed Assets (1999) requires that once companies choose to follow a policy regarding 
asset revaluation they must keep the assets valued up to date and they must revalue a 
whole class of assets and not ‘cherry-pick’ certain assets. Similarly, SSAP 20: Foreign 
Currency Translation (1980) restricts the translation of foreign currency to the closing 
rate/net investment method for most situations.
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2.5.3 France and Germany
Discussion about the concept and reporting of income has been less prominent in 
France and Germany than in the U.S. and the U.K. Debate in the accounting literature 
on this topic is relatively scarce and regulators have not dedicated a specific 
accounting standard to the issue of reporting income. The absence o f debate might be 
a result o f the internationalisation of accounting standards, namely the adoption of 
international accounting standards and U.S. standards.10 That is, as national 
accounting regulation adheres more to international regulation and more companies 
choose to follow international standards, the debate on accounting issues is transferred 
to the international institutions. In fact, in a sample of eighty companies from France 
and Germany I found fourteen French companies and sixteen German companies 
using either international accounting standards or U.S. GAAP in the period from 1993 
to 2001 (especially in the later years).
Traditionally, French and German regulators have permitted a wider use of 
dirty surplus accounting practices than their U.S. and U.K. counterparts. In France, 
most o f these movements are related to goodwill adjustments, currency translation 
differences, and other gains and losses such as consolidation adjustments and 
provisions required by law. In Germany, dirty surplus practices arise mainly from 
goodwill write-offs, foreign currency translation differences and other adjustments to 
reserves such as consolidation adjustments.
10 In France, Law No. 98-261 of 6 April 1998 allowed listed companies to use international accounting 
standards instead of national standards under certain conditions. Until 31 December 2002 and in the 
absence o f international accounting standards, the companies may use internationally recognised 
standards (U.S. GAAP). In Germany, after a legislation reform in 1998, listed companies have the 
choice to prepare their group accounts in accordance to the German Commercial Code or to 
international accounting standards or U.S. GAAP. Additionally, the companies listed in the New 
M arket (Neue Markt), launched in March 1997, were required to present financial statements in 
accordance with international accounting standards or U.S. GAAP.
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More recently, French and German regulators seem to be joining the 
international tendency to improve the disclosure of financial performance. In France, 
the Comite de Reglementation Comptable (CRC), the French Accounting Regulation 
Committee, issued a standard revising the consolidation methodology adopted in 
1986. The new standard, CRC 99-02 in effect after 1 January 2000, introduced a new 
methodology (denominated Second Methodology), which now requires a statement of 
changes in shareholder’s equity for consolidated accounts. Similar to the international 
standards the new standard allows some flexibility regarding the positions o f the 
statement of changes in shareholder’s equity: either as part of the main statements or 
as part o f the notes, although preference is given to the last option. In Germany, the 
recently created Deutscher Standardisierungsrat, the German Accounting Standards 
Committee, issued German Accounting Standard (GAS) 7: Group Equity and Total 
Recognised Results requiring that, for periods commencing after 30 June 2001, 
consolidated accounts include a statement o f changes in shareholders’ funds. The 
statement should be reconciled with the earnings figure reported in the income 
statement.
2.5.4 The IASB
The IASB definition of income reflects a preference for the all-inclusive measure. The 
IASB conceptual framework refers to income as including all revenues and gains that 
may, or may not, arise in the course of the ordinary activities, together with any 
unrealised gains (IASB framework, points 74 to 77). The same view is expressed in 
IAS 8: Net Profit fo r  the Period, Fundamental Errors and Changes in Accounting 
Policies (1999) which requires that all items of income and expense should be
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included in net income for the period unless an International Accounting Standard 
requires or permits otherwise.11
Nevertheless, the IASB allows certain items to be accounted for directly in 
shareholders’ funds. The main examples include corrections to fundamental errors 
related to prior periods and effects of changes of accounting policies (IAS 8), 
revaluation o f assets (.IAS 16: Property, Plant and Equipment, issued in 1999, and IAS  
38: Intangible Assets, issued in 1999), and certain exchange differences (IAS 21: The 
Effects o f  Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates, issued in 1995). Goodwill is required 
to be capitalised and amortised according to IAS 22: Business Combinations (1999) in 
line with FRS 10 in the U.K.
Similar to U.S. GAAP and U.K. GAAP, international accounting standards 
require a separate statement of changes in equity showing the net profit or loss for the 
period, items recognised directly in shareholders’ funds and the cumulative effects of 
changes in accounting policy and corrections of fundamental errors (IAS 7, point 86).
The IASB is currently discussing the issue under the Financial Reporting 
Project. The project, which started as a partnership-project with the U.K. regulators 
and other domestic standard setters, is as from 2004 a joint project with the FASB, 
designated the Joint International Group on Performance Reporting. The project 
concerns the presentation of financial performance and echoes a preference for 
comprehensive income. In motivating the project, the Board states that:
“There is no strong conceptual motivation for having some income and 
expenses reported in an income statement while others are taken directly to 
equity.”
The main focus of the project is:
11 IAS 8, point 7.
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“ ...the development of a single statement of comprehensive income -  i.e. a 
statement that reports all recognised income and expenses.”
A statement of comprehensive income will be required and consequently the 
statement o f changes in equity and the cash flow statement will undergo some 
changes. It is also an objective of the project to undertake the categorisation and 
display o f components of reported performance in order to have consistency of 
presentation among reporting entities. The proposed statement of comprehensive 
income will contain four main categories of items: business, financing, tax and 
discontinued operations, with the bottom line figure being comprehensive income. 
The statement will be presented in a matrix or columnar format, with a column for 
income and expenses from re-measurements and a column for other income and 
expenses. The re-measurements column will include items such as asset revaluations, 
fair value adjustments, etc.
2.6 Evidence on the usefulness of net income and comprehensive income
Empirical research has attempted to contribute to the debate on clean surplus versus 
dirty surplus income by analysing the implications of different definitions of income 
for users of accounting information: investors, managers, financial analysts, etc.
Dhaliwal, et a l (1999) investigate whether comprehensive income or net 
income is a better measure of company performance. They test the association 
between net income and comprehensive income with the companies’ market returns 
and future cash flows. The results indicate that net income is more strongly associated 
with market returns and is a better predictor of future operating cash flow and future 
income. Dhaliwal, et al. (1999) also test the association between each individual 
component o f comprehensive income, as defined in SFAS 130, and stock returns and
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find that only marketable securities adjustments improves the association between 
returns and income. Not surprisingly, financial companies that usually have large 
amounts of financial assets are responsible for this result. Contrary to Dhaliwal, et al. 
(1999), Hand and Landsman (1998) find evidence that aggregated dirty surplus flows 
are value-relevant although transitory. In a study that implements the residual income 
valuation model, they find that dirty surplus items are significantly associated with 
market value but have a lower coefficient that earnings.
O ’Hanlon and Pope (1999) conduct similar tests using a U.K. sample and both 
short-interval and long-interval tests. Their argument for using use long-term intervals 
up to 20 years is that the low association between short-interval returns and short- 
interval accounting variables found in studies like Dhaliwal, et al. (1999) may be 
influenced by the time differences in the recognition of events by the market and the 
financial reporting system. As the interval of analysis increases the effect of time 
differences diminishes and association between returns and income measures might 
became higher. Furthermore, the impact of some dirty surplus flows is likely to be 
spread over long periods and short-term analysis would miss part o f the effect. For 
example, goodwill can have an economic life of 20 years. O’Hanlon and Pope (1999) 
find a strong association between ordinary profit and stock returns over short and 
long-intervals. Similar to the results of Dhaliwal, et al. (1999) for a U.S. sample, they 
find little evidence that U.K. dirty surplus flows are value-relevant even in long- 
intervals.
Cahan, Courtenay, Gronewoller and Upton (2000) also test the value-relevance 
o f other comprehensive income items (asset revaluations and foreign currency 
translation reserves) for New Zealand companies. In contrast to Dhaliwal, et al. 
(1999) and O’Hanlon and Pope (1999), they show that comprehensive income is
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more value relevant than net income, which is mainly attributable to asset 
revaluations. They also find that the desegregation o f comprehensive income into 
components is not incrementally value relevant beyond the aggregate comprehensive 
income figure. However, as pointed out by the authors, the results are difficult to 
generalise given the potential influence of outliers in their sample. The New Zealand 
capital market is small and influenced by a few larger companies.
More recently, Wang (2003) investigates the association of dirty surplus flows 
and stock returns in the EU countries. The study tests the value-relevance of reported 
net income and comprehensive income (measured by the author) and the incremental- 
value-relevance of comprehensive income in the presence o f net income. Like 
Dhaliwal, et al. (1999) and O’Hanlon and Pope (1999), Wang (2003) reports that net 
income better explains stock returns than clean surplus earnings in Belgium, 
Germany, Denmark, France, The Netherlands and Portugal. The author attributes this 
result to the more permanent nature of net income. However, dirty surplus flows 
appear to have incremental explanatory power over net income for some countries 
(Germany, Spain, Finland, the U.K. and Sweden) but the study does not provide 
information on the type of flows or on the companies’ characteristics responsible for 
that effect.
Although informative about the association between income measures, dirty 
surplus items and company value, these studies do not provide a basis for deciding 
whether these items should be disclosed and where they should be disclosed. To 
address this issue, Cahan, et a l (2000) analyse whether the disclosure o f the 
components of comprehensive income in a separate statement of changes in equity 
affects the value-relevance of these items in relation to disclosure in the income 
statement. They analyse the incremental value-relevance relative to both
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comprehensive income and net income. The results indicate that the incremental 
value-relevance of the items does not change when they are disclosed in a separate 
statement, suggesting that the statement of changes in equity provides additional 
information to investors.
Hirst and Hopkins (1998) also investigate the disclosure implications of 
comprehensive income. They conduct an experiment with buy-side financial analysts 
to test whether the explicit disclosure of comprehensive income and its components as 
required by SFAS 130 helps analysts detect earnings management through available- 
for-sale marketable securities. First, they find that analysts better identify 
comprehensive income when reported in the income statement. Second, they find that 
the difference in the analysts’ stock price judgments between companies that manage 
available-for-sale marketable securities and companies that do not is mitigated when 
comprehensive income is displayed in a prominent way, particularly in the income 
statement. These results indicate that clear comprehensive income reporting helps 
analysts assess the quality of earnings and adjust their valuation judgment.
Maines and McDaniel (2000) complement the previous study by analysing the 
impact of different format presentations of comprehensive income on non­
professional investors’ judgments. Using a similar experimental framework as Hirst 
and Hopkins (1998), they test how MBA students’ assessment of company 
performance varies with different formats of comprehensive income disclosure, 
especially with respect to unrealised gains in available-for-sale marketable securities. 
In line with Hirst and Hopkins (1998), the study provides evidence that non­
professional investors’ judgments about company and managerial performance is 
affected only when comprehensive income and its components are presented in a 
separate statement of comprehensive income. Both Hirst and Hopkins (1998) and
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Maines and McDaniel (2000) studies seem to indicate that disclosure of 
comprehensive income in a prominent statement improves the users’ perceptions.
Biddle and Choi (2002) also contribute to the debate on clean surplus and dirty 
surplus earnings by showing that different measures of income better serve different 
users and interests. They compare the usefulness of sixteen measures of income 
(including net income, comprehensive income and combinations of SFAS 130 
components in between) for three applications: information content, executive 
compensation, and prediction. Their results are as follows: (1) for information content 
purposes, measured in terms of equity returns, comprehensive income, as defined in 
SFAS 130, dominates other income measures, (2) executive compensation is more 
highly associated with net income, and (3) no income definition is superior in 
explaining future net income, future operating income and future cash flows. These 
results indicate that comprehensive income is more useful for explaining stock returns 
but net income is a better measure for evaluating managerial performance and 
explaining executive compensation. Biddle and Choi (2002) also concluded that in 
general, usefulness in the three applications increases with the introduction of more 
comprehensive income components.
Taken together, the results of the empirical studies seem to provide evidence 
on the decision usefulness of comprehensive income and support the disclosure of 
comprehensive income and its components in a prominent financial statement. This 
lends support to the IASB position on requiring a single statement o f financial 
performance combining net income and comprehensive income.
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2.7 Summary
For many decades academics and regulators have been trying to resolve the issue of 
how to measure and report financial performance. Usually two extreme positions are 
defended: reporting only current operating transactions (dirty surplus earnings) and 
reporting all the transactions (clean surplus earnings). The choice between net income 
and comprehensive income is an important choice because it is likely to have 
implications in equity valuation and performance measurement. Accounting research 
has provided evidence on these issues. For example, there is some evidence that the 
disclosure of comprehensive income in a prominent statement improves users’ 
perceptions o f company’s performance. There is also evidence that net income may be 
more useful for evaluating managerial performance while comprehensive income may 
be better at explaining stock returns.
Until now, regulators across the world have adopted a hybrid measure of 
income that is based on an all-inclusive concept of income but that allows a certain 
level o f dirty surplus accounting. However, the current position seems to favour the 
all-inclusive concept of income. In the U.S., SFAS 130 requires the presentation of 
comprehensive income and its components in a prominent financial statement. The 
IASB are also developing a joint project with the FASB on reporting a single 
statement of income including both net income and comprehensive income.
The intense debate on the issue of reporting financial performance gives rise to 
the question of whether the existence of dirty surplus flows actually matters in 
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Appendix 2.1 - Example of special item with an equity portion in Germany
CREATON AG
Extract o f  balance sheet (000 EUR)
Equity and Liabilities 2001 2000
Shareholders' equity
Subscribed capital
Ordinary shares 10,752 10,752
Preferred shares 7,168 7,168
Capital reserves 37,774 37,774
Revenue reserves
Reserves for own shares 9,100 6,790
Other revenue reserves 241 2,551
Accumulated loss -5,770 -11,221
59,265 53,814
Special reserves with an equity component
Depreciation under section 4, Law Promoting
Regional Economy Activity 26,243 32,715
Special item for investment subsidies 846




Dirty Surplus Accounting: International Evidence
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3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I provide evidence on the magnitude and characteristics of dirty surplus 
accounting flows in four accounting regimes (France, Germany, the U.K. and the 
U.S.) as reported in companies’ financial statements. I also provide evidence on the 
accuracy o f different data sources and methods of measuring dirty surplus flows.
Under the clean surplus relationship (CSR), defined in the second chapter, all 
contemporaneous changes in book value from non-owner sources are included in net 
income. Accounting rules in various GAAP regimes allow certain violations of the 
CSR (termed dirty surplus accounting) and some authors have raised concerns that 
such dirty surplus accounting practices might hinder the usefulness of accounting 
numbers for the purpose of cross-country comparisons (Frankel and Lee, 1999). 
However, there is little evidence as to the level of dirty surplus accounting practices and 
the cross-country variation therein. In this chapter, I present evidence relevant to the 
concerns about dirty surplus accounting by documenting the magnitude and the nature 
o f dirty surplus accounting flows in France, Germany, the U.K. and the U.S. during 
the period 1993 to 2001. I find evidence of considerable dirty surplus accounting 
practices, in particular related to goodwill, and that such practices vary in magnitude 
and nature across accounting regimes.
For the same countries, I also explore the reliability of the methods used in 
previous empirical research to measure dirty surplus flows. Specifically, I test the 
accuracy of the methods that apply simplified algorithms to the data provided by 
commercial databases. I test a set of algorithms previously used in the empirical 
literature. I conclude that algorithm-based measures of dirty surplus flows are often 
incorrect, which is in many cases a consequence of inconsistencies in the database 
data. Databases’ failure to provide accurate data can be traced to the opacity of
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financial reporting regarding dirty surplus accounting, in particular in France and 
Germany.
The chapter is organised as follows. The next section describes the sources of 
data on dirty surplus flows. The third section presents the sample and the process of 
data collection. Results on the dirty surplus accounting practices are reported in the 
section four. Section five discusses the reliability of measures based on algorithms and 
section six concludes.
3.2 Sources of data on dirty surplus flows
3.2.1 Commercial databases
Previous empirical studies that have sought to measure dirty surplus flows typically 
rely on computer-readable sources of data such as Compustat, Datastream or Global 
Vantage. For example, Dhaliwal, et al. (1999) compute dirty surplus flows for a 
sample o f non-financial U.S. companies as the summation of foreign currency 
translation differences, adjustments for marketable securities, and adjustments related 
to minimum pension liabilities using data provided by Compustat.12 To establish the 
reliability o f the commercial databases data, I select a number of company-years from 
the countries and period covered in the study and compare the data collected from the 
databases with the corresponding financial statements. I conclude that utilizing 
commercially available data to measure dirty surplus flows could result in large errors 
because the databases often fail to identify such flows accurately. In some cases the 
figures reported by databases are incorrect and in others the data is simply not 
available. Specifically, for the countries and period covered by the study, I found that 
Datastream (a commonly used source of European data) does not provide data on dirty
12 See section 5 for details on the measure used in Dhaliwal, et al. (1999).
47
surplus related-items such as goodwill (#1103 and #1102), currency translation 
differences (#1098) and asset revaluations (#1099) for German and French companies. 
For the U.K., those items are available in Datastream but only for non-fmancial
* 13companies. For the U.S., Compustat, provides information on dirty surplus related- 
items such as retained earnings related to foreign currency translation differences 
(#230) or retained earnings related to marketable securities (#238). The fact that 
Datastream and Compustat do a better job in providing data on dirty surplus flows for 
U.K non-financials and U.S. companies, respectively, is a consequence of the 
accounting standards in these countries. The components of changes in shareholders' 
funds reported by Datastream are based on data derived from the Statement of 
Movements in Shareholders' Funds required under U.K. GAAP as part o f Financial 
Reporting Standard (FRS) 3: Reporting Financial Performance. In the U.S., 
Statement o f  Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) 130: Reporting Comprehensive 
Income requires disclosure of comprehensive income and its components, comprising 
o f foreign currency translation differences, unrealised gains and losses in marketable 
securities, and minimum pension liability adjustments, as part of a primary financial 
statement, which constitute the source for the items reported by Compustat. Because 
FRS 3, SFAS 130 or any similar reporting requirement does not apply to U.K. 
financial companies, or to French and German companies, most o f the relevant items 
are coded as missing by Datastream for these companies. Hence, the only reliable 
source of articulated data on capital movements and components of dirty surplus flows 
for U.K. financial, French and German companies is the notes to their published
14financial statements.
13 Note that Worlscope standardised Company Accounts set o f data replaced Datastream Company 
Accounts data from April 2004.
14 I also investigated the data provided by Global Vantage and concluded similarly.
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An important issue when using the commercial databases concerns the 
reliability o f data on dirty surplus flows. In the case of U.K. non-financial and the U.S. 
companies, it is possible to use the databases to collect a reasonable amount of 
accounting data. However, I found that some of the data provided are inaccurate. For 
example, for the U.S. company Enron Corporation I compared the data obtained via 
Compustat with the information reported in the financial statements for fiscal years 
1998, 1999 and 2000. Compustat does not capture any dirty surplus flows (appendix 
3.1, panel A) whereas the financial statements report foreign currency translation 
differences o f -14, -579 and -307 million USD for the years 1998, 1999 and 2000, 
respectively (appendix 3.1, panel B). Consequently, using Compustat data to measure 
the company’s dirty surplus flows, as in Dhaliwal, et. al (1999), will result in a 
measurement error (appendix 3.1, panel C).
One reason for commercial databases’ failure is the difficulty to correctly
disaggregate capital movements and dirty surplus flows, which in many cases is a
consequence o f unclear and uninformative financial reporting.15 Capital movements
can include complex transactions such as mergers and acquisitions, conversion of
shares and restatements of previous years’ accounts, which together with unclear
financial statements results in incorrect reporting in the databases. A typical example
is the Datastream item ‘other changes in shareholders’ funds’ (#1104). Datastream
reports this item as part of movements in shareholders’ funds although it often
contains both capital movements and dirty surplus movements. The database does not
provide indications on how to classify ‘other changes in shareholders funds and
therefore the understanding and correct classification of this item can only be achieved
by a detailed analysis of the financial statements. For example, for the U.K. company
15 However this reason does not justify the Compustat error in the case o f Enron Corporation presented 
in appendix 3.1.
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Smith & Nephew Pic for the year 2001, Datastream reports ‘other changes in 
shareholders’ funds’ (#1104) of 15.8 million pounds (appendix 3.2, panel A). Since 
there is no indication of the nature of this amount it is the researcher’s task to decide 
whether to classify it as a capital movement or a dirty surplus flow. Only by directly 
investigating the financial statements, namely note 23 to the financial statements 
which contains a description of movements in reserves during the year (appendix 3.2, 
panel B), it is possible to see that part o f the amount (17.9 million pounds) 
corresponds to goodwill on a joint venture (dirty surplus flow) and the remaining part 
(-2.1 million pounds) corresponds to a reduction of shares in the Qualified Employee 
Share Ownership Trust (capital movement).
Another situation that gives rise to the databases’ inaccurate reporting of dirty 
surplus flows relates to adjustments or restatements to previous years’ accounts. Both 
Datastream and Compustat do not have a ‘prior-year adjustments’ item, making it 
difficult to identify such dirty surplus flows. In the case of Datastream, it is only 
possible to detect prior-year adjustments by reconciling the shareholders’ funds at the 
year-end (#1107) with the shareholders’ funds at the beginning of the subsequent year 
(#1106). As shown in the example in appendix 3.2, panel B, note 23 o f Smith & 
Nephew Pic financial statements for the year 2001, the company reports an adjustment 
o f -61.6 million pounds to the accounts of year 2000 as a result of the introduction of 
FRS 19: Deferred Tax. The prior-year adjustment has to be obtained by computing the 
difference between closing shareholders’ funds of 2000 and opening shareholders’ 
funds o f 2001 (appendix 3.2, panel C). For the U.S., Compustat reports restated 
figures although inspection reveals that the restatement items are often incorrect or not 
available. Given the limitations described above and in order to provide consistent 
evidence on dirty surplus accounting practice, most of the data used in this study was
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hand-collected from published financial statements in order to make good the gaps 
and discrepancies in the available machine-readable data.
3.2.2 Companies’ financial statements
The most reliable source of information on dirty surplus flows seems to be companies’ 
financial statements. However, since collecting data on dirty surplus flows from 
financial statements is a difficult task that requires time and knowledge, few previous 
studies used this approach (an exception is O'Hanlon and Pope, 1999).
The transactions that give rise to such flows are usually complex and not 
reported in a transparent way (e.g. mergers and acquisitions, reserves required by 
special legislation, consolidation movements). Correct classification and measurement 
requires expertise on the transactions and accounting methods applied. Further, the 
information regarding dirty surplus flows is sometimes spread across different parts of 
the financial statements such as the notes, the statement of movements in shareholders 
funds’, and even the management report. Sometimes, the company does not clearly 
state whether an item is a dirty surplus flow or a capital movement. Thus, the 
classification between dirty surplus flows and capital movements can depend on the 
user’s interpretation. Finally, the nature and level of dirty surplus flows allowed by 
accounting standards varies across GAAP regimes making it difficult to develop a 
single method to capture such flows. These situations are particularly common for 
French and German companies either because the accounting standards do not require 
disclosure of movements of shareholders’ funds as in the U.K. and the U.S., or 
because investors often have alternative sources of information on the business 
thereby reducing the need for clear financial reporting. The financial reports of French 
and German companies frequently fail to provide details about capital and reserve
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movements and all movements in shareholders’ funds have to be derived from the 
balance sheet figures. This makes identification of dirty surplus flows extremely 
complicated. For example, in the 1999 financial statements o f the German company 
Kromschroeder AG, the only reference to movements in shareholders’ funds is given 
in note 5. This note presents end-of-year figures and states that during the year the 
company engaged in equity increases and reclassification of reserves followed by a 
decrease in reserves. No other information is provided regarding the nature and 
amounts of the movements. Given all these limitations, it is not surprising that 
commercial databases, such as Datastream, Global Vantage or Compustat, do not 
capture the dirty surplus flows correctly and do not supply data on movements in 
shareholders’ funds for France and Germany.
Is therefore a skilled and labour-intensive task collecting reliable data on dirty 
surplus flows from the published financial statements. This coupled with the fact that 
many o f the financial statements are not prepared in English language, limits the 
potential scope of the analysis. For these reasons I restrict my analysis to four 
countries: France, Germany, the U.K. and the U.S. In addition to being economically 
significant, these countries boast a substantial number of publicly quoted companies, 
and within this group of countries there has been substantial variation in the range of 
permitted dirty surplus accounting practices over the test period. Restricting the focus 
to these four countries also ensures availability of a comprehensive archive of 
published financial statements on the Global Access database.
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3.3 Sample and data collection
3.3.1 Sample selection
Table 3.1 provides details o f the selection process. The sample selection procedure for 
each country begins with the identification of all stock exchange-listed financial and 
non-financial companies, active and non-active, for which data are available on either 
Datastream (in the case of the U.K., France and Germany) or Compustat (in the case 
o f the U.S.) in 1997 (the mid-point of the sample period). Financial companies are 
retained because prior research indicates that dirty surplus flows in the U.S. tend to be 
significant in such companies (Dhaliwal, et al., 1999, p. 47). I attempt to control for 
differences in industry composition and in relative within-country company size by 
assigning companies in a given country to one of four broad industry categories (basic 
- resources, basic and general industries and utilities; goods - consumer goods; 
services - services, information and technology; and financials) and one o f four size 
categories. A typical size measure used in the literature is market value. However, 
because some of my subsequent analyses use market data, selecting companies based 
on market value could induce endogeneity problems. Accordingly, I use a non­
market-based size measure. For non-financial companies, size is measured by total 
sales.16 For financial companies, size is measured as the number of employees because 
Datastream and Compustat often do not report sales for financial companies.17 Five 
companies from each of the resulting sixteen industry-size categories are then 
randomly selected to produce a final sample of eighty companies per country.
16 Datastream #104 for French, German and U.K. companies, and Compustat #A12 for U.S. companies.
17 Datastream #219 for French, German and U.K. companies, and Compustat #A29 for U.S. companies. 
Pearson correlation coefficients between number o f employees and fiscal year-end market values are 
0.88 for France, 0.84 for Germany, 0.76 for the U.K. and 0.58 for the U.S.
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A particularly important issue in this study is ensuring that companies in the 
sample accurately reflect the domestic set of accounting rules and practices. Given the 
internationalisation of capital markets and the movement towards the use o f U.S. 
GAAP and international accounting standards, it is possible that selected companies 
may not report under national GAAP. I therefore check each set o f financial 
statements to determine which GAAP sample companies report under. I find that in 
the case of France and Germany, a number of sample companies switched from 
domestic GAAP to international accounting standards or U.S. GAAP during the 
sample period. Other companies use their domestic GAAP but they state these rules 
are also in line with international accounting standards. As an example, the following 
statement was extracted from the French company Hermes Int. 1993 financial reports 
(notes to the consolidated financial statements, accounting policies):
“The consolidated financial statements have been prepared in 
accordance with the principles stipulated by law o f January 3rd 1985 and 
decree of February 17, 1986 concerning the consolidated financial 
statements of trading companies. These principles and methods comply 
with the international accounting standards of IASC.”
Finally, I encountered cases where international accounting standards or U.S. GAAP 
were used in combination with domestic GAAP. For example, another French 
company, Eridania Beghin Say, states in the financial statements o f years 1995 to 
1999:
“The consolidated financial statements have been prepared in 
accordance with French legislation on consolidated financial reporting 
and the current standards formulated by International Accounting 
Standards Committee, with the exception of the IAS 22 concerning
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amortisation periods for goodwill and IAS 12 concerning the recording 
of provisions for deferred taxes on contingencies.”
To ensure that I only select companies reporting under domestic GAAP, companies 
that switched to international accounting standards or U.S. GAAP or cases where it is 
unclear under which GAAP they report are removed from the sample and replaced 
with another company from the appropriate industry-size portfolio. This process is 
repeated until the French and German samples each contain eighty domestic GAAP 
companies. To limit the number of replacements to a manageable level, I treat as 
domestic GAAP companies as those that changed from domestic GAAP to 
international accounting standards or U.S. GAAP at the end o f the test period (i.e. 
2000 or 2001). For these cases, the last one or two periods in which domestic GAAP 
were not used are disregarded.
Another peculiarity evident in the data concerns cases where German 
subsidiary companies establish contracts to transfer their profits to their parent 
company.18 As a consequence, these companies set the earnings figure in the profit 
and loss account to zero. In order to avoid companies with systematic net income of 
zero, I replace these subsidiary companies with alternative companies from the same 
industry-size portfolio.
3.3.2 Data construction
To examine cross-country variation in the level and type o f dirty surplus accounting 
practices, I construct a fully articulated dataset o f movements in shareholders’ funds. 
The data is obtained from Datastream for European countries and Compustat for the
18 Examples o f companies with contracts to transfer earnings are: Duewag, 1996 (Datastream code: 
936476) and Friatec, 1999 (Datastream code: 309899).
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U.S., supplemented with extensive hand-collected data taken from the companies’ 
published financial statements (via Thomson Research / Global Access).
I obtain a set of fully articulated data on book values, net incomes, dirty 
surplus flows and net distributions for each company and year in the following way. 
(For ease of notation, company subscripts are suppressed. All variables should be 
interpreted as realisations for company i.). First, the sources of periodic changes in 
shareholders' funds are assigned to one of three categories at time t : net income (NT), 
net capital distributions (D), or total dirty surplus flows (TDSF). Second, the dirty 
surplus flow category is decomposed into five categories as described below. 
Decomposing the CSR yields the following identity:
B t =  B t - 1 +  X t ~ D t
= Bt_x+ N It + TDSFt -  Dt (3.1)
= Bt_{ + N It + PYAt -G W t -  GMt + ARt + OTHt -  Dt ,
where:
B -  Book value of shareholders’ funds;
X  = Clean surplus earnings;
D  = Dividends net of equity issues;
N I = Net income or clean surplus earnings excluding dirty surplus flows;
PYA = Prior-year adjustments (i.e. differences between the opening book
value of equity at the start of a period and the corresponding closing 
book value of equity at the end of the previous period);
GW  = Goodwill written-off, net of goodwill written back on disposal;
G M  = Issue of equity unrecognised due to merger accounting, measured as
the excess of the market value of equity issued in respect of 
transactions accounted for as mergers over the increase in equity 
recognised in the financial statements in respect of the mergers;
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AR -  Asset revaluations;
OTH  = 'Other dirty surplus flows' (including foreign currency translation
differences, adjustments for marketable securities, adjustments related 
to minimum pension liabilities, subsidies, and certain consolidation 
adjustments);
TDSF  = ( Total dirty surplus flows, as previously defined, equal to PYA - GW  -
GM + AR + OTH.
I employ the general expression (3.1) as the basis to measure the dirty surplus flows 
for each company and year using the data that it is possible to obtain via the databases. 
This is supplemented with hand-collected data from the financial statements in order 
to correct database errors and obtain the missing data. Since components of dirty 
surplus flows and disclosure requirements vary across countries, different data 
collection procedures are required for different countries. The following sub-sections 
outline the procedures used for each country examined.
3.3.2.1 U.S. data
For U.S. companies it was possible to collect a large part of the data from Compustat. 
The data were then checked and corrected in accordance with the published financial 
statements. Based on previous attempts to measure dirty surplus items in the U.S. 
(Dhaliwal, et al., 1999; Hand and Landsman, 1998; Biddle and Choi, 2002), 
expression (3.1) is redefined as follows (Compustat items in parentheses):
Bt = Bt_: +NIt -D V t +CSTt +CSUt -TRSt +CUR,
+MSECt +PENt +DIFt +GMt -G M V
where:
B = Book value of common shareholders’ funds (#60);
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N I = Net income (#172) after deducting preferred dividends (#19);
D V  = Common dividends (#21);
CST  = Movements in common stock (change in #85);
CSU  = Movements in capital surplus (change in #210);
TRS = Movements in treasury stock (change in #88);
CUR = Foreign currency translation differences (change in #230);
MSEC  = Adjustment for marketable securities (change in #238);19
PEN  = Adjustments related to minimum pension liabilities: measured as the
change in additional minimum pension liability in excess of 
unrecognised prior service costs (#297 - #298, if  negative);20
D IF = Other movements in shareholders' funds, measured as the difference
between the flows referred to above and the change in book value 
between the end of the prior period and the end of the current period, as 
reported by Compustat. Because this residual item may include both 
capital transactions (including changes in the book value of equity due 
to mergers) and dirty surplus flows, I investigate its nature in each case 
by checking the published financial statements and reclassifying DIF  
where appropriate;
G M  = Issue of equity unrecognised due to merger (pooling-of-interests)
accounting. This item enters in expression (3.2) twice, once as a 
positive item to be treated as part of equity issues, and once as a 
negative item to be treated as a negative dirty surplus flow akin to a 
write-off of purchased goodwill. This item is equal to the excess o f (1)
19 In some cases I observe that Compustat items #230 and #238 are not in accordance with the
published financial statements. In these cases, I correct Compustat data #230 and #238 to be in
accordance with the figures reported in the financial statements.
20 This calculation operationalises pension costs in accordance with SFAS 130, section P I6, paragraph
131.
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the proceeds of the share issue related to the merger, estimated by 
reference to data from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), 
on numbers of shares in issue and share price, over (2) the increase in 
the book value of equity relating to the merger, as obtained by 
inspection of the financial statements.
Items in expression (3.2) feed into those in expression (3.1) as follows next. The net 
income item (.NI) in expression (3.1) comprises the corresponding item in expression
(3.2). The prior-year adjustment item (.PYA) comprises components of DIF  in (3.2) 
that were identified as relating to prior-year adjustments. The item 'issue of equity 
unrecognised due to merger accounting' (GM) comprises the corresponding item in
(3.2). The 'other dirty surplus flows' item (OTH) comprises the items described as 
CUR, MSEC , PEN  and certain components of DIF  from (3.2). The item 'dividend net 
o f equity issues' (D) in expression (3.1) comprises the following items from (3.2): D V  
plus TRS less GM  less CST less CSU. Goodwill write-offs and asset revaluations are 
not permitted in the U.S.
3.3.2.2 U.K. data
The data for U.K non-financial companies was available via Datastream. 
Nevertheless, it was necessary to analyse the financial statements in order to reclassify 
the residual item ‘other changes in shareholders’ funds’ as either capital movements or 
dirty surplus flows. For U.K. financial companies, most of the data is hand-collected 
from the financial statements. Based on expression (3.1), U.K. data are collected using 
the expression below (Datastream items in parentheses):
Bt = Bt_x + N It -  DVt + CAPt + PYAt -  GWt 
+ARt + OTHER, + OCB Vt + G M t -  G M ,,
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where:
B -  Book value of common shareholders’ funds. This is obtained from
Datastream for non-financials (#1107), and collected manually from 
published financial statements for financials. The book value is 
adjusted to include the creditor for ordinary dividend payable;21
N I  = Net income. Obtained from Datastream for non-financials (#1087) and
collected manually from published financial statements for financials;
D V  = Ordinary dividends (#187), less the increase in the creditor for ordinary
dividend payable (see definition of BV  above);
CAP = Capital issues (exclusive of movements in non-common capital).
Obtained from Datastream for non-financials (#1101 -  [change in #306 
+ change in #302]) and collected manually from published financial 
statements for financials;
PYA = Prior-year adjustments. Identified from Datastream in the case o f non­
financials and collected manually from published financial statements 
for financials;
G W  = Goodwill written-off, net of goodwill written back on disposal.
Obtained from Datastream for non-financials (#1103 -  #1102) and 
collected manually from published financial statements for financials;
AR  = Asset revaluations. Obtained from Datastream for non-financials
(#1099) and collected manually from published financial statements for 
financials;
21 M arket value at year-end reflects the cum-dividend value o f the company at that date but, in 
accordance with U.K. GAAP, U.K. companies report year-end book value net o f dividends payable. In 
order to make book value consistent with market value, I estimate the creditor for ordinary dividend by 
multiplying the total dividend payable (#382) by the ratio o f (1) ordinary dividend expense in the year 
(#187) to (2) total dividend expense in the year (#187+#181).
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OTHER = Other flows. Obtained from Datastream for non-financials (#1098 +
#1100) and collected manually from published financial statements for 
financials;
OCBV=  Other changes in book value. This Datastream item (#1104) comprises
both dirty surplus flows and capital items. All items in this category are 
reclassified, either to 'other dirty surplus flows' or to 'capital issues';
G M  = Issue of equity unrecognised due to merger accounting. The issue of
equity unrecognised due to merger (pooling-of-interests) accounting is 
dealt with as with the U.S. data. In the case of the U.K., the proceeds of 
the share issue related to the merger are estimated by reference to data 
on numbers of shares in issue and share price obtained from 
Datastream.
The items described in expression (3.1) as net income (NT), prior-year adjustments 
(PYA), goodwill (GW), issue of equity unrecognised due to merger accounting (GAT), 
and asset revaluations (AR) comprise the corresponding items from expression (3.3). 
The 'other dirty surplus flows' item (OTH) comprises OTHER and certain components 
o f OCBV  from (3.3). The item 'dividend net of equity issues' (D) in (3.1) comprises 
the following items from (3.3): D V  less CAP less GAT less certain components of 
OCBV.
3.2.2.3 French and German data
The majority of the data were collected manually from the financial statements for the 
French and German companies. The framework used for collection o f data is the same 
as that represented in expression (3.3), except for two items. First, as no instances of 
merger accounting arise in the data for either country, the item denoted GAT is
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unnecessary and therefore omitted. Second, there is an additional term (EUR) that 
captures small changes in book value arising from the introduction of the single 
currency in January 1999, where Datastream converts all pre-1999 data reported in 
domestic currencies into Euros using a fixed exchange rate.22 The expression to obtain 
the dirty surplus flows for France and Germany is as follows:
Bt = Bt_x + N It -  DVt + CAP. + PYAt -  GW,
(3.4)
+ARt +OTHERt + OCBVt + EURt . K J
The item OTHER in expression (3.4) represents one of the more material dirty surplus 
flow categories for French and German companies. For French companies, this 
category includes items such as currency translation differences, subsidies, regulated 
provisions (provisions or reserves required by regulators for taxes, pensions and 
retirement purposes), consolidation adjustments and changes in accounting policies as 
a result o f new accounting regulations (e.g. CRC 99-02).23 For German companies, it 
includes unrealised appreciation in investments and various consolidation 
adjustments.
As with the U.K., the items described in expression (3.1) as net income (N1), 
prior-year adjustments (PYA), goodwill (GW), and asset revaluations (AR) comprise 
the corresponding items in expression (3.4). The 'other dirty surplus flows' item 
(OTH) comprises OTHER, EUR and certain components of OCBV  from (3.4). The 
item 'dividend net of equity issues' (D) comprises the following items from (3.4): D V  
less CAP less certain components of OCBV.
22 j ugg ^ g  same exchange rate to convert data that are manually collected from financial statements 
published in domestic currencies.
23 This regulation deals with consolidation issues.
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3.3.3 Period covered
I use data from the period 1993 to 2001. The choice of a nine-year sample window 
represents a compromise between the desire for a long-horizon on the one hand, and 
the need to ensure that the data collection task is manageable on the other. The start 
date is chosen because it coincides with the introduction by Datastream, our main 
machine-readable source for non-U.S. accounting data, o f the systematic provision of 
information on dirty surplus flows. The start o f the systematic provision of such data 
was occasioned by the introduction in the U.K. of FRS 3, which required a more 
transparent reporting of dirty surplus items than had hitherto been required. Choosing 
the year 1993 as the first year of the analysis ensures that, at least for U.K. non- 
fmancial companies, I obtain a reasonable amount of articulated data on movements in 
shareholders’ funds from Datastream. I then apply the FRS 3-type template, as 
reported in Datastream for U.K non-financials, to all other companies in order to 
apply expression (3.3), which represents the movements in shareholders’ funds.
For each sample company I collect net income, book value and dirty surplus 
flow data for all available years within the nine-year timeframe. Companies with less 
than nine years of data are retained to avoid biasing the country samples towards 
established and surviving companies. The final sample consists o f 2,410 company- 
year observations for 320 companies. The distribution of observations across the four 
countries ranges from a high of 612 company-years for the U.K. to a low of 597 
company-years for the U.S. The minimum number of years per company is two (two 
cases) and the maximum is 10 (two cases).24




3.3.4.1 German financial reporting
Notes to German financial statements are sometimes vague about the types of 
transaction that generate movements in shareholders’ funds. This often limits readers’ 
ability to decompose aggregate dirty surplus flows for German companies into their 
constituent components. For example, while the company Walter Bail AG  states in the 
notes to its financial statements that it is company policy to set off differences 
resulting from currency translation against reserves, no information is provided on 
whether any such translations occur in the reporting period. Given the lack of clarity 
about movements on capital and reserves, many of the flows have to be obtained by 
reconciling the balance sheet figures supplemented by any available information 
disclosed in the notes to the financial statements. Consider the case o f Grammer AG  in 
year 1998 (appendix 3.3). The only way to construct and classify the movements in 
the reserves during the year is to analyse the balance sheet and income statement 
(appendix 3.3, panel A), consult note 7 to find the information on currency translation 
differences (appendix 3.3, panel B), and finally compute the difference between 
current year reserves and previous year reserves plus the identified movements 
(appendix 3.3, panel C). It is worthwhile noting the opacity of notes 7 (revenue 
reserves) and 7a (minority interests). These notes contain a description of the 
corresponding items and associated legal issues, but give no useful indication of the 
movements of the year, except for the currency translation differences.
German companies’ balance sheets sometimes also include ‘special items with 
a reserve component’ or ‘special items with an equity portion’ (Sonderposten mit 
Rucklageanteil). These special items usually result from differences between tax 
accounting and financial accounting, government grants and subsidies, and tax
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benefits from promoting regional economy. As mentioned in chapter 2, section 3.2, 
there is no consensus whether these special items should be treated as equity or 
liabilities and the financial reports often do not clearly indicate which category such 
items belong to. As a consequence, commercial databases deal with these special 
items in different ways. For example, Datastream item #2018 (shareholders' equity) 
excludes special reserves, whereas Worldscope includes them with the designation 
4WS.non-equity reserves’. The results reported in this study are based on data that 
exclude the special items from shareholders' funds. However, in the next chapter I 
consider the inclusion of these items as part of shareholders’ funds (see chapter 4, 
section 7).
3.3.4.2 Merser (pooling-of-interests) accounting
I also consider the issue of equity unrecognised in the financial statements due to 
merger (pooling-of-interests) accounting. This dirty surplus flow is particularly 
important in the U.S. sample since merger accounting has been widely used in the 
U.S., especially in the financial sector (Moehrle and Reynolds-Moehrle, 2001). In the 
sample considered in this study, all cases of merger accounting relate to U.S. 
companies with the exception of one case in the U.K. Appendix 3.4 provides details 
about the companies in the U.S. sample and amounts related to merger accounting 
activity.
Merger accounting can be characterised as involving the non-recording o f two 
exactly compensating items, an equity issue and an immediate write-off o f associated 
goodwill, which results from the difference between the market value o f the 
transaction and the corresponding book value. The market value o f the transaction is 
given by the change in the company market value at the date o f the transaction. That
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1S: [ S h after X P after )  ~ { S h before X P before )  > w h e r e  S h before a n d  S h after is the number of
shares outstanding before and after the transaction, respectively, and Pbefore and Pajter
is the corresponding price of the shares before and after the transaction. Data on these 
variables are collected from CRSP. The date and the book value of the transaction are 
obtained from the financial statements.
I treat the 'issue of equity unrecognised due to merger accounting' as both a 
negative dirty surplus flow, akin to an immediate write-off o f goodwill (dirty surplus 
flow) and an exactly compensating issue of equity (capital movement).
3.3.4.3 Currency uniformity
To ensure comparability across countries, all data are converted to Euros. For France 
and Germany, I follow the procedure used in Datastream and apply the fixed exchange 
rate between the local currency (French francs - FF and Deutschmarks - DM) and the 
Euro, established at 1st of January 1999, to all historical data. As a result o f this 
conversion, some minor rounding differences occur when companies’ accounts started 
to be presented in Euros. However, such differences are negligible and economically 
insignificant. For the U.K. and the U.S., data is converted from pounds Sterling (£) 
and U.S. dollars to Euros using the average exchange rate from December 1992 to 
December 2001.
3.4 Dirty surplus accounting practices in four countries
Table 3.2 reports summary statistics for market values, shareholders’ funds and the 
movements therein for the pooled data and for each country separately. The figures for 
total dirty surplus flows and for dividends net of capital issues are each shown both
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inclusive and exclusive of the unrecognised issue of equity under merger accounting. 
Panel A reports mean and median unsealed values for the data items used in the 
analysis, measured in thousand Euros. Panel B reports the ratios o f the aggregate 
items to the corresponding aggregate reported net income. Aggregate values are 
computed as the summation of all company-year observations for an item divided by 
the summation of all company-year observations for net income. Panel C reports 
means and medians of the individual company-year dirty surplus flows scaled by 
market value and tests of cross-country variation.
The results in table 3.2, panel A suggest that total dirty surplus flows across all 
four countries (either inclusive or exclusive of the merger accounting item) are 
negative on average. Dirty surplus flows are largest in France, followed by Germany, 
the U.K. and finally the U.S. However, when the merger accounting item is treated as 
a dirty surplus flow, aggregate flows are largest for the U.S. Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that, o f the very large numbers reported in respect of the merger-related item for 
the U.S., approximately 95% relate to one company that undertook a number o f very
9 Slarge mergers within the sample period.
The ratio of aggregate dirty surplus flows to aggregate net income (panel B) 
varies substantially across countries. Exclusive (inclusive) o f the merger accounting 
item, the ratio is -1% (-106%) for U.S. companies, -12% (-13%) for U.K. companies, 
-26% (-26%) for French companies and -32% (-32%) for German companies. In the 
U.K., France and Germany, the largest contributor to total dirty surplus flows is 
goodwill. In these countries, the ratio of this negative item to net income is 17%, 26% 
and 22%, respectively.26 Other important classes of dirty surplus flows in the U.K. 
include prior-year adjustments (-4% of net income) and asset revaluations (11% of net
25 The company is Union Planters Corporation: a financial company (see appendix 3.4 for details on 
merger accounting in the U.S.).
26 U.S. companies were not permitted to write-off goodwill directly to equity during the sample period.
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income). In France, asset revaluations and 'other dirty surplus flows' are the most 
important sources of dirty surplus accounting after goodwill (-1% of net income and 
1% of net income, respectively). In Germany, the second most important category of 
flows after goodwill is ‘other dirty surplus flows’ (-9% of net income), which includes 
consolidation adjustments and currency translation differences. In the U.S., merger 
accounting is the primary source of dirty surplus accounting flows (106% of net 
income). Apart from this category, dirty surplus accounting is relatively small, with 
‘other dirty surplus flows’ representing the second most important source (-1% of net 
income). A decomposition and cross-country comparison of the ‘other dirty surplus 
flows’ category is presented in appendix 3.5. It is worthwhile noting that goodwill- 
related items (the most important category of dirty surplus flows) are being eliminated 
in some accounting regimes. Accounting regulators, for example in the U.S., restrict 
the use o f merger (pooling-of-interests) accounting and require that goodwill be 
capitalised and depreciated (or subjected to periodic impairment tests).
Table 3.2, panel C reports means and medians for the individual company-year 
dirty surplus flows scaled by market value at fiscal year-end. For each item in each 
country, I report results of non-parametric signed-rank tests of the null hypothesis that 
the distribution of the item is centred on zero. I use non-parametric tests because of 
the relatively small samples used in this study and the consequent potential for large 
outliers to be influential. Rejections of the null hypothesis that the distribution of the 
dirty surplus flow item is centred on zero occur as follows: goodwill for the pooled 
sample and for France, Germany and the U.K.; unrecognised issues of equity under 
merger accounting for the pooled sample and for the U.S.; asset revaluations for the 
pooled sample and for France and the U.K.; 'other dirty surplus flows' for the U.S.; 
and total dirty surplus flows (both including and excluding the merger-related item)
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for the pooled sample, and for Germany and the U.S. These results provide evidence 
of significant dirty surplus accounting practices in all the four countries.
Panel C also reports probability values for non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis tests 
of the null hypothesis of equality across countries in the mean rank of each class of 
scaled dirty surplus flow. The null hypothesis of equality o f mean rank is rejected at 
the 5% level for goodwill, merger-related flows, asset revaluations and total dirty 
surplus flows excluding the merger-related flow.
Overall, the results presented in table 3.2 suggest that dirty surplus flows are 
economically significant and that their incidence and magnitude vary significantly 
across the four sample countries.
3.5 Accuracy of algorithm-based estimates of dirty surplus flows
Many o f the previous studies that have attempted to evaluate the dirty surplus flows 
apply simplified algorithms to data provided by the commercial databases (e.g. 
Dhaliwal, et al., 1999; Wang, 2003). As shown above, the opacity o f financial 
reporting, in particular in France and Germany, makes data collection from the 
financial statements a difficult task. Algorithms applied to commercial database data 
offer a faster and easier solution even though the databases do not always provide 
reliable and complete information about dirty surplus flows. In this section, I test the 
consistency o f such dirty surplus flows measures. Since I obtain accurate measures of 
dirty surplus flows based on direct observation of the published financial statements, I 
am able to provide evidence on the reliability of algorithm-based dirty surplus flows.
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3.5.1 Algorithm based on changes in shareholders 'fu n d s
A method commonly used in the empirical literature is to measure aggregate total 
dirty surplus flows (TDSFt) as the difference between book value of shareholders’ 
funds at the beginning (Bt.i) and end (Bt) of the accounting period after adding 
reported net income (NIt) and capital transactions (CAPt) and deducting dividends 
(DVt), as follows:
TDSFt =Bt - ( B t_l + N It -D V t +CAPt ) ,  (3.5)
Examples of studies that use this type of algorithm include Hand and Landsman 
(1998), Wang (2003) and Chen, Jorgensen and Yoo (2004). As evidence o f the 
magnitude of the error generated by applying this type of algorithm, table 3.3 reports 
summary statistics for the pooled and individual country samples for total dirty 
surplus flows computed using the financial statements and the above algorithm. Total 
dirty surplus flows based on financial statements are obtained as described in section 
3, with extensive analysis of the financial statements, and two measures are reported: 
total dirty surplus flows inclusive and exclusive of the merger related item. The 
algorithm values are obtained by applying expression (3.5) to data obtained 
exclusively from the commercial databases without any correction based on financial 
statements. For the U.S., data is collected from Compustat. For France, Germany and 
the U.K. data is collected from Global Vantage. Besides being commonly used in 
international empirical studies that measure the dirty surplus flows (e.g. Cheng, 2005; 
Wang, 2003), Global Vantage also offers larger coverage than Datastream of the 
necessary items to construct the algorithm, particularly in the case of France and 
Germany. Thus I use Global Vantage for the three non-U.S. countries and Compustat 
for the U.S. Because I only have access to Global Vantage up to 1999, the analysis
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covers only the period 1993 to 1999, which results in a reduction of the sample size 
from 2,410 (as reported in table 3.2) to 1,416 company-year observations.
Table 3.3 shows a large difference between the value of total dirty surplus 
flows based on analysis of the financial statements and the value derived from the 
algorithm (denoted algoritml). For the pooled sample, mean total dirty surplus flows 
excluding (including) the merger-related item is -10.5 (-51.2) million Euros, whereas 
mean total dirty surplus flows using the algorithm is 30.6 million Euros. The main 
difference occurs in the case of the U.S. because the algorithm does not capture the 
merger category of dirty surplus flows, which is the most important category o f dirty 
surplus flows in that country. The other important case is France where analysis of the 
financial statements produces mean total dirty surplus flows of -35.3 million Euros 
whereas the algorithm yields a mean of 0.1 million Euros. The differences between 
the ‘correct’ total dirty surplus flows (both inclusive and exclusive of the merger- 
related item) and the algorithm-based total dirty surplus flows are statistically 
significant for all cases, except for Germany. Non-parametric Wilcoxon matched-pairs 
signed rank tests of the null hypothesis that the median of the difference of the ranks 
o f the two measures is null is also rejected for all countries taken together and for 
France, the U.K. and the U.S. individually. Overall, the results in table 3.3 provide 
evidence that the type of algorithm typically applied in the empirical literature to 
compute dirty surplus flows might result in substantial measurement error.
3.5.2 Algorithm based on comprehensive income and net income
Another algorithm employed in previous studies such as Dhaliwal, et al., 1999; Biddle 
and Choi, 2002 and Chen, et a l,  2004, computes total dirty surplus flows as the 
difference between comprehensive income and net income. The comprehensive
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income concept, presented in the chapter 2, section 2, is defined by the FASB as the 
change in equity of a business enterprise during a period from transactions and other 
events and circumstances from non-owner sources (Statement o f  Financial Accounting 
Concepts (SFAC) 3: Elements o f  Financial Statements o f  Business Enterprises and in 
SFAC 6: Elements o f  Financial Statements). Comprehensive income (CIt) contains net 
income (.NIt) and other components of comprehensive, namely the dirty surplus flows. 
Therefore, the difference between the two concepts of income gives the total dirty 
surplus flows as follows:
TDSFt = CIt -  N It , (3.6)
The difficulty with this algorithm is that comprehensive income is not defined in 
many GAAP regimes and consequently companies do not report it. In the U.S., it is 
possible to use SFAS 130 definition of comprehensive income and it is also possible to 
obtain that figure from companies’ financial statements. However, in Europe 
accounting standards do not require the disclosure of comprehensive income and, with 
the exception of the U.K where FRS 3 requires companies to present the Statement of 
Total Recognised Gains and Losses, it is not an easy task to compute a measure of 
comprehensive income. Commercial databases do not report a comprehensive income 
item, hence it has to be constructed either from combinations of other database items 
or by investigating the financial statements (thus reducing the benefit o f using 
algorithms). The previous studies referred to above choose the first alternative. 
Dhaliwal, et al. (1999) and Biddle and Choi (2002) construct two measures of 
comprehensive income for U.S. companies using Compustat: one based on SFAS 130 
and other computed as the change from year t-1 to year / of retained earnings (#36) 
adjusted for common dividends (#21). Because changes in retained earnings and other 
reserves can contain both dirty surplus flows and capital movements, the measurement
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of total dirty surplus flows based on comprehensive income might result in the 
exclusion of some dirty surplus flows or inclusion of capital flows. This is particularly 
important for countries other than the U.S. and the U.K. where more adjustments to 
retained earnings are necessary in order to construct comprehensive income. For 
example, Chen, et al. (2004) compute comprehensive income for a non-U.S. sample 
by adding items such as ‘other equity reserves’ and ‘consolidation reserves’ to 
retained earnings, which are likely to contain both capital and dirty surplus flows.27 
For this reason, I replicate the algorithm above for the U.S. sample only where it is 
likely to perform better.
In table 3.4, I report statistics on total dirty surplus flows for the U.S. sample 
obtained from the algorithm in expression (3.6), denoted algorithm2, and from 
extensive analysis of the financial statements described in the section 3. The mean 
total dirty surplus flows computed using algorithm2, is 33.2 million Euros, whereas 
the correct total dirty surplus exclusive (inclusive) of the merger- related item is -1 .2  
(-97.4) million Euros. The difference between the two measures is statistically and 
economically significant. Similar to the previous algorithm based on changes in 
shareholders’ funds, the algorithm based on comprehensive income also provides an 
inaccurate measure of total dirty surplus flows.
3.5.3 Algorithms based on the summation o f individual dirty surplus flow s
The algorithms presented in expressions (3.5) and (3.6) do not provide information 
about individual dirty surplus flows. One way to obtain the individual categories of
27 Chen et al. (2004) compute comprehensive income for non-U.S. companies as the sum o f retained 
earnings (Global Vantage #131), unappropriated net profit (#132), other equity reserves (#133), 
cumulative translation adjustment (#134), legal reserves (#141) and consolidation reserves (#144) 
adding common dividends (#36).
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dirty surplus flows is to use an additive algorithm that captures total dirty surplus 
flows by adding all dirty surplus items provided in the commercial databases. For 
example, Dhaliwal, et al. (1999) compute total dirty surplus flows as the summation 
o f the dirty surplus flows defined in SFAS 130, foreign currency translation 
differences (CURt), marketable securities adjustments (MSECt) and pension liabilities 
adjustments (PEN,):
TDSFt = CUR, + MSEC, + PEN t . (3.7)
Table 3.4 compares total dirty surplus flows for the U.S. sample obtained using 
extensive analysis of the financial statements and using algorithm2 and the above 
algorithm, denoted algorithm3. The mean of total dirty surplus flows based on 
algorithm3 (-1,1 million Euros) does not differ significantly from the mean value 
based on the extensive analysis of the financial statements when the merger-related 
item is not considered. However, when the merger item is taken into account, the 
algorithm value becomes significantly different from the correct value obtained from 
detailed analysis of the financial statements. This result is not surprising as the 
unrecognised issue of equity under merger accounting is the most important dirty 
surplus item in the U.S., in the period analysed, and the remaining dirty surplus flows 
are relatively small when compared with the other sample countries (see table 3.2).
3.5.4 Correlation analysis
I investigate the association between total dirty surplus flows based on the financial 
statements and based on the three previous algorithms. Although algorithms do not 
produce accurate measures of dirty surplus flows, if  algorithm-based values are
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strongly associated with the correct values they might still be useful in contexts where 
the researcher is interested in obtaining proxies of dirty surplus flows in a simple way.
Table 3.5 reports Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients between the 
financial statements-based and algorithm-based total dirty surplus flows values. I 
report Spearman coefficients because they consider the ranks of the observations 
instead of the observations themselves and do not require the normality assumption, 
which can be problematic given the potential influence o f extreme observations. For 
algorithm 1, results for the pooled sample indicate that the correlation between the 
ranks o f the two total dirty surplus flows measures is approximately 0.5 (either 
including or excluding the issue of unrecognised equity under merger accounting). 
The cases where the coefficient is closer to one, thus showing a strongest association 
are the U.K. (0.78) and Germany (0.74). The cases where the coefficient is closer to 
zero (weakest association) are the U.S. [0.43 (0.35) excluding (including) the merger 
item] and France (0.36). For the U.S. sample, algorithm3 that uses individual 
categories of dirty surplus flows shows the highest association of all three algorithms 
[correlation of 0.83 (0.76) excluding (including) the merger item].
Generally, the correlation analysis reveals a positive and significant 
association between total dirty surplus flows computed with extensive inspection of 
financial statements and computed from the three algorithms based on database data. 
The association is particularly strong for the U.K. and the German sample when using 
an algorithm based on changes in shareholders’ funds. For the U.S., the association 
with the true measure of total dirty surplus flows is strongest if the algorithm is based 
on individual categories o f dirty surplus flows instead of changes shareholders’ funds. 
This is not surprising as using individual items eliminates the possibility of polluting 
the measurement of dirty surplus flows with capital movements. However, the
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disadvantage of this approach is its limited applicability to the countries where such 
individual items are disclosed in the financial reports and commercial databases.
Overall, the analysis in this section reveals that employing the algorithms 
aforementioned will yield significantly different amounts of dirty surplus flows as 
compared to the amounts reported in the companies’ financial statements. Therefore, 
it is only possible to obtain accurate measures of dirty surplus flows by investigating 
the financial reports. Nevertheless, the results show that in some cases there is a strong 
association between financial statements-based and algorithms-based values. Results 
also suggest that different algorithms might perform better in different countries. The 
algorithms can thus be used if one is interested in generating a relative ranking of 
companies other than measuring the precise value of dirty surplus flows.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter discusses the methods used to measure dirty surplus flows and presents 
evidence on the magnitude and nature of dirty surplus accounting practice in four 
accounting regimes (France, Germany, the U.K. and the U.S.) during the period 1993 
to 2001.
After inspecting the data provided in the commercial databases, I conclude that 
such data is often not a reliable source of information regarding dirty surplus flows 
either because these flows are not reported or because they are netted against capital 
transactions. To overcome the gaps encountered in the databases, I hand-collect data 
from published financial statements and verify the articulation o f the data by 
reconciling all movements in shareholders’ funds. This permits the correct 
identification of all movements in shareholders’ funds and consequently the 
desegregation into capital flows and different categories of dirty surplus flows.
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Detailed analysis of the financial statements also provides evidence that reporting of 
dirty surplus flows is still unclear in certain accounting regimes such as France and 
Germany and that this opacity is one of the reasons why commercial databases fail to 
provide accurate information about these flows.
Based on the unique set of data gathered from extensive analysis of the 
companies’ financial statements, I present evidence that the distributions of classes of 
dirty surplus flows are often not centred on zero, and that there is significant cross­
country variation in such flows. Dirty surplus flows are on average negative across the 
four countries and goodwill-related items are the most important flows.
Finally, I compare the total dirty surplus flows obtained using the financial 
statements with those that would be obtained by using simplified algorithms applied to 
commercial database data. I conclude that employing commonly used algorithms 
might result in large measurement errors of total dirty surplus flows but that there is a 
strong correlation between the algorithm-based and the financial statement-based 
measures. Given the intricacy of collecting information from published financial 
reports, algorithms can offer a simpler solution if  the user’s intention is merely to 
obtain a measure associated with the ‘correct’ dirty surplus accounting flows. Even so, 
an accurate measure of dirty surplus accounting can only be assessed by observing the 
companies’ financial reports.
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Table 3.1 - Sample selection
France Germany U.K. U.S. All
Companies in databases lists at May 2002
Active 425 822 1,469 11,827 14,543
Non-active 1,138 3,307 2,909 9,893 17,247
Duplicates -1 -7 -7 -15
Total 1,562 4,122 4,371 21,720 31,775
Companies with availability o f data 
on sales or nr. employees at 1997 321 561 1,381 9,105 11,368
Random selection o f 5 companies o f each 
o f the 16 industry - size classificationsa 80 80 80 80 320
Companies with:
10 years o f datab 2 2
9 years o f data 31 38 38 46 153
8 years o f data 19 13 8 2 42
7 years o f data 9 8 7 7 31
6 years o f data 8 5 14 7 34
5 years o f data 6 11 9 7 33
4 years o f data 5 3 2 8 18
3 years o f data 2 3 3
2 years o f data 2 2
Total number o f observations 598 603 612 597 2,410
Notes to table 3.1:
a. The table reports the number o f observations in each stage o f the sample selection process. 
The sample was divided into four industry classifications and within those into four size 
classification resulting in a total o f sixteen industry/ size classifications. Industry 
classifications are as follows:
. Basic: Resources, basic and general industries and utilities
. Goods: Consumer goods
. Services Services, information and technology
. Financials
b. As a consequence o f changes in the fiscal year-end two companies report financial statements 
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Table 3.4 - Mean (median) of total dirty surplus flows for the U.S. sample
obtained from financial statements and from algorithms
TDSF, (in thousand Euros)
Number o f 
company- 
years: 597




Notes to Table 3.4:
a. The table reports mean, median and tests o f measures o f total dirty surplus flows. The financial 
statements values are obtained from extensive analysis o f the published financial statements. 
Financial statements excluding GM  denotes total dirty surplus flows (TDSF) excluding the 
unrecognised issue o f equity under merger accounting (=OTH), OTH denotes 'other dirty surplus 
flows' and comprises o f currency translation differences (CUR), adjustments for marketable 
securities (MSEC) and adjustments related to minimum pension liabilities (PEN). Financial 
statements including GM  denotes total dirty surplus flows including the unrecognised issue o f 
equity under merger accounting (=OTH + GM). Algorithms values are obtained using exclusively 
data from Compustat. Algorithm2 is computed as follows: TDSF, = Cl, -  NIh where C l denotes 
comprehensive income defined changes in retained earnings plus common dividends and NI 
denotes net income. Algorithm3 is computed as follows: TDSF, = CUR, + MSEC, + PEN, . 
Subscripts t-l and t denote the beginning and end o f the accounting period.
b. Probability values based on a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed ranks test o f the null hypothesis o f 
median difference o f ranks equal to zero. Probability values o f 0.05 (5%) or less are printed in 
bold type.
Fin.statements Fin.statements Algorithm2 Algorithms
excluding GM including GM
-1,190.09 -97,428.49 33,162.61 -1,091.97
(0 .00) (0 .00) (0 .00) (0 .00)
< 0.001  < 0.001
0.101 0.002
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Table 3.5 - Spearman correlation coefficients between total dirty surplus flows
obtained from financial statements and from algorithms
Number o f Fin. statements Fin. statements
company-years excluding GM including GM
Algorithml: TDSFt = Bt -  (BtA + NIt - D V t-C A P J
All 1,416 0.532 0.500
(<0.001) (<0.001)
France 302 0.363 0.363
(<0.001) (<0.001)
Germany 204 0.741 0.741
(<0.001) (<0.001)
U.K. 313 0.781 0.767
(<0.001) (<0.001)
U.S. 597 0.428 0.354
(<0.001) (<0.001)
Algorithm^: TDSFt = C l - N I t
U.S. 597 0.646 0.595
(<0.001) (<0.001)
AIgorithm3: TDSFt = CURt + MSECt + PENt
U.S. 597 0.832 0.764
(<0.001) (<0.001)
Notes to table 3.5:
a. The table reports Spearman correlation coefficients and probability values o f different measures 
o f total dirty surplus flows. Notation is as follows: TDSF denotes total dirty surplus flows, 
financial statements excluding GM  denotes total dirty surplus flows excluding the unrecognised 
issue o f equity under merger accounting, financial statements including GM denotes total dirty 
surplus flows including the unrecognised issue o f equity under merger accounting, B denotes 
book value o f common shareholders' funds, NJ denotes net income, DV  denotes ordinary 
dividends, CAP denotes capital transactions, C l denotes comprehensive income, CUR denotes 
currency translation differences, MSEC denotes adjustments for marketable securities and PEN  
denotes adjustments related to minimum pension liabilities. Subscripts t-1 and t denote the 
beginning and end of the accounting period.
b. Probability values o f the null hypothesis o f Spearman correlation coefficients equal to zero are 
given beneath the coefficients. Probability values of 0.05 (5%) or less are printed in bold type.
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Appendix 3.1 - Calculation of dirty surplus flows using the DST algorithm and the
financial statements for U.S. company Enron Corporation
P anel A: D ata obtained from  C om pustat
ENRON CORP
(in million USD) Compustat item 2000 1999 1998
N et Income (Loss) #172 979 893 703
Ret Earn-Cum Translation Adj #230 0 0 0
Marketable Securities Adj #238 0 0 0
Pens-Unrcg Prior Srv Cst Udr #297 @NA @NA @NA
Pension-Addl Minimum Liablty #298 @NA @NA @NA
Source: Com pustat -  Research Insight
Panel B: D ata obtained from  the com pany financial statem ents
ENRON CORP. and Subsidiaries Consolidated Statement o f  Comprehensive Income
Year ended December 31,
(in million USD) 2000 1999 1998
N et Incom e
Other comprehensive income:







T otal C om prehensive Income 672 314 689
Source: Enron Corp. publishedfinancial statements
P anel C: C om parison of d irty  surplus flows com puted using 
C om pusta t data  and the financial statem ents
an  algorithm  applied  to
Year ended December 31,
(in million USD) 2000 1999 1998
1. Total dirty surplus flows using DST method applied 
to Compustat data (panel A):
Foreign currency translation differences 
= change in Compustat item #230
0 0 0
Adjustments fo r  marketable securities 
= change in Compustat item #238
0 0 0
Minimum pension liability adjustments 
= 0.65 x  change Compustat items 
[(#297-#298) if < 0]
0 0 0
Total dirty surplus flows 0 0 0
2. Correct value o f total dirty surplus flows as reported 
in the financial statements (panel B): -307 -579 -14
3. Error in measuring total dirty surplus flows using 
Compustat data ( 1 - 2 ) : 307 579 14
Notes: DST denotes the algorithm used in Dhaliwal, Subramanyam and Trezevant (1999).
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Appendix 3.2 - Calculation of dirty surplus flows using data from Datastream
and data from the financial statements for U.K. company Smith & Nephew Pic
P anel A: D ata obtained from  D atastream  (DS)
Smith &Nephew Pic
fin million pounds) DS item Year 2000 Year 2001
Opening shareholders’ funds #1106 551.7 268.0
Profit for the year #1087 205.2 129.6
Ordinary dividends #187 456.9 42.9
Currency translation differences #1098 -9.9 -8.8
Other recogn. gains and losses #1100 0 31.8
Capital issues #1101 7.7 11.1
Goodwill on acquisitions #1102 0 0
Goodwill on disposals #1103 31.8 0
Other changes in shareholders’ funds #1104 0 15.8
Closing shareholders’ funds #1107 329.6 404.6
Source: Datastream
Panel B: D ata obtained from  the com pany financial statem ents
Note 23 Reserves from Smith &Nephew Pic financial statements o f2001________________________
Share Profit and
(in million pounds) premium loss account
At 1 January 2001 (as previously reported) 125.4 91.5
Prior year adjustment -61.6
At 1 January 2001 (restated) 125.4 29.9
Exchange adjustment -8.8
Retained profit for the year 86.7
Movements related to the QUEST -2.1
Unrealised gain on formation o f joint venture 31.8
Goodwill on operations contributed to joint venture 17.9
Share options and convertible bonds 10.4
At 31 December 2001 135.8 155.4
Note as in the fin ancia l statements: the pr io r  y ea r  adjustment a t 1 January 2001 relates to the adoption o f  FRS 19.
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Appendix 3.2 (continued) - Calculation of dirty surplus flows using data from 
Datastream and data from the financial statements for U.K. company Smith &
Nephew Pic
P anel C: D irty  surplus flows calculation using D atastream  and  the financial sta tem ents
As reported in the As reported in
financial statements Datastream
(in million pounds) (panel B) (panel A)
Prior year adjustments:
This item does not exist in DS 
Needs to be calculated as:
-61.6





Currency translation differences: -8.8
Directly obtained from DS item #1098 -8.8
Gain in join venture:
Reported in DS item #1100 as ‘Other gains 
and losses’. It is necessary to check the
31.8




DS item #1102 ‘Goodwill on acquisitions’ 
is null. It is necessary to check the financial 
statements to conclude that goodwill is 
included in DS item #1104 ‘Other changes 
in shareholders’ funds’ as follows:
17.9
17.9 (goodwill) -  2.1 (capital to QUEST) = 15.8
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Appendix 3.3 - Calculation of dirty surplus flows using the financial statements
for German company GrammerAG
Panel A: Data obtained from the balance sheet and income statement
Grammer AG
(in thousand DM) Notes Year 1997 Year 1998
BALANCE SHEET
Share capital and reserves:
Subscribed capital 35,000 35,000
Capital reserve 46,000 46,000
Revenue reserve (7) 9,738 16,490
Unappropriated earnings 28,867 28,834
Difference from capital consolidation 5,250 3,839
Ajustment item for minority interests 3,438 3,667
INCOME STATEMENT
N et income for the year 21,090 18,378
Third-party claims in net income for the year -487 -530
Third-party claims in loss for the year 37 85
Grammer profits carried forward 20,390 28,867
Allocation to other reserves -6,213 -5,966
Allocation to other revenue reserves 0 -5,000
Disbursement -5,950 -7,000
Panel B: Information on movements in shareholders’ funds from the notes to the financial 
statements
Note (7) Revenue reserves
“The mandatory reserve remains unchanged at DM 2,314 thousand, as against DM 2,314 thousand in 
1997. The mandatory reserves and the capital reserves in keeping with section 272 para. 2 Nos. 1 through 
3 HGB together comprise more than one tenth o f the share capital. The articles o f incorporation do not 
foresee a level that deviates from that stipulated by law.
Other Group revenue reserves have been raised by an allocation o f DM 5,000 thousand and they thus 
totalled DM 7,434 thousand as at Dec. 31, 1998. At that date they contained the partial netting o f 
goodwill from first-time consolidation amounting to DM 7,007 thousand, identical to the 1997 figure, the 
Group portion o f the revenue reserves and the balance sheet income o f the subsidiaries included, as well 
as the differences from currency translation o f -D M  7,583 thousand, as against -D M  1,439 thousand  
the prior year. The netting differences from consolidation o f debts such as impacted on earnings and the 
elimination o f intra-group earnings from the prior year are likewise part o f revenue reserves. The 
respective change o f prior year has been booked to Group net income for the year.”
Appendix 3.3 (continued) - Calculation of dirty surplus flows using the financial
statements for German company Grammer AG
Panel C: Reconciliation of m ovem ents in shareho lders’ funds and calculation of d irty  surp lus 
flows
Subscribed Capital Revenue Difference in
capital reserves reserves capital
(in  th o u s a n d  D M ) consolidation
Balance at the end o f 1997 35,000 46,000 9,738 5,250
Movements o f the year 1998:
Allocation from profit
From income statement -  Panel A +5,966
Allocation from profit
From income statement -  panel A +5,000
Currency translation difference
At end o f 1997 (from note 7 - panel B) -1,439
At end o f 1998 (from note 7 - panel B) -7,583
Currency difference o f the year -6,144
Consolidation difference1 -1,411
Otherb 1,930
Balance at the end o f 1998 35,000 46,000 16,490 3,839
Dirty surplus flows o f 1998: -6,144 + 1,930 -1,411 -  -5,625
Notes to panel C:
a. Obtained by difference between consolidation difference at the end o f 1998 and at the end o f 1997 as 
follows: 3,839 -  5,250.
b. Obtained by difference comparing revenue reserves at the end o f 1998 with reserves at the end o f 
1997 plus movements o f the year 1998 as follows: 16,490 -(9 ,7 3 8  + 5,966 + 5,000 -  6,144).
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Appendix 3.4 - Merger accounting in the U.S. sample
(in  m illio n  E u ros)
Company name Year Industry Size Unrecognised issue o f  equity
Incara pharmaceuticals 1998 Basic 1 -11.84
Cuisine Solutions 2000 Goods 1 17.70
Titan Corp. 1998 Services 3 87.48
2000 Services 3 384.71
Norrel Corp. 1996 Services 4 -2.4
Citigroup Inc 1997 Financials 4 5,611.26
1998 31,197.88
2000 17,749.12
Old Kent Financial 1995 Financials 4 33.74
1998 -71.40
1999 179.17
Oxford Health Plans 1995 Financials 4 62.56














Appendix 3.5 - Other dirty surplus flows (OTH)
(in thousand Euros)
Item France Germany U.K. U.S.
Other gains and losses -542,697.0 1,883,567.028 57,159.9 91,029.6
Foreign currency translation 
differences 2,931,760.0 44,444.0 -360,304.7 -1,816,371.1
Subsidies -1,776.0
Provisions required by 
legislation -94,845.0




Adjustments for marketable 
securities 1,076,357.1
Total 702,284.0 -1,839,123.0 -303,144.8 -694,912.0
N 598 603 612 597
Mean 1,174.39 -3,049.96 -495.33 -1,164.01
28 The main items are related to consolidation adjustments and changes in consolidation scope. 
Examples o f other items included in this category are adjustments to conform to legislation and 
unrealised appreciation in investments. Note that due to the lack o f clear information in the financial 
reports it is not possible to fully discriminate this category.
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Chapter 4




In the previous chapter I document that dirty surplus accounting practices can be of 
large magnitude and that the magnitude varies across accounting regimes. In this 
chapter, I seek evidence on the impact, and cross-country variation therein, of such dirty 
surplus accounting practices within the context of an accounting-based measure of 
performance. The countries considered are France Germany, the U.K. and the U.S. 
during the period 1993 to 2001, as in chapter 3.
For decades, academics and regulators have been discussing the desirability 
and consequences of dirty surplus accounting. They usually point out that dirty 
surplus accounting practices may create opportunities for earnings management and 
may limit the usefulness of accounting numbers in measurement of periodic 
performance (Littleton, 1940; Statement o f  Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 
130: Reporting Comprehensive Income; Linsmeier, et al., 1997). Concerns have also 
been raised in the context of business valuation. Authors such as Linsmeier, et al. 
(1997) and Francis, Olsson and Oswald (2000), claim that dirty surplus accounting 
may interfere with the applicability of the residual income valuation model (RIVM) 
since the equivalence between the dividend valuation model and RIVM relies on the 
assumption that earnings forecasts obey the clean surplus relationship (CSR). It has 
been further suggested that cross-country variation in the level of CSR violations may 
cause problems when accounting-based measures are used for international 
comparisons, in particular in cross-country implementations of the RIVM (Frankel 
and Lee, 1999). These concerns have motivated regulators in recent years to eliminate 
dirty surplus accounting practices or to require such practices to be reported in a more
29transparent way.
29 See detailed discussion on the regulatory development about dirty surplus accounting in chapter 2.
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Although is it recognised in the literature that dirty surplus accounting might 
have implications for performance measurement, there is little evidence on the issue. 
In this chapter I present evidence on the impact of omitting dirty surplus flows from 
accounting-based information used to measure multi-period abnormal performance. I 
do so by assessing the effect of disregarding dirty surplus flows in a measure of 
abnormal performance denoted Excess Value Created (EVC). I find that omission of 
dirty surplus flows creates bias in the measures of abnormal performance, and cross­
country variation therein, but that this is largely attributed to goodwill-related flows. 
More importantly, the omission of dirty surplus flows results in significant inaccuracy 
in abnormal performance measurement for all categories of dirty surplus flows and on 
all four accounting regimes studied, for a range of different horizons.
The chapter is organised as follows. The next section presents the abnormal 
performance measure used to evaluate the impact of omitting dirty surplus flows. 
Section three presents the measures of EVC errors. Section four discusses the results. 
Section five analyses the effect of increase in the horizon length on which EVC is 
measured. Section six presents the relationship between EVC and the residual income 
valuation model. Robustness checks are reported in the section seven and section eight 
concludes.
4.2 An accounting-based measure of abnormal performance
I investigate the impact of dirty surplus accounting flows using an accounting-based 
measure of abnormal performance. Specifically, I observe the cross-country effect of 
the omission of categories of dirty surplus flows in measuring abnormal performance 
using a measure termed Excess Value Created (EVC) that equals the excess of
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economic value generated by the company during a given time period over the 
invested capital at the end of that period.
O'Hanlon and Peasnell (2002) show that EVC can be written as the terminal 
value of the realised clean surplus residual incomes arising during a multi-period 
interval, appropriately adjusted by the beginning-of-interval and end-of-interval 
differences between economic value and accounting book value. Since the identity 
between EVC and the residual income-based formulation thereof relies on the CSR, it 
provides a natural framework for examining the effect of disregarding dirty surplus 
flows when using accounting earnings to measure abnormal economic performance.
Another natural framework in which to evaluate the impact of dirty surplus 
accounting practices is the residual income valuation model (RIVM). The RIVM and 
EVC formulations represent different perspectives of the business but they are directly 
related as they both rely on the clean surplus residual income concept. Contrary to 
EVC, which measures performance at the end of the multi-period interval {ex-post), 
the RIVM is a forward-looking measure that estimates an intrinsic value of the 
business at the beginning of the interval based on expectations of future flows (ex- 
ante). Thus, EVC is based on realised values of accounting flows whereas the RIVM 
uses projections of future flows. This may constitute a practical disadvantage of the 
RIVM approach vis-a-vis the EVC because forecasts of earnings (or residual income) 
are sometimes not available and are subjective by nature. Analysts often adjust the 
earnings numbers to produce their forecasts, which may result in measurement error. 
For example, Sougiannis and Yaekura (2001) conclude that there is information 
missing from analysts’ forecasts and that impairs the performance of valuation 
models. Further, as some of the dirty surplus flows are difficult to predict and do not
30 See section 6 for discussion of the relationship between EVC and RIVM.
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occur systematically, analysts might assume them to be zero in the future whereas 
reported dirty surplus flows might be non-zero on average. Realisations of flows, on 
the other hand, are observable and do not require assumptions about the future 
although there is a risk of potential influence of extreme observations.31 The use of ex­
post realisations also guarantees the availability of data on dirty surplus flows and 
allows a check on the articulation between the relevant accounting stocks and flows 
and the transactions with owners that are used in the analysis. For the mentioned 
reasons, I explore the issue of the impact of disregarding dirty surplus flows within the 
performance measurement perspective. In section 7, I show that a valuation 
perspective would yield similar conclusions.
Using market value of equity as a measure of economic value, EVC from an 
equity perspective over a multi-period measurement interval beginning at time b and
ending at time e, denoted EVCbe , is defined as follows:
EVCbe = MVe - 1*, (4.1)
where MVe is market value at the end of the measurement interval and / ,  is the end-
of-interval measure of the capital invested by shareholders. (For ease o f notation, 
company subscripts are suppressed where possible. Where no company subscript 
appears, all variables should be interpreted as realisations for company /). End-of- 
interval capital invested is defined as the beginning-of-interval market value of 
shareholders' equity less dividends paid (net of equity contributions) during the 
interval, all inclusive of the required return, as follows:
I be =  ^ i f t o  +  v t ) - z "  f i  0  +  ( 4 - 2 )
*=1 s= l k = 1
31 A possible way to overcome the influence o f extreme observations is to average the realisations o f 
flows o f individual companies in portfolios Penman and Sougiannis (1998).
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where D denotes dividend net of capital contributions and r denotes the cost of equity 
capital. Clean surplus residual income for period b+s, denoted X£Sb+s, is defined as 
follows:
X c s ,b + s  =  X b+s ~  rb+s^b+s- 1 > ( 4 - 3 )
where B denotes book value of shareholders’ funds and X  is clean surplus earnings as 
defined in the second chapter:
^ +s=D b+s+(Bb+s- B bts_ i) .  (CSR)
Re-arranging CSR as
^b + s ~  ^b + s - 1 ^ b + s  ^ b + s  ’
and substituting (4.3) into this rearranged formulation o f CSR, the evolution o f book 
value is as follows:
B b + 1 ~  0 +  rb+ i ) +  X Cs ,b + \  ~  A > + i
2 ~  B b +1 0  + rb+2 ) + X Cs ,b +2  ~  A >+2
~  ^ b ( ^  +  rb+1) 0  + rb+2 )  ~  A + l ( l  + rb+2 ) -  A>+2 + ^ C S ,b +1 0  +  Vb+2 ) + ^ b + 2 
. . . etc. .
Generalising, the book value of shareholders' funds at the end of a multi-period 
interval starting at time b and ending at time e is:
+
k = \
e -b - l  e-(b+s)
~ I  Db+S n (l + w ) - 0 .  (4 -4)
5=1 k = 1
e -b - l  e-(b+s)
+ x  x csms n  o + w ) + - * « ,  •
5=1 *=1
Substituting (4.2) and (4.4) into (4.1), the EVC abnormal performance measure can be 
written as the terminal value of the within-interval clean surplus residual incomes, as
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adjusted by terms reflecting the beginning-of-interval and end-of-interval market-to- 
book premia:
EVCqSc = M V ,- l \
e -b - 1 e-(6+s)
= 2  ^CS,b+s F t  (l + rb+s+k) + Xcs,e (4 -5)
s=l k=1
+ { W - B ' ) - ( M V b-B b)Y[{l  + rM ).
k =1
The relationship in (4.5) relates directly to performance measures proposed by Stem 
Stewart and Co. within their Economic Value Added (EVA®) performance 
measurement system (Ehrbar, 1998; Young and O'Byme, 2001).32 EVA® is a special 
case o f residual income, which Stem Stewart propose as a business performance 
measure to be used in determining executive remuneration. The cumulative residual
e -b -l  e-(b+s)
income terms in (4.5), ^  Xcs,b+s I I  (l + rz>+s+*) + %cs,e > correspond to a multi-
s=1 k =1
period measure of EVA®, which Stem Stewart propose as a basis for calculating 
executive bonuses.33 Further, the end-of-interval market-to-book premium 
corresponds to Stem Stewart's Market Value Added (MVA), which is proposed as a 
measure of wealth creation.34 Finally, the beginning-of-interval market-to-book 
prem ium corresponds to beginning-of-interval MVA, which can provide a basis for
32 EVA® is a registered trademark o f Stem Stewart and Co.
33 Ehrbar (1998, chapter 7), a former Senior Vice-President of Stern Stewart and Co., argues that 
EVA®-based executive bonuses should not be paid immediately, but should be accumulated in a bonus 
bank. Bonuses should then be paid on the basis of the cumulative balance in the bonus bank. This is 
equivalent to using a multi-period accumulation of EVA® as a basis for calculating bonuses. However, 
Ehrbar does not suggest that 'interest' should be added to the bonus bank balance.
34 Ehrbar (1998, chapter 3) defines MVA as the excess of market value over adjusted book value, and 
argues that it is a measure o f wealth creation. Young and O'Byme (2001, chapter 2) correctly observe 
that MVA is not in itself a satisfactory performance measure.
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estim ating beginning-of-interval expectations regarding future EVA®, against which 
w ithin-interval EVA® outcomes can be com pared.35
A measure o f abnorm al performance in which residual income is calculated as 
in expression (4.5), except for the omission o f a class (or classes) o f dirty surplus 
flows m ay be w ritten as follows:





where E V C DS e is an erroneous measure o f EVC for the m ulti-period interval from  b
to e that omits dirty surplus flows, and D S  denotes the om itted class or classes o f 
dirty surplus flows. The error in m easuring EVC is therefore equal to the term inal 
value at tim e e o f  the omitted dirty surplus flows arising in the interval from  b to e, 
tim es minus one:
E V C bDS, - E V C bCSie
e - b - l  e-(b+ s)
i  os**, n (i+u)+®,
5=1 k =1
(4.7)
4.3 Measuring the impact of dirty surplus flows on abnormal performance
4.3.1 EVC error measures
Using the same data and sample described in chapter 3, section 3, I construct seven 
types o f  EVC error based on expression (4.7), for each country and for m easurem ent 
intervals o f  three and eight years. Each error measures the effect o f  om itting one o f  the
35 Y oung and O 'B yrne (2001, chapter 8) propose such a procedure. Their argum ent is based  on the 
residual incom e valuation m odel, according to w hich the m arket-to-book prem ium  is equal to  the 
present value o f  expected future residual incomes.
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following seven classes of dirty surplus flows (detailed definitions of the items can be 
found in chapter 3, section 3.2):
• Prior-year adjustments (PYA);
• Goodwill write-offs (net of write-backs) (GW);
• Issues o f equity unrecognised due to merger accounting (GAL);
• Goodwill write-offs (net of write-backs) plus issues of equity unrecognised due to 
merger accounting, taken together (GW+GM);
• Asset revaluations (AR);
• Other dirty surplus flows (OTH);
• All dirty surplus flows, equal to prior-year adjustments less goodwill write-offs 
less issues of equity unrecognised due to merger accounting plus asset 
revaluations plus other dirty surplus flows (ALL).
I explore the impact of disregarding dirty surplus flows by computing signed 
(bias) and absolute (inaccuracy) cumulative abnormal performance measurement 
errors associated with the omission of each of the seven classes of dirty surplus flows. 
Two alternative scaling variables are used to facilitate cross-sectional analysis: 
beginning-of-interval market value and the absolute value of the true EVC measure
( EVCbCSe). The first scaling procedure produces numbers that can be interpreted as
errors in the measurement of the excess rate of return earned over the interval on the 
beginning-of-interval market value. The second can be interpreted as the proportionate 
error in the EVC measure.
, EVCbDSs -  EVCqS EVCbDSe -  EVCbSe




EVCbDSie -  EVCbCSe EVCbDSe -  EVCbCSe
M V E V C .CS.e
(4.9)
Seven versions of expressions (4.8) and (4.9) are calculated, each corresponding to 
one omitted class of dirty surplus flow. For expression (4.8) the seven versions are as 
follows:
e-b - 1 e-(b+s)
Z  PYA>» 1 1  (l + rb+s+k )  +  P Y A e
J=1 k=1
M V b
e - b - 1 e -(6 + j)z pu*« n 0 ^"b+s+k )
J=1 jfc=l
LE V C ;CS,e
(i)
e-b - 1 -(b+s)z n o + ^+5+*) + (^ e^
5=1 k =1
^ e - ( i + 5 )z g^ « n 0  fy+s+k)  +  G W e
5=1 k=\
M V
(  e - b - 1 e -(b + s )z g m b~  n o +  rb + s + k )  +  G M e
E V C CS.e
(ii)
5=1 k=\
^ r  e - b - 1 e -(6 + 5 )z n o + /i+5+ik) + G;^
y . 5=1 k=\
M V E V C
(iii)
CS,e\
e - b - 1 e-(i+5) A
2  { G W b+s +GM i+J) [ 7  (1 H G ^ + G A O
5=1 k=\ y .
M V





2  E[ (1 + r6+5+yt) + ^ e
^ 5=1 k=1
M V b
f e-b - \  e-(b+s)z n 0 "^b+s+k )  O T H e
5=1 k- 1
e -6 -1  e -(b + s )z n 0 >^+5+& ) + ^ e
5=1 k = 1
Le f c ,CS.e
(V)
^ ( e-b- 1 e-(A+5)z n 0 ^b+s+k )  O T H e
5=1y •
M V
e-b - 1 e-(A+5)




E V C .
(vi)
CS.el
e-b-l -(b+s)z all^ n 0 b^+s+k  )  A L L e
5=1 k =1




For the EVC absolute errors given in (4.9) the expressions are identical to expressions 
(i) to (vii), except that the numerators are absolute values and therefore the sign of the 
expressions becomes positive.
To seek evidence on the impact of omitting dirty surplus accounting flows in 
measuring abnormal performance and cross-country variation therein, I apply non- 
parametric statistical tests to these measures.
4.3.2 Cost o f  equity capital
The abnormal performance measure in expression (4.6) is calculated using a time- 
varying cost of equity capital based on a time-varying risk free rate plus a constant 
equity premium of 5%, as follows:
rb+s = r fb+s + rP> (4.10)
where:
rfb+s = Country-specific risk-free rate at fiscal year b+s. This is computed as
the 12-month moving average for the year ended at the balance sheet
date of the relevant annualised 3-month Treasury bill rate36; 
rp = Equity risk premium, assumed to be 5%.
The cost of equity for country j  at time b+s is estimated to be the annualised 3-month 
Treasury Bill rate for country j  for time b+s, plus an assumed risk premium of 5%. 
The rates are adjusted for accounting periods that are o f other than 12-months
duration, using the standard formula (l + r365 )p/365 _ i ? where r365 is the annual rate, on
a 365-day basis, and p  is the period, in days, for which the rate needs to be adjusted. 
For example, for an accounting period of eight months, which can occur if  a company
36 In order to use comparable short-term risk free rates across the four countries I used the 3-month 
Treasury Bill rates reported by the International Monetary Fund available in Datastream.
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changes its year-end, the cost of equity capital is adjusted to an eight-month 
equivalent.
The method used to estimate the cost o f equity capital is similar to that 
employed in previous studies such as Frankel and Lee (1998). Other studies such as 
Francis, et al. (2000) and Penman and Sougiannis (1998) employ more sophisticated 
methodologies to estimate the cost o f equity. However, the evidence in these studies 
and in Sougiannis and Yaekura (2001) suggests that value estimates are relatively 
insensitive to the choice of discount rate.
The choice of 5% for the equity risk premium is based on recent evidence 
suggesting that the ex ante equity premium value lies somewhere in the region of 4% 
to 6%. For example, Claus and Thomas (2001) find that the risk premium in US, U.K. 
Canada, France, Germany and Japan, during the period 1985 to 1998 lies between 2% 
and 4%. Similar results are reported by Easton, et al. (2002), who find an equity 
premium of 5.3%. Lamdin (2002) estimates an average risk premium between 4.7% 
and 5.7%. Using a long-term and short-term risk free rate during the period 1981 to 
2000 Copeland, Koller and Murrin (2000) suggest similar values: between 4.5% and 
5%.
The procedure used to estimate the cost of equity capital allows variability 
through time in line with interest rates but assumes that all companies have a beta 
equal to one and that the market risk premium is constant at 5%. I test the robustness 
o f the results to changes in the cost of equity capital, namely by allowing for beta to 
vary across industry and country and by changing the equity risk premium (see section
7).
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4.3.3 A lignm ent o f  year-end book value and market value
I compute the EVC values using market value as at three months after fiscal year-end 
This is achieved by adjusting the market value at the balance sheet date
(MVb s ) by tfre total return on the company's stock for the three months after the 
balance sheet date ( Ret3 ):37
l^ B S l = M^BS XRe t3 ’ (4-11)
where R et3 is the three-month return given by the ratio of the return index at three
months after the balance sheet to the return index at the balance sheet data.38 This 
procedure ensures that the market value is likely to reflect information from the 
annual financial statements whilst remaining comparable with the balance sheet value 
o f shareholders’ funds. The analysis was repeated for market value at the fiscal year- 
end. Results are similar to those obtained for market value three months after year-end 
and therefore are not reported for reasons of economy of space.
Another necessary alignment between year-end book value and market value 
relates to the issue of accounting for dividends. Because of the accrual principle of 
accounting, the dividend expense can be recognised in book value at the end o f the 
year whereas the payment may occur in the following year (this is the case in the U.K. 
and the U.S. but not in France and Germany, where the dividend is accounted for on a 
cash basis). This accrual accounting movement generates a dividend liability in the 
balance sheet, which is cancelled when payment occurs. Hence, at fiscal year-end, 
book value is an ex-dividend figure whereas market value is cum-dividend value. In 
these cases, and when necessary data is available, I overcome the discrepancy by
37 In a small number of cases where the first year o f data coincides with the IPO o f the company, 
market value data were not available until shortly after the start o f the first accounting period. In these 
cases I used the first available data.
38 Return indexes are obtained from Datastream (code RI) and from CRSP for some U.S. companies.
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transforming book value into a cum-dividend figure. To achieve this, I add the 
creditor for ordinary dividend to reported book value. The creditor for ordinary 
dividend is estimated by multiplying the total dividend creditor by the ratio of (1) 
ordinary dividend charged in the year to (2) total dividend charged in the year.39
4.3.4 Measurement interval
I calculate EVC in expressions (4.5) and (4.6) for a short-term and a long-term 
horizon using a three-year and eight-year horizon length, respectively. The maximum 
horizon length of eight years is chosen to guarantee a relatively large number of 
observations in the sample. Results based on a smaller sample of nine years and 
results based on a medium-term horizon of six years are consistent with those reported 
for the eight-year horizon. In section 5 ,1 test the sensitivity of the results to changes in 
the horizon length.
To avoid including the same accounting data in more than one EVC 
calculation for a given horizon length, I report results based on non-overlapping 
horizons. For example, for a company with data for nine years (1993 to 2001), I 
compute three separate three-year horizon EVC measures: 1993 to 1995, 1996 to 1998 
and 1999 to 2001. Across the four countries, the total number o f non-overlapping 
intervals is 738 for the three-year interval length {e-b = 3) and 197 for the eight-year 
interval length {e-b = 8).
39 Recall from footnote 21 that for U.K. companies, creditor for ordinary dividend is computed as 
(Datastream codes in parentheses): Total dividend payable (#382) x Ordinary dividend expense (#187) 
/ [Ordinary dividend expense (#187) + Preferred dividend expense (#181)]. For U.S. companies, it was 
not possible to obtain the creditor for ordinary dividends from Compustat.
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 EVC signed error
Table 4.1 reports means and medians of the EVC signed errors from omission of dirty 
surplus flows for each class of dirty surplus flow and for each country. Panel A reports 
signed errors for the three-year measurement interval; panel B reports those for the 
eight-year measurement interval. The errors are scaled both by beginning-of-interval 
market value and by the absolute value of the correct (clean surplus) measure of EVC 
as defined in expressions (4.8) and (4.9). The first scaling procedure gives the error in 
measurement of the excess rate of return on the beginning-of-interval market value; 
the second gives the proportionate error in the EVC measure. Each panel reports, for 
each country and for each dirty surplus EVC measure, the result o f a non-parametric 
signed-rank test of the null hypothesis that the distribution of signed errors is centred 
on zero. Each panel also reports test statistics for non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis tests 
of the null hypothesis that the average rank of signed errors across countries is equal. 
This test is performed for the seven classes of dirty surplus flows both for all four 
countries together, and for each paired combination of countries.
For the three-year interval, table 4.1, panel A shows that the null hypothesis 
that the distribution of errors is centred on zero is rejected for all dirty surplus flows in 
three cases (Germany, U.K., U.S.) for both the market value-scaled and EVC-scaled 
errors. For goodwill, it is rejected in three cases (France, Germany, U.K.) for the 
market value-scaled errors and in two cases (Germany and U.K.) for the EVC-scaled 
errors. For the merger-related item, it is rejected in one case (U.S.) for both the market 
value-scaled and EVC-scaled errors. For goodwill inclusive o f the merger-related 
item, it is rejected in all four cases for the market value-scaled errors and in three 
cases (Germany, U.K. and U.S.) for the EVC-scaled errors. For asset revaluations,
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prior-year adjustments and 'other dirty surplus flows', it is never rejected, which 
indicates that the bias introduced in the EVC measure by disregarding dirty surplus 
flows is mostly attributed to goodwill-related items. The relevance of the goodwill 
items is confirmed by results of the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis tests of the null 
hypothesis of the equality of mean rank in signed errors across countries. For both the 
market value-scaled and EVC-scaled errors, the null hypothesis is rejected only for 
goodwill and goodwill inclusive of the merger-related items.
The results of the tests of equality of mean rank across pairs of countries are 
similar for both scaling methods. Results indicate that there are more cases of 
significant differences in the signed errors for the goodwill category. Significant 
differences occur for the pairs France/Germany, France/U.K., France/U.S., 
Germany/U.S., U.K./U.S (for market value scaled-errors) and France/Germany, 
France/U.K., Germany/U.S., U.K./U.S. (for EVC scaled-errors). The next most 
important category regarding the number of pairs of countries for which the null 
hypothesis is rejected is the goodwill inclusive of the merger-related item. The 
hypothesis is rejected four times (France/Germany, France/U.K., Germany/U.S., 
U.K./U.S.) for both scaling methods. Significant differences arise also in the category 
‘all dirty surplus flows’ for the pairs France/Germany, France/U.K, for both scaling 
methods. No rejections arise in the case of asset revaluations, prior-year adjustments 
or other dirty surplus flows.
For the eight-year horizon, reported in panel B o f table 4.1, the null hypothesis 
that the distribution of the signed errors is centred on zero is rejected twice (Germany, 
U.S.) when all dirty flows are omitted, regardless of the scaling method. For goodwill, 
it is rejected in two cases (Germany, U.K.) for both scaling methods. Rejections for 
the same two countries arise for the goodwill inclusive of the merger-related item
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category (for both market-scaled and EVC-scaled errors). However, this result seems 
to be attributable entirely to the goodwill item, as I find no rejections when 
considering the merger-related item separately. For the other classes of dirty surplus 
flows, there are few rejections. For asset revaluations, rejection occurs once for the 
U.K. in the case of the EVC-scaled errors. For prior-year adjustments it is never 
rejected. For 'other dirty surplus flows', it is rejected once (U.K.) for both scaling 
methods.
Similar to the three-year interval, the null hypothesis o f equality o f mean rank 
in errors across all four countries is rejected for the goodwill items. For both scaling 
methods, is rejected for goodwill, the merger-related item and goodwill inclusive of 
the merger-related item, but not in any other case. Regarding differences in the signed 
errors across pairs of countries, the results of the Kruskal-Wallis tests reveal that 
rejections of the null hypothesis are identical regardless of whether the errors are 
scaled by market value or EVC. Rejections occur for goodwill in four cases 
(France/Germany, France/U.K., Germany/U.S. and U.K./U.S.), for the merger-related 
item in two cases (France/U.S. and Germany/U.S.), for goodwill inclusive of the 
merger-related item in four cases (France/Germany, France/U.K., Germany/U.S. and 
U.K./U.S.), and finally for 'other dirty surplus flows' in the case of Germany/U.K.
The overall impression conveyed by table 4.1 is that bias in the measures of 
abnormal performance caused by omission of dirty surplus flows, and cross-country 
variation therein, arise largely as a result of the merger item (which is treated here 
similarly to a goodwill write-off) and goodwill. The influence of asset revaluations, 
prior-year adjustments and 'other dirty surplus flows' in creating such effects is 
relatively small. This conclusion is not surprising given the findings reported in the 
previous chapter that goodwill and goodwill related to merger accounting are the main
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contributors to dirty surplus accounting in the countries and period studied. 
Disregarding the goodwill-related dirty surplus flows from performance measures 
based on abnormal residual income results in overestimates of the measures (as 
goodwill has a negative sign thus reducing net income). This positive bias can have 
economic consequences as it may overstate business performance, managers’ bonuses 
or any other assessment based on EVC-type of measures. It is worthwhile mentioning 
again that the problem posed by the goodwill-related items in this context is being 
removed as regulators restrict the use of merger (pooling-of-interests) accounting and 
goodwill write-offs and therefore the impact o f disregarding dirty surplus flows in 
creating bias in performance measurement may be limited to the period analysed.40
4.4.2 EVC absolute errors
Table 4.2 reports statistics and tests for cross-country variation in the EVC absolute 
errors. Absolute errors assess the inaccuracy in abnormal performance measurement. 
The null hypothesis that the distribution of errors is centred on zero is not tested for 
the absolute values of errors, as all values must be non-negative.
Contrary to the effects observed in the signed errors, which are largely due to 
goodwill-related items, all classes of dirty surplus flows give rise to significant cross­
country differences in absolute errors. For both scaling measures, and for both horizon 
intervals of three and eight years, the null hypothesis of equality of mean ranks in 
errors across the four countries is rejected for all classes of dirty surplus flows. The 
tests of equality of mean ranks across pairs of countries reveal that the level of
40 For example, in the U.S. the FASB introduced, in force from June 2001, SFAS No. 141 Accounting 
fo r  Business Combinations and SFAS 142 No. Accounting for Goodwill and Intangible Assets, which 
prohibit the pooling-of-interests method of accounting for business combinations and require a 
purchase accounting method where goodwill should be capitalised and depreciated (or subjected to 
periodic impairment tests).
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rejections of the null hypothesis, at the 5% significance level, is generally not 
sensitive to the scale measure used. For the three-year interval the only situation 
where the null hypothesis is not rejected simultaneously for the market value and EVC 
scale is for the ‘other dirty surplus flows’ category for the pair U.K./U.S. For the 
eight-year interval, this situation occurs for total dirty surplus flows for 
Germany/U.S., and for ‘other dirty surplus flows’ for France/U.K., Germany/U.S. and 
U.K/U.S.
Next, I analyse the level of rejections of the null hypothesis of equality of 
mean ranks across pairs of countries for each of the seven classes of dirty surplus 
flows. For the three-year horizon, the hypothesis is rejected for all possible pairs of 
countries in the case of goodwill. For the EVC measure that disregards all dirty 
surplus flows, it is rejected for five pairs of countries (France/U.K., France/U.S, 
Germany/U.K, Germany/U.S. and U.K./U.S). For the merger-related item, it is 
rejected for all pairs with the U.S. (France/U.S., Germany/U.S. and U.K./U.S.), 
reflecting the fact that merger accounting is mostly a U.S. accounting practice. For 
goodwill inclusive of the merger-related item, the hypothesis is rejected for all pairs 
except France/U.S. For asset revaluations, it is rejected for all pairs except 
Germany/U.S., as asset revaluation are not permitted in these countries. For prior year 
adjustments, rejections occur for four pairs (France/Germany, France/U.K., 
Germany/U.K. and U.K/U.S.). Finally, for the ‘other dirty surplus flows’ category the 
hypothesis is rejected for the five pairs (France/Germany, France/U.K., France/U.S., 
Germany/U.S. and U.K./U.S.) when the errors are market-scaled and four pairs 
(France/Germany, France/U.K., France/U.S. and Germany/U.S.) when the errors are 
EVC-scaled.
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For the longer horizon of eight-years, the null hypothesis of equality of mean 
ranks across pairs of countries is rejected for all pairs for goodwill. For the category 
all dirty surplus flow, the null hypothesis is rejected for four pairs of countries 
(France/U.K., France/U.S., Germany/U.K. and U.K./U .S.) in the case of market-scaled 
errors and for five pairs (France/U.K., France/U.S., Germany/U.K., Germany/U.S. and 
U.K./U.S.) in the case of EVC-scaled errors. The null hypothesis is rejected for all 
pairs in the case of goodwill. For the merger-related item, it is rejected twice 
(France/U.S. and Germany/U.S.). For goodwill inclusive of the merger-related item, it 
is rejected for all pairs except France/U.S. For asset revaluations, it is rejected for all 
pairs except Germany/U.S. For prior-year adjustments, it is rejected for the pairs 
France/U.K., Germany/U.K. and U.K./U.S. For ‘other dirty surplus flows’, it is 
rejected twice (France/U.S. and U.K./U.S.) for errors scaled by market value, and 
three times for errors scaled by EVC (France/U.K., France/U.S. and Germany/U.S.).
In summary, regarding inaccuracy in EVC, the results show significant cross­
country variation for all classes of dirty surplus flows. Contrary to bias, inaccuracy in 
EVC is not only attributable to the omission of goodwill-related items but to all types 
o f dirty surplus flows. Further, inaccuracy in EVC seems to occur for all accounting 
regimes and for different horizons. This is particularly important for business and 
managerial performance measurement based on residual income-type formulae. 
Disregarding dirty surplus flows will result in inaccurate calculations of cumulative 
residual income over a multi-period interval. Consequently, using this measure to 
evaluate business performance, establish management remuneration schemes, 
determine value creation over a time-interval, or as a basis for any business decision 
may lead to incorrect assessments. Furthermore, using residual income-type measures 
of performance that disregard dirty surplus flows in international comparisons may
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result in misleading conclusions as results suggest cross-country variation particularly 
regarding inaccuracy.
4.5 The impact of the horizon length
I now explore the issue of whether the impact o f omitting dirty surplus flows from 
EVC abnormal performance measure diminishes as the time-interval lengthens. 
Previous studies provide some indication of a reduced importance of dirty surplus 
flows over longer time-intervals. For example, O’Hanlon and Pope (1999) test the 
value relevance of dirty surplus in the U.K. and find little evidence that dirty surplus 
flows are value-relevant for long intervals (up to 20 years). A decline in the impact of 
dirty surplus flows over time may occur because dirty surplus flows are of opposite 
sign and thus cancel over time, or because EVC calculations become dominated by the 
other inputs (namely earnings and book value) over longer intervals.
I investigate this issue by analysing whether the number of rejections of the 
null hypothesis that the distribution of EVC errors is centred on zero changes with 
increases in the length of the horizon. To avoid the possibility that differences in 
sample sizes associated with different horizons might give rise to differences in the 
number of rejections at different horizons, I hold the sample size constant across the 
two horizons of three and eight-years. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 repeat the analysis reported 
in tables 4.1 and 4.2 using only those observations (197) for which eight-year horizon 
EVC estimates are available. Comparison of the number o f rejections of the null 
hypothesis in panel B of tables 4.1 and 4.2 with those in tables 4.3 and 4.4, where the 
sample is held constant for three and eight-year interval, provides evidence as to 
whether the number of rejections reduces as the horizon increases.
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I focus first on the signed values of errors. There is no strong evidence that the 
number o f rejections decreases for the longer horizon. In the case of the signed rank 
test o f the null hypothesis that the distribution of the signed errors is centred on zero, 
the number o f rejections is similar for both intervals (seven cases for the three-year 
interval for both scales and seven (eight) cases for the eight-year interval for the 
market-value scaled errors (EVC-scaled errors)). For the non-parametric Kruskal- 
Wallis tests o f the null hypothesis that the average rank of differences in EVC across 
countries is equal, I find some indication that the number of rejections decreases for 
the eight-year interval. The hypothesis of equality across countries in the EVC 
measure scaled by beginning-of-interval market value for calculations that omit all 
dirty surplus flows, that omit prior-year adjustments (only for the market value-scaled 
errors), and that omit ‘other dirty surplus flows’, is rejected at the 5% level for the 
three-year horizon but not for the eight-year horizon. Likewise, the numbers of 
rejections for paired errors also decreases for the longer interval. For example, where 
all dirty surplus flows are excluded, the tests fail to reject the null for all pairs of 
countries for both the market value-scaled and the EVC-scaled errors for the eight- 
year interval, whereas it is rejected in four (three) cases for the market value-scaled 
(EVC-scaled) errors for the three-year interval. These results favour the possibility 
that cross-country differences in the impact of omitting dirty surplus flows on 
abnormal performance measures declines as the measurement interval lengthens. For 
longer intervals the international differences regarding dirty surplus accounting 
practices seem to have less impact on abnormal performance measured by EVC.
Regarding the absolute values of the errors, I find no evidence of a reduction 
in the number of rejections for the tests of equality of mean rank across the four 
countries. For the three-year interval, the equality is rejected for all cases, except for
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the merger-related item. For the eight-year interval, the hypothesis of equality is 
rejected in all cases. For tests comparing pairs of countries, the numbers of rejections 
is even higher for the eight-year interval. For the EVC scaled errors, the number of 
rejections increases from 24 cases for the three-year interval to 29 for the eight-year 
interval.
In summary, results reported in tables 4.3 and 4.4 provide no strong evidence 
that the number of rejections reduces as the horizon increases as would be expected if 
the dirty surplus flows cancel or become relatively less important over longer periods. 
Only in the case of cross-regime variation in the signed errors is there some indication 
o f such an effect. The results are in line with the findings reported earlier and the 
impact o f dirty surplus flows on abnormal performance measurement persists for 
longer measurement intervals.
4.6 The relationship between EVC and RIVM in measuring the impact of dirty 
surplus flows
The RIVM is directly related to EVC as it also depends on the concept of residual 
income that obeys CSR. In fact, residual income can be interpreted both from a 
performance measurement perspective, where realised earnings can be seen as a 
measure of achieved profitability and the required return on book value can be viewed 
as the required profitability, and from a valuation perspective, where residual income 
is viewed as a measure of future value creation. The EVC formulation assumes the 
first perspective: measuring performance at the end of a period based on realised 
numbers. The RIVM assumes the second perspective: estimating the intrinsic value of 
the business at the beginning of the interval based on expectations of the future.
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Given the direct link between the r . w l; ‘ u r i n u i a i i i  ■;i . H i e  i m p . u  : ■ ■■' ■ ■ n m - T : -  
dirty surplus flows can also be assessed from the valuation perspective using the 
RIVM. In that case, a clean surplus RIVM valluue estimate is as follows (expectations 
operator is omitted for ease of notation):
where X  is clean surplus earnings, r denotes the cost o f  eqiiiiiity3; denotes book value 
o f shareholders’ funds and MVe -  Be , the market-to-hook pasanmiioiiiim af time e. For ease
o f notation, company subscripts are suppressed and ail variables are- to be i nterpreted 
as realisations for company i.
Dirty surplus RIVM value estimates can be constructed by disregarding a class 
or classes of dirty surplus flows (DS) from clean surplus earnings:
The effect o f omitting dirty surplus flows from RIVM clean surplus value estimates is 
equal to the difference between dirty surplus RIVM value estimates and clean surplus 
RIVM value estimates:
If ex-post realisations are used as perfect-fore sight forecasts of future flows in the 
RIVM, EVC and RIVM will yield equivalent measures of errors by disregarding dirty 
surplus flows. Expression (4.14) that measures the RIVM error is similar to expression
e - b
^b+ s *s^.„=Bb+Y. S (4.12)
V *=i J jt=i
IVDS.b = Bb + 'E
e - b -  DSb+s ) -  ^  A « - i  . MVe -  Be
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  H r ,
s  e - b (4.13)
5=1
I K 1* '* * )
k=\ j  * = i
(4.14)
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(4.7) that measures the EVC error, except that the former is the present value at time b 
o f the omitted flows while the later is the terminal value at time e. This is a direct 
consequence of the fact that the RIVM assumes an ex-ante perspective while the EVC 
presents an ex-post perspective.
Given this correspondence between the two measures, it is to be expected that 
the results and conclusions obtained for the valuation framework are similar to those 
obtained for the abnormal performance measure. I performed the analysis for the 
RIVM perspective and the results obtained were indeed as expected. Therefore, I do 
not tabulate or discuss these results any further.
4.7 Robustness checks
I test the sensitivity of the results to variations in the methodology and find that the 
general pattern of results does not change after the following robustness checks:
i) Market value at the balance sheet date: I used the market value of the company at 
the year-end instead of the market value at three-months after the year-end.
ii) Medium-term horizons: I perform the analysis for a six-year horizon. The use of 
non-overlapping valuation horizons introduces the potential for arbitrariness with 
respect to the start date of horizons. Because of the length of the available data series 
(nine years), this problem is a minor one in the case of three- and eight-year horizons 
but is potentially important in the case of six-year horizons. For six-year horizons, I 
select for each company the six-year period commencing with the first year of 
available data, since this gives the largest number of observations. However, I also
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perform the six-year horizon tests on the basis of periods commencing with the second
and third year o f available data.
iii) Inclusion o f  ‘special items with a reserve component ’ in the book value o f  German 
companies'. As mentioned in chapter 3, section 3.4.1, some German companies report 
a special item that may or may not be considered part o f equity. I repeat the analysis 
including this item in the opening and closing book value of such German companies. 
The variations on the special items are considered as an additional dirty surplus flow 
included in the ‘other dirty surplus flow’ category.
iv) Different cost o f  equity capital: I allow for different calculations of the cost of 
equity. More specifically, I compute the cost of equity in three different ways: (1) 
allowing beta to vary across industry and country whilst assuming a market risk 
premium of 5%; (2) assuming a constant beta of one while varying the equity risk 
premium; and (3) considering a cost of equity equal to zero. Even though the general 
inferences drawn from using different costs of equity did not change, because of the 
potential importance that the discount rate might have in this type of studies, it is 
worth highlighting the specific differences that did arise.
Using an industry- and country-specific beta plus a constant equity risk 
premium is a common procedure in the valuation literature (Lee, Myers and 
Swaminathan, 1999; Francis, et al., 2000) and it allows for some cross-sectional 
variation in discount rates. Alternatively, company-specific discount rates could be 
used but two reasons justify not using them: first, it is argued that industry costs of 
equity capital are more precise than company-specific ones (Fama and French, 1997); 
second, it has been shown that using company-specific discount rates leads to similar
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results as using industry-specific ones in implementations of residual income-type 
measures (Francis, et al., 2000). I use as the beta for industry m in country j ,  the 
median o f the betas collected from Datastream in early 2004 for all active companies 
in industry m in country j . Results using country-industry specific betas (reported in 
tables 4.5 and 4.6) are very similar to results shown in tables 4.1 and 4.2. Generally, 
all tests yield similar results for both the signed and absolute errors and for both 
scaling measures.
Next, I test the robustness of the results to different equity premia using 3% 
and 7%. Results are not tabulated for reasons of economy of space, but they yield the 
same inferences drawn from tables 4.1 and 4.2 in both cases.
Finally, I repeat the analysis using a cost of equity capital equal to zero. In this 
case EVC becomes a measure of total money return that can be written in terms of 
aggregate clean surplus earnings plus the increase in the market-to-book premium 
over the interval. Using expression (4.5) above and setting the cost of equity capital 
if) equal to zero gives:
EVCbcs,  = ^ U 6+s +(MVe - B e) - ( M V b - B b).  (4.15)
5=1
Note that clean surplus residual income ( X ^ s ) defined in expression (4.3) is equal to
clean surplus earnings ( X ), since the capital charge on book value is equal to zero.
Similarly, for the dirty surplus EVC measure defined in expression (4.6), I 
obtain:
EVChDS,e = e' Z ( X bts- D S b+1) + (MVe - B e) - ( M V b -B „ ) .  (4.16)
5=1
Results (not tabulated) are generally similar to the ones reported in tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
These results are in line with previous findings in the literature showing that changes
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in the discount rate have little impact on the results obtained from residual income- 
type of measures (Penman and Sougiannis, 1998; Francis, et al., 2000).
4.8 Conclusion
For decades dirty surplus accounting practices have been a source of misgivings 
among accounting researchers and accounting regulators. It is well known that such 
practices can result in the exclusion from net income of potentially material flows, and 
that the incidence of such excluded flows can vary across GAAP regimes. However, 
there is little evidence as to whether such practices, and cross-country variation therein, 
actually matter in a practical context. This study provides evidence in this regard by 
examining the impact of dirty surplus accounting practices in contexts where theory 
explicitly suggests that they could matter, namely an accounting-based performance 
measure. The analysis is performed for France, Germany, the U.K. and the U.S. during 
the period 1993 to 2001.
I explore the potential impact of dirty surplus accounting flows in the context of 
performance measurement. I use a measure of multi-period abnormal performance 
denoted Excess Value Created that can be correctly written in terms of within-interval 
residual incomes if all dirty surplus flows are included, but which will give rise to error 
if  dirty surplus flows are omitted. I examine the effect of the omission of various 
classes o f dirty surplus flows in creating error in this measure of abnormal 
performance. The EVC error committed by disregarding classes of dirty surplus flows 
is equal to the terminal value of the omitted dirty surplus flows occurring during a 
time-interval. I observe the bias (signed error) and the inaccuracy (absolute error). As 
regards bias, the effects of omitting dirty surplus flows and cross-country variation 
therein are largely limited to goodwill-related flows, which regulators are eliminating
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as a dirty surplus item. As regards inaccuracy, I find that all classes of dirty surplus 
flows give rise to some significant cross-country variation and that such effects do not 
diminish when the measurement interval lengthens. The results suggest that omission 
of dirty surplus flows may cause problems as regards the accuracy of performance 
measures and therefore using such measures for performance evaluation and 
contracting purposes may result in incorrect business decisions. Further, the omission 
o f dirty surplus flows may lead to incorrect inferences when comparing performance 
measures across accounting regimes.
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Table 4.1 - Signed values of errors from measurement of excess value created
(EVC) omitting dirty surplus flows (errors scaled by beginning-of-interval
market value and absolute value of EVC)
Panel A: 3-year Measurement Interval (e-b = 3)
Scaled by beginning market value a Scaled by absolute value of E V C a
F r a n c e  G e r m a n y U .K . U .S . A l l  f o u r h F r a n c e G e r m a n y U .K . U .S . A l l  f o u r h
N 1 7 8 1 8 0 1 9 1 1 8 9 7 3 8 1 7 8 1 8 0 1 9 1 1 8 9 7 3 8
ALL mean 0.017 0.073 0.120 0.050 0.072 4.410 0.077 0.395
median 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.054
Pairs
France 0.023 0.038 0.139 0.015 0.036 0.076
Germany 0.489 0.190 0.829 0.285
U.K. 0.133 0.304
GW  mean 0.015 0.076 0.134 0.000 0.016 4.075 0.208 0.000
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001
Pairs c:
France <0.001 0.031 0.042 <0.001 0.026 0.093
Germany 0.891 <0.001 0.562 <0.001
U.K. 0.003 0.003
GM mean 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.386
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.059
Pairs c:
France 1.000 0.334 0.088 1.000 0.334 0.088
Germany 0.332 0.086 0.332 0.086
U.K. 0.155 0.156
GW +GM mean 0.015 0.076 0.140 0.054 0.016 4.075 0.215 0.386
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001
Pairs
France <0.001 0.018 0.819 <0.001 0.016 0.963
Germany 0.965 <0.001 0.683 <0.001
U.K. 0.016 0.017
AR mean 0.001 0.000 -0.021 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.146 0.000
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.672 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.641
Pairs c:
France 0.702 0.406 0.695 0.250 0.360 0.239
Germany 0.474 1.000 0.563 1.000
U.K. 0.464 0.555
PYA mean 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.003 0.001
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.540 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.708
Pairs c:
France 0.655 0.366 1.000 0.655 0.476 1.000
Germany 0.308 0.722 0.411 0.724
U.K. 0.400 0.507
OTH mean 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 0.056 0.338 0.005 0.008
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.426 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.254
Pairs c:
France 0.415 0.178 0.158 0.398 0.080 0.110
Germany 0.428 0.554 0.299 0.479
U.K. 0.697 0.660
121
Table 4.1 (continued) - Signed values of errors from measurement of excess
value created (EVC) omitting dirty surplus flows (errors scaled by beginning-of-
interval market value and absolute value of EVC)
Panel B: 8-year Measurement Interval (e-b = 8)
Scaled by beginning market value a Scaled by absolute value of E V C a
F r a n c e  G e r m a n y U .K . U .S . A l l  f o u r b F r a n c e  G e r m a n y U .K . U .S . A l l  f o u r b
N 5 0 5 1 4 8 4 8 1 9 7 5 0 5 1 4 8 4 8 1 9 7
ALL mean 0.080 0.076 1.476 0.532 0.052 1.239 27.284 -0.514
median 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.376 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.730
Pairs c:
France 0.249 0.128 0.257 0.388 0.410 0.350
Germany 0.430 0.859 0.911 0.893
U.K. 0.402 0.436
GW mean 0.091 0.064 1.608 0.000 0.030 1.452 23.219 0.000
median 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.000 <0.001
P a irsc:
France 0.025 0.012 0.151 0.012 0.009 0.151
Germany 0.125 <0.001 0.493 <0.001
U.K. 0.001 0.001
GM mean 0.000 0.000 0.084 0.610 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.254
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007
Pairs c:
France 1.000 0.307 0.020 1.000 0.307 0.020
Germany 0.303 0.019 0.303 0.019
U.K. 0.092 0.095
GW +GM mean 0.091 0.064 1.692 0.610 0.030 1.452 23.255 0.254
median 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.007
P a irsc:
France 0.025 0.012 0.700 0.012 0.009 0.700
Germany 0.122 0.041 0.476 0.024
U.K. 0.025 0.023
AR mean 0.002 0.000 -0.196 0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.097 0.000
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.227 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.217
Pairs c:
France 0.398 0.147 0.412 0.398 0.136 0.412
Germany 0.212 1.000 0.212 1.000
U.K. 0.224 0.224
PYA mean -0.000 -0.001 -0.036 0.007 -0.000 -0.009 -0.017 0.003
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.586 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.557
P a irsc:
France 1.000 0.341 0.325 1.000 0.336 0.325
Germany 0.333 0.315 0.308 0.315
U.K. 0.683 0.639
OTH mean -0.013 0.013 0.016 -0.085 0.020 -0.204 4.143 -0.771
median 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.094 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.130
Pairs c:
France 0.586 0.084 0.864 0.273 0.260 0.912
Germany 0.025 0.197 0.025 0.159
U.K. 0.080 0.170
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Notes to table 4.1:
a. The table reports mean and median signed differences between EVC measures over the interval from 
b to e, calculated exclusive o f dirty surplus flows and denoted EVCbD$ e , and the correct EVC
measure denoted EVCb , as given by expression (4.7) in the text:
r e -b - 1 e-(b+s)
X  D S b+s J ^ [  0  + rb+s+k) + D S e 
5=1 k=1
EVCbDS:e-E V C bc s _e = -
Panel A reports these errors for three-year measurement intervals (e-b=3); Panel B reports these 
errors for eight-year measurement intervals (e-b=8). The errors in measurement o f EVC are scaled 
both by market value at the start o f the measurement interval (left side o f each panel) and by the 
absolute value o f the correct EVC measure (right side o f each panel). The various dirty surplus- 
based measures differ from each other with respect to the classes o f dirty surplus flows that are 
omitted. Notation is as follows:
• ALL: all dirty surplus flows are omitted;
• GW: goodwill only is omitted;
• GM: the unrecognised issue of equity under merger (pooling-of-interests) accounting only is 
omitted;
• GW+GM: both goodwill and the unrecognised issue o f equity under merger (pooling-of-interests) 
accounting are omitted;
• AR: asset revaluations only are omitted;
• PYA: prior-year adjustments only are omitted;
• OTH: 'other dirty surplus flows' only are omitted.
The median printed in bold indicates that one can reject at the 5% level the null hypothesis that the 
distribution is centred on zero (signed-rank test).
b. Probability values based on a Kruskal-Wallis test o f the null hypothesis o f equality o f mean rank in 
signed errors across all four countries. Probability values o f 0.05 (5%) or less are printed in bold 
type.
c. Probability values based on a Kruskal-Wallis test o f the null hypothesis o f equality o f mean rank in 
signed errors across pairs o f countries. Probability values o f 0.05 (5%) or less are printed in bold 
type.
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Table 4.2 - Absolute values of errors from measurement of excess value created
(EVC) omitting dirty surplus flows (errors scaled by beginning-of-interval
market value and absolute value of EVC)
Panel A: 3-year Measurement Interval {e-b = 3)
Scaled by beginning market value a Scaled by absolute value of EVC
F r a n c e G e r m a n y U .K . U .S . A l l  f o u r b F r a n c e G e r m a n y U .K . U .S . A l l  f o u r b
N 1 7 8 1 8 0 1 9 1 1 8 9 7 3 8 1 7 8 1 8 0 1 9 1 1 8 9 7 3 8
ALL mean 0.050 0.105 0.270 0.076 0.347 4.790 0.829 0.452
median 0.013 0.009 0.074 0.001 <0.001 0.023 0.023 0.100 0.001 <0.001
Pairs c:
France 0.261 <0.001 <0.001 0.306 <0.001 <0.001
Germany <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
U.K. <0.001 <0.001
GW mean 0.017 0.089 0.220 0.000 0.077 4.419 0.572 0.000
median 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.000 <0.001
Pairs
France <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Germany <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
U.K. <0.001 <0.001
GM mean 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.055 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.387
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001
P a irsc:
France 1.000 0.334 0.001 1.000 0.334 0.001
Germany 0.332 0.001 0.332 0.001
U.K. 0.002 0.002
GW +GM mean 0.017 0.088 0.225 0.055 0.077 4.419 0.578 0.387
median 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.000 <0.001
P a irsc:
France <0.001 <0.001 0.623 <0.001 <0.001 0.585
Germany <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
U.K. <0.001 <0.001
AR mean 0.001 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.230 0.000
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001
P a irsc:
France <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Germany <0.001 1.000 <0.001 1.000
U.K. <0.001 <0.001
PYA mean 0.000 0.002 0.016 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.048 0.002
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001
P a irsc:
France 0.025 <0.001 0.051 0.025 <0.001 0.051
Germany <0.001 0.673 <0.001 0.668
U.K. <0.001 <0.001
OTH mean 0.033 0.032 0.018 0.020 0.271 0.538 0.062 0.128
median 0.011 0.003 0.002 0.000 <0.001 0.018 0.008 0.003 0.000 <0.001
P a irsc:
France <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Germany 0.183 0.001 0.098 0.002
U.K. 0.045 0.111
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Table 4.2 (continued) - Absolute values of errors from measurement of excess
value created (EVC) omitting dirty surplus flows (errors scaled by beginning-of-
interval market value and absolute value of EVC)
Panel B: 8-year Measurement Interval (e-b = 8)
Scaled by beginning market value a Scaled by absolute value of E V C 1
F r a n c e G e r m a n y U .K . U .S . A l l  f o u r b F r a n c e G e r m a n y U .K . U .S . A l l  f o u r h
N 5 0 5 1 4 8 4 8 1 9 7 5 0 5 1 4 8 4 8 1 9 7
ALL mean 0.180 0.143 2.108 0.739 0.120 1.321 27.643 1.056
median 0.036 0.064 0.357 0.005 <0.001 0.035 0.051 0.170 0.005 <0.001
Pairs
France 0.822 <0.001 0.017 0.428 <0.001 0.013
Germany <0.001 0.092 0.012 0.018
U.K. <0.001 <0.001
GW mean 0.099 0.109 1.847 0.000 0.059 1.455 23.433 0.000
median 0.000 0.004 0.134 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.004 0.089 0.000 <0.001
Pairs c:
France 0.001 <0.001 0.004 <0.001 <0.001 0.004
Germany <0.001 <0.001 0.001 <0.001
U.K. <0.001 <0.001
GM mean 0.000 0.000 0.084 0.610 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.254
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007
Pairs c:
France 1.000 0.307 0.020 1.000 0.307 0.020
Germany 0.303 0.019 0.303 0.019
U.K. 0.092 0.095
GW +GM mean 0.099 0.109 1.931 0.610 0.059 1.455 23.47 0.254
median 0.000 0.004 0.134 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.004 0.089 0.000 <0.001
Pairs
France 0.001 <0.001 0.515 <0.001 <0.001 0.492
Germany <0.001 <0.001 0.001 <0.001
U.K. <0.001 <0.001
AR mean 0.002 0.000 0.216 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.106 0.000
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001
Pairs c:
France 0.011 <0.001 0.014 0.011 <0.001 0.014
Germany <0.001 1.000 <0.001 1.000
U.K. <0.001 <0.001
PYA mean 0.000 0.001 0.065 0.009 0.000 0.009 0.026 0.004
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001
Pairs
France 1.000 <0.001 0.276 1.000 <0.001 0.286
Germany <0.001 0.277 <0.001 0.295
U.K. 0.001 0.001
OTH mean 0.078 0.128 0.092 0.133 0.059 1.022 4.177 0.799
median 0.026 0.018 0.019 0.003 0.014 0.026 0.038 0.009 0.003 0.002
Pairs c:
France 0.373 0.538 0.001 0.656 0.045 0.001
Germany 0.883 0.053 0.084 0.005
U.K. 0.012 0.071
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Notes to table 4.2:
a. T h e  ta b le  reports m ean  and m ed ian  sig n ed  d ifferen ce s  b e tw e e n  E V C  m ea su res o v er  the  in terval from  
b to  e, ca lcu la ted  e x c lu s iv e  o f  d irty surplus f lo w s  and d en o ted  EVCbD Se, and th e  correct E V C
m ea su re  d en o ted  EVCbe , as g iv e n  b y  ex p ressio n  (4 .7 )  in th e  text:
 ^e - b - 1 e - (6 + j )
2 ]  D S b+ s  J ~ J  ( 1 +  'i+s+Jfc) +  ^ 'S ,e ■
V 5=1 k = l ,
P a n e l A  reports th e se  errors for three-year m easu rem en t in terva ls (e-b=3 ). P an el B  reports th e se  
errors for  e ig h t-y ea r  m easu rem en t in terva ls (e-b=8). T h e  errors in m ea su rem en t o f  E V C  are sc a led  
b oth  b y  m arket v a lu e  at the  start o f  the  m easu rem en t in terval ( le f t  s id e  o f  ea c h  p a n el) and b y  the  
a b so lu te  v a lu e  o f  th e  correct E V C  m easu re (righ t s id e  o f  each  p a n el). T h e  v a r io u s d irty  su rp lu s-  
b a se d  m ea su res  d iffer  from  ea ch  other w ith  resp ect to  the  c la s se s  o f  d irty su rp lu s f lo w s  that are 
o m itted . N o ta tio n  is as fo llo w s:
• ALL: a ll d irty  surp lus f lo w s  are om itted ;
• GW: g o o d w ill  o n ly  is om itted ;
• GM: th e  u n reco g n ise d  issu e  o f  eq u ity  under m erger (p o o lin g -o f- in te r e sts )  a c c o u n tin g  o n ly  is 
om itted ;
• GW +GM : b o th  g o o d w ill  and the u n reco g n ise d  issu e  o f  eq u ity  under m erger  (p o o lin g -o f- in te r e s ts )  
a c c o u n tin g  are om itted ;
• AR: a sse t  reva lu a tio n s o n ly  are om itted ;
• PYA\ p rior-year ad ju stm en ts o n ly  are om itted ;
•  OTH\ 'other d irty  surp lus f lo w s' o n ly  are om itted .
b. P ro b a b ility  v a lu e s  b ased  on  a K ru sk a l-W a llis  te st  o f  th e  n u ll h y p o th e s is  o f  eq u a lity  o f  m ean  rank in 
a b so lu te  errors acro ss a ll four cou n tr ies. P rob ab ility  v a lu e s  o f  0.05 (5%) or le s s  are p rin ted  in b o ld  
ty p e .
c . P ro b a b ility  v a lu e s  b a sed  on  a K ru sk a l-W a llis  te st  o f  th e  n u ll h y p o th e s is  o f  eq u a lity  o f  m ea n  rank in 
a b so lu te  errors acro ss pairs o f  cou n tr ies. P rob ab ility  v a lu e s  o f  0.05 (5%) or le s s  are prin ted  in b o ld  
ty p e .
EVCbDSie-E V C bC S t = -
126
Table 4.3 - Signed values of errors from measurement of excess value created
(EVC) omitting dirty surplus flows (errors scaled by beginning-of-interval
market value and absolute value of EVC)
Using only those companies for which 8-year horizons are available
3-year Measurement Interval (<e-b = 3)
Scaled by beginning market value a
F r a n c e  G e r m a n y U .K . U .S . A l l  f o u r b F r a n c e  G e r m a n y U .K . U .S . A l l  f o u r b
N 5 0 5 1 4 8 4 8 1 9 7 5 0 5 1 4 8 4 8 1 9 7
ALL mean 0.020 -0.000 0.275 0.018 0.570 0.277 0.139 1.245
median 0.008 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.002 0.012 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.002
Pairs c:
F ran ce 0.015 0.481 <0.001 0.009 0.822 <0.001
G erm a n y 0.036 0.566 0.053 0.486
U .K . 0.013 0.025
GW mean 0.003 0.019 0.273 0.000 0.108 0.050 0.149 0.000
median 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 <0.001
Pairs c:
F ran ce 0.041 <0.001 0.568 0.018 0.001 0.568
G erm a n y 0.051 0.012 0.065 0.004
U .K . <0.001 <0.001
GM mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.328
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.100
Pairs
F ran ce 1.000 1.000 0.147 1.000 1.000 0.147
G erm a n y 1.000 0.143 1.000 0.143
U .K . 0.155 0.155
GW +GM  mean 0.003 0.019 0.273 0.021 0.1076 0.050 0.149 1.328
median 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 <0.001 0.0000 0.000 0.005 0.000 <0.001
Pairs c:
F ran ce 0.041 <0.001 0.615 0.018 0.001 0.641
G erm a n y 0.051 0.072 0.065 0.023
U .K . 0.001 0.001
AR mean 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0 .006 0.000
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.636 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.612
Pairs c:
F ran ce 1.000 0.451 1.000 0.305 0.714 0.320
G erm a n y 0.361 1.000 0.361 1.000
U .K . 0.375 0.375
PYA mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.002
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.269
Pairs c:
F ra n ce 1.000 0.074 0.307 1.000 0.300 0.307
G erm a n y 0.071 0.303 0.295 0.303
U .K . 0.045 0.177
OTH mean 0.017 -0.019 -0.005 -0.002 0.462 0.227 -0.005 -0.081
median 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001
Pairs
F ran ce <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
G erm a n y 0.268 0.424 0.189 0.458
U .K . 0.495 0.403
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Notes to table 4.3:
a. The table reports mean and median signed differences between EVC measures over the interval from 
b to e , calculated exclusive of dirty surplus flows and denoted EVCbD Se, and the correct EVC
measure denoted EVCbe , as given by expression (4.7) in the text:
r e -b - 1 e-(6+ j)
X  D S b+s J ~ [  {^ + rb+s+k) + D S e 
5=1 k =1
EVCbDSfi-E V C bCSfi
Panel A reports these errors for three-year measurement intervals (e-b=3). Panel B reports these 
errors for eight-year measurement intervals (e-b=8). The errors in measurement o f EVC are scaled 
both by market value at the start o f the measurement interval (left side o f each panel) and by the 
absolute value o f the correct EVC measure (right side of each panel). The various dirty surplus- 
based measures differ from each other with respect to the classes o f dirty surplus flows that are 
omitted. Notation is as follows:
• ALL: all dirty surplus flows are omitted;
• GW: goodwill only is omitted;
• GM: the unrecognised issue o f equity under merger (pooling-of-interests) accounting only is 
omitted;
• GW+GM: both goodwill and the unrecognised issue o f equity under merger (pooling-of-interests) 
accounting are omitted;
• AR: asset revaluations only are omitted;
• PYA: prior-year adjustments only are omitted;
• OTH: 'other dirty surplus flows' only are omitted.
The median printed in bold indicates that one can reject at the 5% level the null hypothesis that the 
distribution is centred on zero (signed-rank test).
b. Probability values based on a Kruskal-Wallis test o f the null hypothesis o f equality o f mean rank in 
signed errors across all four countries. Probability values o f 0.05 (5%) or less are printed in bold 
type.
c. Probability values based on a Kruskal-Wallis test o f the null hypothesis o f equality o f mean rank in 
signed errors across pairs o f countries. Probability values o f 0.05 (5%) or less are printed in bold 
type.
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Table 4.4 - Absolute values of errors from measurement of excess value created 
(EVC) omitting dirty surplus flows (errors scaled by beginning-of-interval 
market value and absolute value of EVC)
Using only those companies for which 8-year horizons are available
3-year M easurem ent In terval (e-b = 3)
F r a n c e G e r m a n v U .K . U .S . A l l  f o u r h F r a n c e G e r m a n v U .K . U .S . A l l  f o u r b
N 5 0 5 1 4 8 4 8 1 9 7 5 0 5 1 4 8 4 8 1 9 7
ALL mean 0.048 0.039 0.362 0.025 0.603 0.358 0.230 1 .2 6 1
median 0.019 0.009 0.056 0.000 <0.001 0.046 0.019 0.124 0.000 <0.001
Pairs c:
France 0.207 0.003 <0.001 0.190 0.079 <0.001
Germany <0.001 0.005 0.001 0.022
U.K. <0.001 <0.001
GW mean 0.008 0.020 0.338 0.000 0.117 0.061 0.211 0.000
median 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.000 <0.001
Pairs
France <0.001 <0.001 0.086 <0.001 <0.001 0.086
Germany <0.001 <0.001 0.001 <0.001
U.K. <0.001 <0.001
GM mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.328
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.100
Pairs
France 1.000 1.000 0.147 1.000 1.000 0.147
Germany 1.000 0.143 1.000 0.143
U.K. 0.155 0.155
GW +GM mean 0.008 0.020 0.338 0.021 0.117 0.061 0.211 1.328
median 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.000 <0.001
Pairs c:
France <0.001 <0.001 0.723 <0.001 <0.001 0.682
Germany <0.001 <0.001 0.001 <0.001
U.K. <0.001 <0.001
AR mean 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.034 0.000
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001
Pairs c:
France 0.021 0.015 0.025 0.021 0.016 0.025
Germany <0.001 1.000 <0.001 1.000
U.K. <0.001 <0.001
PYA mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.001 0.002
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.029
P a irsc:
France 1.000 0.038 0.307 1.000 0.038 0.307
Germany 0.036 0.303 0.036 0.303
U.K. 0.183 0.183
OTH mean 0.040 0.041 0.012 0.008 0.486 0.335 0.027 0.194
median 0.014 0.003 0.002 0.000 <0.001 0.029 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.001
Pairs c:
France 0.041 0.003 <0.001 0.045 0.001 <0.001
Germany 0.390 0.039 0.264 0.106
U.K. 0.145 0.292
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Notes to table 4.4:
a. The table reports mean and median signed differences between EVC measures over the interval from 
b to e, calculated exclusive of dirty surplus flows and denoted EVCbQ se , and the correct EVC
measure denoted EVCbe , as given by expression (4.7) in the text:
r  e - b - 1 e - ( b + s )  Nz n
v 5=1 k=l ,
Panel A reports these errors for three-year measurement intervals (e-b=3). Panel B reports these 
errors for eight-year measurement intervals (e-b=8). The errors in measurement o f EVC are scaled 
both by market value at the start o f the measurement interval (left side o f each panel) and by the 
absolute value of the correct EVC measure (right side of each panel). The various dirty surplus- 
based measures differ from each other with respect to the classes o f dirty surplus flows that are 
omitted. Notation is as follows:
• ALL: all dirty surplus flows are omitted;
• GW: goodwill only is omitted;
• GM : the unrecognised issue of equity under merger (pooling-of-interests) accounting only is 
omitted;
• GW +GM : both goodwill and the unrecognised issue o f equity under merger (pooling-of-interests) 
accounting are omitted;
• AR: asset revaluations only are omitted;
• PYA: prior-year adjustments only are omitted;
• OTH: 'other dirty surplus flows' only are omitted.
b. Probability values based on a Kruskal-Wallis test o f the null hypothesis o f equality o f  mean rank in 
absolute errors across all four countries. Probability values o f 0.05 (5%) or less are printed in bold 
type.
c. Probability values based on a Kruskal-Wallis test o f the null hypothesis o f equality o f mean rank in 
absolute errors across pairs o f countries. Probability values of 0.05 (5%) or less are printed in bold 
type.
EVCbDSie-E V C bCSt„ = -
130
Table 4.5 - Signed values of errors from measurement of excess value created 
(EVC) omitting dirty surplus flows (errors scaled by beginning-of-interval 
market value and absolute value of EVC)
Using median country-industry betas to estimate the cost of equity capital
P a n e l  A : 3 - y e a r  M e a s u r e m e n t  I n te r v a l (e-b = 3 )
S c a le d  b y  b e g in n in g  m a r k e t  v a lu e  a S c a le d  b y  a b s o lu te  v a lu e  o f  E V C a
F ran ce G erm a n v U.K. U.S. A ll  fou rh F ran ce G erm a n v U.K. U.S. A ll  fo u rb
N 178 180 191 189 738 178 1 80 191 18 9 738
A L L  mean 0.016 0.072 0.120 0.049 0.158 0.611 0.260 -0.082
median 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.057
P a irsc:
F ran ce 0.025 0.037 0.140 0.022 0.044 0.109
G erm a n y 0.467 0.195 0.788 0.198
U .K . 0.129 0.172
G W  mean 0.015 0.075 0.134 0.000 0.022 0.543 0.224 0.000
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001
P a irsc:
F ran ce <0.001 0.025 0.042 <0.001 0.027 0.093
G erm a n y 0.939 <0.001 0.511 <0.001
U .K . 0.002 0.003
G M  mean 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.053 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.059
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.059
Pairs
F ran ce 1.000 0.334 0.088 1.000 0.334 0.088
G erm a n y 0.332 0.086 0.332 0.086
U .K . 0.155 0.156
G W + G M  mean 0.015 0.075 0.140 0.053 0.022 0.543 0.232 0.059
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001
Pairs c:
F ran ce <0.001 0.014 0.818 <0.001 0.016 0.968
G erm a n y 0.917 <0.001 0.628 <0.001
U .K . 0.013 0.016
A R  mean 0.001 0.000 -0.020 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0 .064 0.000
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.672 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.639
Pairs c:
F ran ce 0.702 0.407 0.695 0.250 0.357 0.239
G erm an y 0.474 1.000 0.563 1.000
U .K . 0.464 0.555
P Y A  mean 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0 .017 0.013 0.001
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.540 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.705
P a irsc:
F ran ce 0.655 0.366 1.000 0.655 0.476 1.000
G erm an y 0.308 0.722 0.408 0.724
U .K . 0.400 0.506
O T H  mean 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 0.135 0.085 0.0790 -0 .142
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.424 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.257
P a irsc:
F ran ce 0.435 0.173 0.172 0.497 0.072 0.145
G erm an y 0.394 0.585 0.243 0.583
U .K . 0.595 0.443
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Table 4.5 (continued) - Signed values of errors from measurement of excess 
value created (EVC) omitting dirty surplus flows (errors scaled by beginning-of- 
interval market value and absolute value of EVC)
Using median country-industry betas to estimate the cost of equity capital
Panel B: 8-year Measurement Interval (e-b =  8)
Scaled by beginning market value a Scaled by absolute value of E V C a
F ran ce  G erm a n v U.K. U.S. A ll fou rh F ran ce G erm a n v U.K. U.S. A ll  fo u rb
N 50 51 4 8 4 8 1 9 7 5 0 51 4 8 4 8 1 9 7
ALL mean 0.077 0.073 1.436 0.508 0.134 0.392 0.652 2.726
median 0.001 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.414 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.592
Pairs c:
F ran ce 0.253 0.141 0.279 0.307 0.263 0.227
G erm a n y 0.486 0.807 0.911 0.796
U .K . 0.438 0.630
GW mean 0.089 0.057 1.567 0.000 0.030 0.287 0.737 0.000
median 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.000 <0.001
Pairs
F ran ce 0.025 0.013 0.151 0.010 0.007 0.151
G erm a n y 0.126 <0.001 0.530 <0.001
U .K . 0.001 0.001
GM mean 0.000 0.000 0.083 0.581 0.000 0.000 0.040 2.802
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007
Pairs c:
F ran ce 1.000 0.307 0.020 1.000 0.307 0.020
G erm a n y 0.303 0.019 0.303 0.019
U .K . 0.092 0.095
GW +GM mean 0.089 0.057 1.650 0.581 0.030 0.287 0.777 2.802
median 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.006
Pairs c:
F ran ce 0.025 0.012 0.700 0.010 0.007 0.691
G erm a n y 0.122 0.041 0.493 0.024
U .K . 0.024 0.022
AR mean 0.002 0.000 -0.194 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0 .132 0.000
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.132
Pairs
F ran ce 0.305 0.086 0.320 0.167 0.100 0.180
G erm a n y 0.127 1.000 0.194 1.000
U .K . 0.137 0.206
PYA mean -0.000 -0.001 -0.035 0.007 -0.000 -0.005 -0.023 0.003
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.750 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.725
Pairs c:
F ran ce 1.000 0.477 0.325 1.000 0.471 0.325
G erm a n y 0.469 0.315 0 .437 0.315
U .K . 0.858 0.792
OTH mean -0.014 0.017 0.015 -0.080 0.103 0.110 0.030 -0.078
median 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.087 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.114
P a irsc:
F ran ce 0.698 0.062 0.764 0.423 0.149 0.531
G erm a n y 0.027 0.194 0.029 0.083
U .K . 0.077 0.294
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Notes to table 4.5:
a. T h e  ta b le  reports m ean  and m ed ian  sig n ed  d ifferen ce s b e tw e e n  E V C  m ea su res o v er  the in terval from  
b to  e, ca lcu la ted  e x c lu s iv e  o f  d irty surplus f lo w s  and d en o ted  EVCbDSe, and the correct E V C
P a n e l A  rep orts th e se  errors for three-year m easu rem en t in tervals (e-b^3 ). P an e l B  reports th e se  
errors for e ig h t-y ea r  m easu rem en t in tervals (e-b=8). T h e  errors in m ea su rem en t o f  E V C  are sc a led  
b oth  b y  m ark et v a lu e  at the start o f  the m easu rem en t in terval ( le f t  s id e  o f  ea ch  p a n el) and b y  the  
a b so lu te  v a lu e  o f  the  correct E V C  m easu re (right s id e  o f  ea ch  p a n el). T h e  var io u s d irty  su rp lu s-  
b a sed  m ea su res  d iffer  from  ea ch  other w ith  resp ect to  the c la s se s  o f  d irty  su rp lu s f lo w s  that are  
o m itted . N o ta tio n  is as fo llo w s:
• ALL: a ll d irty  surp lus f lo w s  are om itted;
• GW\ g o o d w ill  o n ly  is om itted;
• GM: th e  u n reco g n ise d  issu e  o f  eq u ity  under m erger (p o o lin g -o f- in te r e sts )  a c c o u n tin g  o n ly  is
• GW+GM: b oth  g o o d w ill  and the u n reco g n ised  issu e  o f  e q u ity  under m erger  (p o o lin g -o f- in te r e s ts )  
a c c o u n tin g  are om itted;
• AR: a sse t  rev a lu a tio n s o n ly  are om itted;
• PYA: p r ior-year adjustm ents o n ly  are om itted;
• OTH\ 'other dirty surp lus flo w s' o n ly  are om itted .
T h e  m ed ia n  printed  in b o ld  in d ica tes that o n e  can  reject at the  5%  le v e l th e  n u ll h y p o th e s is  that the  
d istr ib u tio n  is  cen tred  on  zero  (sign ed -ran k  test).
b. P ro b a b ility  v a lu e s  b ased  o n  a K ru sk a l-W allis te st  o f  th e  n u ll h y p o th e s is  o f  e q u a lity  o f  m ea n  rank in  
s ig n e d  errors acro ss a ll four cou n tr ies. P rob ab ility  v a lu e s  o f  0 .0 5  (5% ) or le s s  are prin ted  in b o ld  
ty p e .
c. P ro b a b ility  v a lu e  b ased  on  a K ru sk a l-W a llis  te st  o f  the  n u ll h y p o th e s is  o f  e q u a lity  o f  m ea n  rank in  
s ig n e d  errors acro ss pairs o f  cou n tr ies. P rob ab ility  v a lu e s  o f  0 .0 5  (5% ) or le s s  are prin ted  in b o ld  
ty p e .
m ea su re  d en o te d  EVCbe , as g iv e n  b y  ex p ressio n  (4 .7 )  in the text:
' - b - 1 e - ( b + s )
^  D S b+s  J " I  ( 1 +  ^ + 5 + /c )  +  ^
' e -
K 5=1 k - 1 /
om itted ;
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Table 4.6 - Absolute values of errors from measurement of excess value created
(EVC) omitting dirty surplus flows (errors scaled by beginning-of-interval
market value and absolute value of EVC)
Using median country-industry betas to estimate the cost of equity capital
Panel A: 3-year Measurement Interval (e-b = 3)
S c a le d  b y  b e g in n in g  m a r k e t  v a lu e  a S c a le d  b y  a b s o lu te  v a lu e  o f  E V C
F ran ce G erm an v U.K. U.S. A ll fou rh F ran ce G erm a n v U.K. U.S. A ll  fou rh
N 1 7 8 1 80 191 189 738 17 8 180 191 18 9 738
ALL mean 0.049 0.105 0.268 0.075 0.360 0.797 1.282 0.239
median 0.013 0.009 0.073 0.001 <0.001 0.022 0.029 0.106 0.001 <0.001
Pairs c:
F ran ce 0.444 <0.001 <0.001 0.668 <0.001 <0.001
G erm a n y <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
U .K . <0.001 <0.001
GW mean 0.017 0.087 0.219 0.000 0.027 0.658 1.054 0.000
median 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.000 <0.001
P a irsc:
F ran ce <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
G erm a n y <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
U .K . <0.001 <0.001
GM mean 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.055 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.061
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001
P a irsc:
F ran ce 1.000 0.334 0.001 1.000 0.334 0.001
G erm a n y 0.332 0.001 0.332 0.001
U .K . 0.002 0.002
GW +GM mean 0.017 0.087 0.224 0.055 0.027 0.658 1.060 0.061
median 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.000 <0.001
Pairs c:
F ran ce <0.001 <0.001 0.764 <0.001 <0.001 0.603
G erm a n y <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
U .K . <0.001 <0.001
AR mean 0.001 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.259 0.000
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001
Pairs c:
F ran ce 0.007 <0.001 0.006 0.007 <0.001 0.006
G erm a n y <0.001 1.000 <0.001 1.000
U .K . <0.001 <0.001
PYA mean 0.000 0.002 0.016 0.001 0.000 0.018 0.046 0.002
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001
Pairs c:
F ran ce 0.025 <0.001 0.051 0.025 <0.001 0.051
G erm a n y <0.001 0.674 <0.001 0.670
U .K . <0.001 <0.001
OTH mean 0.032 0.031 0.018 0.020 0.333 0.244 0.132 0.181
median 0.011 0.003 0.002 0.000 <0.001 0.018 0.009 0.003 0.000 <0.001
Pairs c:
F ran ce <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.006 <0.001 <0.001
G erm a n y 0.184 0.001 0.079 <0.001
U .K . 0.038 0.062
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Table 4.6 (continued) - Absolute values of errors from measurement of excess 
value created (EVC) omitting dirty surplus flows (errors scaled by beginning-of- 
interval market value and absolute value of EVC)
Using median country-industry betas to estimate the cost of equity capital
Panel B: 8-year Measurement Interval (e-b = 8)
Scaled by beginning market value a Scaled by absolute value o f E V C 1
F ran ce G erm an v U.K. U.S. A ll fou rh F ran ce G erm a n v U.K. U.S. A ll fou rh
N 5 0 51 4 8 48 1 9 7 5 0 51 4 8 4 8 1 9 7
ALL mean 0.169 0.138 2.060 0.704 0.210 0.464 1.049 3.001
median 0.034 0.063 0.337 0.005 <0.001 0.030 0.040 0.159 0.006 <0.001
P a irsc:
F ran ce 0.924 <0.001 0.017 0.432 <0.001 0.031
G erm a n y <0.001 0.079 0.008 0.025
U .K . <0.001 <0.001
GW mean 0.096 0.103 1.802 0.000 0.039 0.290 0.888 0.000
median 0.000 0.004 0.123 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.002 0.097 0.000 <0.001
Pairs c:
F ran ce 0.001 <0.001 0.004 <0.001 <0.001 0.004
G erm a n y <0.001 <0.001 0.002 <0.001
U .K . <0.001 <0.001
GM mean 0.000 0.000 0.083 0.581 0.000 0.000 0.040 2.802
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007
P a irsc:
F ran ce 1.000 0.307 0.020 1.000 0.307 0.020
G erm a n y 0.303 0.019 0.303 0.019
U .K . 0.092 0.095
GW +GM mean 0.096 0.103 1.886 0.581 0.039 0.290 0.929 2.802
median 0.000 0.004 0.123 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.002 0.097 0.000 <0.001
Pairs c:
F ran ce 0.001 <0.001 0.515 <0.001 <0.001 0.515
G erm a n y <0.001 <0.001 0.001 <0.001
U .K . <0.001 <0.001
AR mean 0.002 0.000 0.213 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.142 0.000
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001
Pairs c:
F ran ce 0.040 <0.001 0.047 0.021 <0.001 0.025
G erm a n y <0.001 1.000 <0.001 1.000
U .K . <0.001 <0.001
PYA mean 0.000 0.001 0.064 0.008 0.000 0.005 0.033 0.005
median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 <0.001
Pairs
F ran ce 1.000 <0.001 0.276 1.000 <0.001 0.286
G erm a n y <0.001 0.277 <0.001 0.295
U .K . 0.001 0.001
OTH mean 0.071 0.120 0.090 0.126 0.170 0.258 0.061 0.195
median 0.026 0.015 0.019 0.003 0.014 0.015 0.026 0.009 0.003 0.011
Pairs c:
F ran ce 0.443 0.651 0.001 0.703 0.130 0.003
G erm a n y 0.833 0.055 0.141 0.011
U .K . 0.009 0.076
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Notes to table 4.6:
a. T h e  ta b le  reports m ean  and m ed ian  sig n ed  d ifferen ces b e tw een  E V C  m ea su res o v e r  the in terval from  
b to  e, ca lcu la ted  e x c lu s iv e  o f  d irty surplus f lo w s  and d en o ted  EVCbD Se, and the correct E V C
m ea su re  d en o te d  EVCb , as g iv e n  b y  exp ressio n  (4 .7 )  in the text:
 ^e - b - 1 e -(b + s )  N
Y u  D S b+s  ] ^ [  0  +  rb + s + k )  +  D S e • 
s= l k = 1
P a n e l A  reports th e se  errors for three-year m easu rem en t in terva ls (e-b=3 ). P an el B  reports th e se  
errors for  e ig h t-y ea r  m easu rem en t in tervals (e-b=8). T h e errors in m ea su rem en t o f  E V C  are sc a led  
b o th  b y  m ark et v a lu e  at th e  start o f  th e  m easu rem en t interval ( le f t  s id e  o f  ea ch  p a n el) and b y  the  
a b so lu te  v a lu e  o f  th e  correct E V C  m easu re (right s id e  o f  each  p an el). T h e  v a r io u s d irty  su rp lu s-  
b a se d  m ea su res  d iffer  from  each  other w ith  resp ect to  the c la s se s  o f  d irty  su rp lu s f lo w s  that are  
o m itted . N o ta tio n  is as fo llo w s:
• ALL: a ll d irty  su rp lu s f lo w s  are om itted;
• GW: g o o d w il l  o n ly  is om itted ;
• GM: th e  u n reco g n ise d  issu e  o f  eq u ity  under m erger (p o o lin g -o f- in te r e sts )  a c c o u n tin g  o n ly  is 
om itted ;
• GW+GM: b oth  g o o d w ill  and the u n reco g n ised  issu e  o f  eq u ity  under m erger  (p o o lin g -o f- in te r e s ts )  
a c c o u n tin g  are om itted ;
• AR: a sse t  rev a lu a tio n s o n ly  are om itted;
• PYA: p rior-year ad ju stm en ts o n ly  are om itted;
• OTH: 'other d irty  surp lus f lo w s' o n ly  are om itted .
b . P ro b a b ility  v a lu e s  b ased  on  a K ru sk a l-W allis test o f  the  nu ll h y p o th es is  o f  e q u a lity  o f  m ean  rank in 
a b so lu te  errors a cro ss a ll four cou n tr ies. P rob ab ility  v a lu es  o f  0.05 (5%) or le s s  are prin ted  in b o ld  
ty p e .
c . P r o b a b ility  v a lu e s  b a sed  on  a K ru sk a l-W allis te st  o f  the n u ll h y p o th es is  o f  e q u a lity  o f  m ean  rank in  
a b so lu te  errors a cro ss pairs o f  cou n tries. P rob ab ility  v a lu es  o f  0.05 (5%) or le s s  are prin ted  in b o ld  




The Effect of Omitting Dirty Surplus Flows on RIVM 
and AEGM Intrinsic Value Estimates
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5.1 Introduction
Finance theory defines the value of equity of a company as the present value of the 
expected future stream of dividends discounted at the cost of equity capital (PVED). 
If projected accounting numbers obey the clean surplus relationship (CSR) and if the 
projected closing and opening book values o f equity are consistent across periods, 
PVED can be written as the book value of equity at the valuation date plus the present 
value of expected future residual incomes (Peasnell, 1982; Ohlson, 1995). This 
reformulation of the PVED is referred to as the residual income valuation model 
(RIVM). If  there is consistency across periods in expected earnings, earnings changes 
and retained earnings, PVED can also be written as capitalised next-period projected 
earnings plus the present value of a measure of subsequent abnormal earnings growth 
(Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 2000; Ohlson, 2003; Juettner-Nauroth and Skogsvik, 
2005). This reformulation of the PVED is known as the abnormal earnings growth 
model (AEGM). Because the two accounting-based valuation models, RIVM and 
AEGM, are equivalent to the PVED it is expected that they provide the same intrinsic 
value estimates as the PVED. However, empirical implementations of the accounting- 
based models may result in intrinsic value estimates that differ from the PVED if 
based on implicit assumptions about future flows that are inconsistent with the PVED. 
In the particular case of the RIVM, a potential source of difference between PVED 
and accounting-based value estimates is violation of the CSR. Because the CSR is the 
mechanism that assures the equivalence of RIVM with PVED, CSR violations in the 
accounting numbers used to obtain expected future flows might cause error in the
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RIVM intrinsic value estimates (Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 2000; Ohlson, 2003; 
Juettner-Nauroth and Skogsvik, 2005).41
Empirical studies typically implement accounting-based models using 
forecasts o f earnings provided by analysts as proxy for expected future earnings (e.g. 
Francis, et al., 2000). Because analysts sometimes omit components of earnings that 
are unusual or difficult to predict (as shown in Cheng, 2005), such forecasts are likely 
to violate the CSR, which will cause error in the RIVM intrinsic value estimates. 
Further, when using intrinsic value estimates derived from the RIVM for international 
comparisons, the error may vary across countries because there may be cross-country 
variation in violations of CSR contained in analyst’ forecasts of earnings as the 
magnitude and nature of CSR violations varies across accounting regimes (Frankel 
and Lee, 1999). Because of the potential problems with the RIVM caused by its 
dependence on the CSR, it is sometimes suggested that the AEGM will work better in 
the presence of significant CSR violations (Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 2000; 
Ohlson, 2003; Chen, et al., 2004; Jeuttner-Nauroth and Skogsvik, 2005).
The importance of dirty surplus flows in valuation is likely to depend on their 
relationship with the present value of expected future dividends, which is expected to 
depend in part on the expected magnitude and persistence of the flows. For example, 
if  market participants believe that expected future dirty surplus flows are unrelated to 
the present value of expected future dividends because they are small on average, or 
are transitory, or are likely to affect dividends only in the distant future, then such 
flows are likely to be relatively unimportant in forecast-based valuation. However, if 
investors believe that such flows are likely to be significant in magnitude and are
41 A n o th e r  d im e n s io n  to  the  p rob lem  m ight arise i f  the m od e l is app lied  on  a per-sh are b asis . E ven  
w h e n  a c c o u n tin g  n u m b ers o b e y  C S R  in aggregate , the m ay v io la te  it on  a per-sh are b asis i f  it is 
e x p e c te d  that a future issu e  w ill  b e  m ade at a p rice that d iffers from  the p rojected  b o o k  va lu e  per share  
at th e  d a te  o f  the  issu e  (O h lso n  and Juettner-N auroth, 2 0 0 0 ;  O h lson , 2 0 0 3 ) .
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likely to have an impact on dividends within their forecast horizon, then omission of 
expected future dirty surplus flows in a valuation model might result in significant 
valuation errors. For example, investors may expect some financial companies to have 
persistent gains and losses related to financial instruments and that dividends will be 
affected by these flows.
There is little evidence that dirty surplus flows are important for equity 
valuation. Previous studies such as Dhaliwal, et a l (1999) and Biddle and Choi (2002) 
measure the association between share price and contemporaneous dirty surplus flows 
in the U.S. and find limited evidence of an association. O’Hanlon and Pope (1999) 
also find a weak association between long-window stock returns and corresponding 
long-interval accumulations of dirty surplus flows in the U.K. Isidro et al. (2004) 
explore the association between market-to-book premia and perfect-foresight forecasts 
of dirty surplus flows in France, Germany, the U.K. and the U.S., finding only a weak 
association. Despite studying the association between market value and dirty surplus 
flows, these studies do not provide direct evidence as to how the incidence of dirty 
surplus flows relates to valuation errors from standard implementations of accounting- 
based valuation models. I seek to provide some evidence on the issue in this chapter.
I explore analytically and empirically the effect of omitting expected future 
dirty surplus flows from earnings forecasts used to obtain RIVM and AEGM intrinsic 
value estimates. I show that empirical implementation of the RIVM and the AEGM 
yield identical intrinsic value estimates provided that there is consistency in 
assumptions about projected earnings, projected dividends and projected book values 
and CSR holds in the accounting numbers. This calls into question the argument that 
the AEGM might be expected to work better than the RIVM in the presence of dirty 
surplus flows. An important contribution of this analysis is that it demonstrates that
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the error resulting from omitting dirty surplus flows in standard implementations of 
the RIVM and AEGM is identical for both models.
I then investigate empirically the relationship between valuation errors 
(differences between intrinsic value estimates and observed share price at the 
valuation date, scaled by the later) and total dirty surplus flows, together with cross­
country and cross-industry variation herein. I use two sets of data to conduct the 
empirical analysis. This is motivated by the desire to use a large sample for countries 
in which dirty surplus flows can be measured relatively reliably by applying 
algorithms to machine readable data, and the desire to include in the study countries 
for which dirty surplus flows can only reliably be measured by direct reference to 
financial statements. The large-sample study is limited to the U.S. and the U.K during 
the period 1994 to 2003; for the small-sample study, I use data from France, Germany, 
the U.K. and the U.S. during the period 1994 to 2001. Data for the small-sample study 
are previously used in chapters 3 and 4. Results for the large sample, provide some 
evidence o f a positive and significant association between absolute valuation errors 
and absolute total dirty surplus flows (inaccuracy), but only for the U.S. However, the 
results do not confirm the predicted negative relationship between signed valuation 
errors and signed total dirty surplus flows (bias). In fact, results suggest an association 
but in the opposite direction. For the U.S. sample, I find significant cross-industry 
differences in the relationship, namely between financial companies and other 
industry groups. Results for the small sample indicate a significant relationship 
between valuation errors and total dirty surplus flows for both signed and absolute 
valuation errors, but only in the case of U.S. companies. There is also some evidence 
of cross-country differences but again, only in relation to the U.S. However, 
conclusions based on the small-sample analysis should be interpreted with caution
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given the relative small sizes of the sample employed. In general, the results provide 
some support of a relationship between valuation errors and total dirty surplus flows 
in the case of the U.S. sample. Nevertheless, taking all results together, I conclude that 
the relationship is weak.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section presents 
the general formulations of forecast-based models and in particular the PVED. Section 
three introduces the general formulation of the RIVM and AEGM accounting-based 
valuation models and explores analytically the effect on the models’ intrinsic value 
estimates o f omitting expected dirty surplus flows from earnings forecasts. Section 
four presents empirical implementations of the accounting-based valuation models 
and describes the tests used to explore the relationship between valuation errors and 
total dirty surplus flows. Section five describes the data and sample. Section six 
discusses the results for the large sample-study while section seven presents results for 
the small-sample study. Section eight reports robustness checks. Section nine 
concludes.
5.2 Forecast-based valuation models
A wide variety of valuation methods can be found in the academic literature as well as 
in practice.42 This study focuses on forecast-based models. Forecast-based models, 
considered to be the core of valuation (Kothari, 2001), define company value as the
expected future cash flows discounted at the appropriate rate. That is:
E , ^ )  t E,(CF2)  ^ E,(CF,)  t ( 5 1 )
0 + U 1 O + o ) 2 (1+ o ) 3
or
42 S e e  for  e x a m p le  F ern an d ez (2 0 0 2 , p .2 1 ) for a list o f  so m e  c o m m o n ly  u sed  va lu a tio n  m eth o d s.
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r , = M o w , ] ( i + * r ,
5=1
where:
vt = Value of the company at valuation time t\
M l  = Expectations operator at time t;
CF = Stream of future cash flows;
rd Risk-adjusted discount rate.
Different types of cash flows can be used in forecast-based models, depending on 
whether the valuation is performed from an entity or an equity perspective. From the 
shareholders’ point of view (equity perspective), dividends are regarded as the future 
cash flows. This way, the equity value of the company is the present value o f expected 
future dividends (Copeland and Weston, 1992, p.20), defined as follows:
r , = M 4 « ] ( 1+ ' T  (pVED>
5=1
where:
d  = Expected future dividends net of equity issues;
r = Cost of equity capital.
Although the PVED is a standard valuation model, it is sometimes argued that it may
not perform well in capturing equity value because it relies on forecasts of future
dividends, which might not be a good indicator of future value creation. The same
holds for free cash flows.43 Free cash flows would adequately measure value if
matched with the cash investments that generate them. But the cash inflows returned
from investments are recognised in periods after the recognition of the cash outflows
43 Free cash flows can be calculated as operating income after tax less the change in net operating 
assets. This calculation requires that income is comprehensive so that comprehensive operating income 
and the change in book value of the net operating assets explain the cash flow from the operating 
activities to the financing activities (Penman, 2001, p.310).
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to fund investments. Only accrual accounting matches the inflows received from the 
company s operations with the outflows that generate them. That is why accounting- 
based models, such as the RIVM and the AEGM, have been suggested in the valuation 
literature as providing a more reliable way of measuring equity value (e.g Ohlson, 
1995; Penman, 2001, p. 182). The attractiveness of the RIVM and AEGM lies in their 
direct link to accounting numbers, specifically earnings. Another attractive feature is 
that contrary to the PVED, which is based only on a flow component, the RIVM and 
AEGM are anchored in current book value and capitalised next period earnings, 
respectively, thereby giving less weight to the forecasted portion and consequently 
reducing the potential influence of forecast errors in the value estimates (Francis, et 
al., 2000). Finally, another practical advantage of the accounting-based models is that 
analysts typically forecast earnings, an accounting variable, not dividends or free cash 
flows. The association between earnings and prices is well documented in the 
accounting literature (e.g. Ball and Brown, 1968; Francis, Schipper and Vincent, 
2003).
However, the properties of accounting may not always be beneficial. Certain 
accounting practices might distort book value and earnings. It is usually argued that 
accounting methods do not affect value estimates because the immediate impact of 
such methods will ultimately revert in future periods (Healy and Palepu, 2001, p. 11 - 
6). However, when implementing the models for finite horizons it is difficult to 
accurately capture the effects and contra-effects of accounting methods in the post­
horizon terms. A particular case that has preoccupied valuation researchers concerns 
dirty surplus accounting practices. Violations of the CSR are allowed in most GAAP 
regimes and they could interfere with the intrinsic value estimates derived from the 
RIVM, whose equivalence with the PVED relies on the CSR (Frankel and Lee, 1999).
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I study the implications for RIVM and AEGM intrinsic value estimates of using 
earnings forecasts that do not follow CSR.
5.3 Dirty surplus flows and accounting-based valuation models
5.3.1 The equivalence between the PVED, RIVM and AEGM
The RIVM and the AEGM can each be derived from the PVED, defined above, by 






where y 5(l + r ) -J -»  0 as s -»oo. Alternatively, y  could be a finite series ending at 
time t+T, where y t+T = 0. The addition of expression (5.2) to PVED gives:
oo
K =><+Z£< [ Vm- G ' VMO+ V5 • (5-3)
5=1
RIVM can be derived if  y  in expression (5.2) is defined as book value of equity, 
denoted b, as follows:
oo _
v, = v I A E « +4+H1+d*<«-i](1+T  • (5-4)
5=1
Consider the CSR defined in chapter 2. If  CSR holds, net income, denoted x ,  
comprises all changes in the book value of equity other than dividends net of equity 
issues:
x - b  + d  - b  , (CSR)-*7 + 5  — ° t + s  +  U t+S  U t+S - 1 '
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Provided that CSR holds, the second term on the right-hand side of expression (5.4) 
reduces to the present value of expected future residual incomes. Under CSR, residual 
income, denoted x a , is as follows:
The AEGM expresses the intrinsic value of equity as the capitalized next-period 
expected earnings plus the present value of the capitalized subsequent abnormal 
earnings growth, where abnormal earnings growth is the difference between year-on- 
year earnings change and a normal return on previous-year retained earnings. To 
derive the AEGM, define y t+s in expression (5.2) as the expectation at time t of 
earnings at time t+s+\, capitalized as a perpetuity as at time t+s (Ohlson and Juettner- 
Nauroth, 2000):
The RIVM and the AEGM are each equivalent to PVED and they can be derived by 
adding to PVED a zero-sum expression in which the terms are defined to be 
accounting items. For the RIVM, the valuation anchor is book value and the residual 
income is the flow that determines the premium over the anchor. For the AEGM, the
x t+ s  bt+s + dt+s bt+s_y rbt+s_ j 
_  fy+s + dt+s ~ (l + r ) ^ +5-1 •
(5.5)
Substitution of (5.5) into (5.4) gives the RIVM:
oo




Substitution of (5.6) into (5.3) gives the AEGM:




valuation anchor is capitalised earnings and abnormal earnings growth is the flow that 
determines the premium. As a consequence, the models differ with respect to their 
dependence on CSR in linking with the PVED. Residual income needs to be defined 
in accordance with CSR, otherwise a non-zero-sum item would be added to PVED in 
the RIVM derivation, and therefore the RIVM intrinsic value estimate would differ 
from the PVED intrinsic value estimate. Equivalence of AEGM with PVED does not 
require earnings to be defined in accordance with CSR, but requires consistency 
across successive periods in projected earnings, earnings changes and retained 
earnings. It is the fact that the RIVM and the AEGM differ with respect to their 
reliance on CSR for their equivalence to the PVED that supports the view that the 
AEGM may be preferable to RIVM where CSR violations are particularly severe.
5.3.2 The relationship between RIVM intrinsic value estimates and AEGM  intrinsic 
value estimates
The equivalence of the RIVM and AEGM with the PVED and the difference between 
the two models with respect to their reliance on CSR are based on the premise that 
expectations regarding future dividends are given, and are not affected by accounting 
projections represented by the zero-sum expression (5.2). However, in forecast-based 
implementations of accounting-based valuation models it is standard practice to derive 
dividend projections from earnings projections assuming a dividend payout ratio. 
Typically, in implementations of the RIVM, projections of future book values per- 
share are derived using projected earnings per share, projected payouts and the 
assumption that CSR holds on a per-share basis (Frankel and Lee, 1998; Lee, et a l,  
1999; Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan, 2001; Gode and Mohanram, 2003; Chen, et 
a l,  2004; Daske, 2005). Similarly, in implementations of the AEGM, projections of
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retained earnings are based on projected future earnings net o f an estimated payout 
ratio (Gode and Mohanram, 2003; Chen, et al., 2004). Such procedures, in which 
earnings projections drive dividend projections, are consistent with the fact that, over 
the whole life of the company, the aggregate of all accounting gains and losses must 
equal the aggregate of net distributions to shareholders.
Before considering the possible effect of CSR violation on intrinsic value 
estimates from the models, I first consider the relationship between standard 
applications of the two models. The intrinsic value estimate from the RIVM is as 
follows:
v p s ^ VM = bps, + j r  [x/w,+3 -  rbpsHs_, ] ( l  + r)~s
Z ' (-5+
= b p s ,+ J ] x p s ^ ( l  + r y s,
S = 1
where vp sf1VM is the estimate of intrinsic value per share from RIVM at time t, bpst
is book value per share at time t, bpst+s for s > 0 is the time-/ projection of book
value per share for time t+s, xpst+s is the time-/ projection of earnings per share for
time t+s, and xpsa is the time-/ projection of residual income per share for time t+s.
Projected residual incomes per share are as follows, where book values per share for
t+l onwards are projected from time / book value per share, subsequent projections of 
earnings per share and subsequent projections of dividend per share (dpst+s):
xpsf+l= xpst+l-rb p s t
xps?+2 = xpst+2 -  r (bpst + xpst+l -  dpst+l)
xps°+ 3 = xpst+3 -  r (bpst + xpst+l + xpst+2 -  dpst+l -  dpst+2)
etc.
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The projected dividends per share in expression (5.8) are given by applying an 
assumed dividend payout ratio to projections of earnings per share. The AEGM is 
implemented as follows using the same CSR-compliant earnings and dividend 
projections that are used in implementing the RIVM:
.AEGM _ XPSM  , y  : ( 5 9 )vps,
5=1
Note that xpst+l = xps“+[ + rbpst . Note also that, since projections are formulated 
under the assumption that CSR holds, 
xPS«s ~dpsM  =b,+s- b l+s_
Therefore,
1 -  XP SHS  )  -  r  (XP S,+S -  d P s ,* S )  =  ( xP s n s+ l -  r b ,+s )  -  (XPSM  -  'A-w-l ) 
=  x P s L +i ~ x P s L -
Expression (5.9) can thus be expanded as follows:
rbpst +xps?+l | {xPs“+2 ~ xps“+1)^  | r ^-i 
r r
, ( ^ 3  - ^ T ) (1 , r f + i x^ - xps‘4 (^ , p
r t
= bpst +
+xpsaM T(1 + r )_1 + (1 + r)~1 + (l + r)~3 +.
+ ( x p C 2 - XP S “M )  ( I +  r )  2 + ( 1 +  f' )  3 +





Collecting terms, it can be seen that this formulation of the AEGM gives an intrinsic 
value estimate identical to vps^ VM:
v p s f GM = bps, + x p s l  1 (1 + r)~' + x p s l2 (1 + r)~2 + xps“ 3 (l + r)~3 +...
RIVvps0 .
149
Hence, if accounting projections obey CSR and are used consistently in the RIVM and 
AEGM, then the RIVM and AEGM must give identical intrinsic value estimates and, 
therefore, identical valuation errors with respect to PVED.44 In the next subsection I 
discuss this valuation error.
5.3.3 The effect o f  expected future dirty surplus flows in the valuation error in the 
RIVM  and AEGM
In this subsection, I define the valuation error that would arise from the omission of a 
projected dirty surplus flow for time t+s, denoted f [+s, in implementing the two 
accounting-based models. I assume that any dirty surplus flow will have a dividend 
impact o f 8ft+s at the time at which it arises, where 0 < 8 < 1, and a dividend impact at
time t+s+z o f ( l - 5 )  f t+s, where z > 0. This setting assumes that dirty surplus flows
will be reflected in dividends at some point in time, but imposes no restriction with 
regard to when that time will happen. For example, it allows for the dividend impact 
of a dirty surplus flow to be expected to arise in the distant future and to have a 
present value of zero. In such a setting, it is expected that the omission of a single 
expected future dirty surplus flow from a valuation model would result in the 
following valuation error:45
- u 8(l + r)  5 + ( l - 5 ) ( l  + r) (5.11)
44 The consistent use of accounting projections includes the use o f consistent growth assumptions in 
terminal value terms.
45 This simple setting could be made more complicated by allowing a dirty surplus flow to be 
associated with a more complicated stream of dividends, but the inferences would not change
significantly. Alternatively, this simplified setting can be justified by defining f t+s to be a component 
o f a dirty surplus flow that has an impact o f &fi+s on the dividend at time t+s and an impact of 
(l -  8) f t+s on the dividend at time t+s+z.
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I now demonstrate that the valuation error described in expression (5.11) would arise 
from implementations of both the RIVM and AEGM. I consider the effect on the
RIVM intrinsic value estimate, vpsfIVM as given in expression (5.7), of omitting f t+s 
from the projected earnings per share for time t+s. First, projected residual income per 
share for time t+s will be less than it would otherwise have been by the quantity f t+s. 
The present value of this effect is:
- / <+, o + > r .
Second, the projected book values per share from time t+s to time t+s+z-1 will be less 
by f t+s (l -  6 ). This will cause the projected capital charge per share for time t+s+ 1 to
time t+s+z to be less by r . f t+s (1 -5 )  46 The present value of this effect is:
r - ftt+ s (1 -  S )(l + /-)"(s+1) + (1 -  6) (1 + r)~(,+2) +... + (1 -  5) (1 + r)~(s+:)
The sum of these two items is:
t+ s (1 + r )_I -  (1 -  8) (1 + r ) 5^+1) -  (1 -  8) (1 + r)"^+2) - . . .  -  (1 -  8 ) (1 +  r )  s^+=)
This expression resumes to the following, which is equal to the valuation error given 
in expression (5.11):
■(i + r r _ ( i _ 8) ( ( i+ , r - ( i + r ) V - )
8 ( l  + r)~s + ( l - 8 ) ( l  + r) ^  ■
I now consider the effect on the AEGM intrinsic value estimate, vpst as given in
-ft+s 
= -ft+s
expression (5.9), of omitting f t+s from the projected earmngs per share for time t+s.
46 The capital charge is the product of the cost of equity and the opening book value o f equity, which is 
deducted from net income to arrive at residual income.
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First, projected earnings per share for time s will be less by f t_s . The present value o f 
this effect is:
r
Second, because the time t+s earnings reduces by f t+s and the time t+s retained 
earnings reduces by f t+s( 1 - 5 ) ,  the abnormal earnings growth for time t+s+l 
increases by f i+s (l + r (l -  5)). The present value of this effect is:
— (l + '-r+/,+s(l-S)(l + rT-r
Third, because o f the omitted year t+s+z dividend, f l+s (l — 5 ), arising from the 
omission o f the year t+s earnings component, the projected abnormal earnings growth 
o f year s+z+1 reduces by r .f t+s ( l - 8 ) . The present value o f this effect is:
- /(w (l-5 )( l  + r)-<“ >.
The sum o f these three items is:
_  £±i. (1 + r + r)’s + f l+s ( l - 8 ) ( l+ r ) " s -  f l+s ( l - S ) ( l  + r  ) ' (s+J*.
r  r
As with RIVM, this expression resumes to the following, which is equal to the 
valuation error given in expression (5.11):
v - M '
- f ,l+ s 8 (l + r )  5 + ( l - 8 ) ( l  + r)
In summary and as expected, I have shown that the valuation error given in expression 
(5.11) would arise in empirical implementations of both the RIVM and AEGM. 
Generalising the valuation error for the omission o f series o f expected future dirty 
surplus leads to the following expression:
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- X X  S(l+r)-' + ( l-8 ) ( l+ r )
5=1
~ { s + =) (5.12)
The effect of omitted expected dirty surplus flows on valuation errors from the RIVM 
and AEGM can be easily inferred from expression (5.12). If valuation errors are 
defined as the excess of the intrinsic value estimate over the observed price, scaled by 
the later, they should be negatively associated with dirty surplus flows, with the effect 
being driven by the magnitudes of 8 and z. For example, a high value of 8 and a 
small value of z would mean that f t+s would have a relatively important effect on the 
present value of expected future dividends, and that omission of that flow might 
therefore cause a relatively large valuation error. In contrast, a low value of 8 
combined with a very high value of z, consistent with the dividend impact of f t+s 
being largely reduced to the effect on the liquidating dividend of the company, would 
mean that f t+s would have little effect on the present value of expected future
dividends, and that its omission would be unlikely to generate significant valuation 
error. In subsequent sections, I explore empirically whether the incidence of dirty 
surplus flows is associated with valuation errors.
5.3.4 The relationship between omitted expected future dirty surplus flows and 
valuation error
Assuming that a share’s market price is the best measure of its intrinsic value, 
deviations of value estimates from observed price, designated valuation errors, are 
attributed to errors in the intrinsic value estimates derived from the RIVM and 
AEGM. Based on expression (5.12), I develop predictions regarding the relationship 
between valuation errors and expected future dirty surplus flows omitted from
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earnings projections used to obtain RIVM and AEGM intrinsic value estimates. I test 
the relationship both in terms of signed valuation errors (bias) and absolute valuation 
errors (inaccuracy).
From expression (5.12), one can easily infer that the omitted dirty surplus 
flows are negatively associated with bias in the valuation errors and positively 
associated with inaccuracy in the valuation errors. Hence, in situations where 
projected earnings omit larger expected future dirty surplus flows it is expected a 
larger effect on the valuation errors.
Typically, empirical applications of the RIVM and AEGM make use of 
analyst’ forecasts of earnings to obtain projections of earnings for future periods 
(Frankel and Lee, 1998; Lee, et al., 1999; Francis, et al., 2000; Gebhardt, et al., 2001; 
Easton, et al., 2002; Gode and Mohanram, 2003; Chen, et al., 2004; Daske, 2005). If 
such forecasts do not obey CSR, one would expect the intrinsic value estimates 
derived from the accounting-based models to contain error. Empirical research has 
acknowledged this problem. For example, Frankel and Lee (1999) and Chen et al. 
(2004) point that RIVM intrinsic value estimates can be distorted if analysts’ forecasts 
of earnings systematically violate the CSR. There is some empirical evidence that 
analysts’ forecasts are not constructed in accordance with the CSR. For example, 
Cheng (2005, p.2) states that “the inefficiency of analysts’ forecasts is largely due to 
their underestimation or ignoring the effects o f ... transitory earnings when predicting 
future earnings”. Chen et al., (2004) also provide evidence o f CSR violations in 
consensus analyst’ forecasts of earnings and show that the extent of such violations 
varies across the following countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the 
U.K. and the U.S. Therefore, it is expected that as the level of dirty surplus flows 
increases, analysts’ forecasts of earnings will deviate more from clean surplus
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earnings resulting in errors in the models' intrinsic value estimate. Further, since the 
magnitude and nature of dirty surplus accounting practices varies across countries 
(Isidro, et a l ,  2004), violations of CSR contained in analysts’ forecasts of earnings 
might vary accordingly (Chen, et al., 2004), inducing cross-country variation in the 
relationship between valuation errors and total dirty surplus flows.
Previous studies such as Dhaliwal, et al., (1999), and the study presented in 
chapter 3 provide some indication of larger dirty surplus accounting practice in the 
financial sector. I therefore, also consider whether the relationship between valuation 
errors and total dirty surplus flows differs across industries, in particular between 
financial and non-financial sectors.
5.4. Empirical implementation of the RIVM and AEGM
In this section I develop empirical applications of the RIVM and AEGM using explicit 
analyst forecasts of earnings for two-years-ahead and a terminal value term. I then 
assess the relationship between bias and inaccuracy in the models’ value estimates and 
the sign and magnitude of total dirty surplus flows.
5.4.1. Projections offuture flows and terminal values
Similar to previous studies, I implement the RIVM and AEGM using both explicit 
forecasts of earnings over a short period, and implicit forecasts of earnings and 
dividends beyond that period as projections of future flows (Frankel and Lee, 1998; 
Lee, et a l,  1999; Francis, et al., 2000; Gebhardt, et a l,  2001; Easton, et al., 2002; 
Gode and Mohanram, 2003; Chen, et al., 2004; Daske, 2005). Explicit forecasts of 
earnings are obtained using consensus analysts’ forecasts of earnings per share from 
I/B/E/S for one and two-years-ahead. Implicit forecasts of earnings for year three
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onwards are computed by applying an assumed expected roe to previous-year 
expected future book value. Projections of book value for year one and beyond are 
derived from previous year book value, forecasts of earnings and forecasts of 
dividends and the assumption that CSR holds. Implicit forecasts of dividends are 
derived from forecasts of earnings multiplied by an estimated expected payout ratio.
The intrinsic value estimate at valuation time 0 from the RIVM is given by the 
following expression:
ypsT =bpsJ Xpy b^ K  ^ -rbPh)+Ty'
(1 + r)  (1 + r)2
where:
bpsQ -  Common book value per share at valuation time 0 obtained as follows.
Common book value from the most recent published financial 
statements (Compustat: #60 for U.S. companies and Worldscope: 
Ws.03501 for French, German and U.K. companies) divided by the 
number of common shares outstanding at valuation date 0 obtained 
from I/B/E/S;
xps = Forecasted earnings per share. For the first two years, x/?sis the
I/B/E/S mean consensus forecasts of earnings per share one- and two- 
years-ahead. For year three and beyond, xps is estimated applying an 
expected roe (discussed below) to previous year book value: 
xpss = roe x bpss_ i ;
bps s = Common book value per share for year one and beyond obtained using
the CSR as follows. bpss =bpss_} + xpss -d p s s , where dpss is the 
forecasted dividend per share equal to dpxxpss , being dp the implicit 
expected dividend payout ratio (discussed below);
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r Expected cost of equity capital (discussed below);
TV  = Terminal value term estimated as: — r^Psi .
( r - g ) ( l  + r ) 2
g  = Expected post-horizon growth rate equal to roe  (1 - d p ) .
For the AEGM the value estimate at valuation date 0 is obtained as follows:
^A E G M  _  xps{ , (xps2 - x p s l ) - r ( x p s l - d p s 1) (xps3 -  XpS2 ) + r(xpS2 -  dps2 ) rj-iT/
™  r q l T q  + f  + T V ■
(5.14)
where:
TV  = Terminal value term estimated as:
r ( r - g ) ( l  + r)
As demonstrated above, empirical applications of the RIVM and AEGM that use a 
consistent set of accounting forecasts should yield identical intrinsic value estimates. 
Implementations of the models using short-term forecasts and a terminal value term 
should also result in identical intrinsic value estimates, so long as consistent post­
horizon forecasts of growth are applied to residual income and abnormal earnings 
growth (first difference in residual income). This can be demonstrated for expressions 
(5.13) and (5.14). Expression (5.14) for the AEGM can be written in the form of 
expression (5.10) as follows:
AEGM XpS, XP S2 XpS, XP S ,
o = ^ °  + ( i + d V b 2 ( 1 + T  O - s X i + O 3 '
Since xps° = xps°(l + g ) ,  the AEGM intrinsic value estimates becomes identical to 
the RIVM intrinsic value estimate:
_  i XPS\ . XPS2 ) * ^ 3 -------vps0 -b p s 0 + . +  2 / w. y
(1 + r)  (l + r ) ( r - g ) ( l  + r)
„RIVM= vpsQ .
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Expanding the term xpsa , I obtain the RIVM intrinsic value estimate as presented in 
expression (5.13):
vpsS™” = bpso + ^ L .  + J Z S2 + . xps'
0  + '-) (l + r ) 2 ( r - £ ) ( l  + r ) ;
= v p s T t -
Appendix 5.1 demonstrates the equivalence between the RIVM and AEGM intrinsic 
value estimates for the U.K company AEA Tecnology Pic for the financial year 1997. 
As my application is consistent across both models, intrinsic value estimates are 
identical and therefore only one set of intrinsic value estimates is reported. Consistent 
with previous valuation studies, negative value estimates are set to zero (e.g. Francis, 
et al., 2000).
5.4.1.2 Explicit analysts ' earninss forecasts
To ensure that the one-year-ahead earnings forecast are based only on publicly 
available information, I select one-year-ahead mean forecasts of earnings made ‘x ’ 
months after the fiscal year-end so that they post-date publication of the most recent 
financial statements. Because the time lag between the financial statements date and 
the public reporting date varies from one country to another, I allow ‘x’ to vary across 
the countries considered in this study. Based on the reporting date provided in the 
I/B/E/S files, I find that the longest reporting lag occurs in Germany where the 
majority of companies publish financial statements between four and six months after 
the year- end. The shortest reporting lag is in the U.S.: two to three months after the 
fiscal year-end. For France and the U.K., the lag is on average three months. Thus, I 
consider the I/B/E/S analysts’ mean forecasts of one-year-ahead earnings made at 
three months after the current fiscal year-end in the case of French, U.K. and U.S.
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companies and five months after the current fiscal year-end in the case of German 
companies. Whenever I/B/E/S does not provide earnings forecasts exactly at these 
dates I select the forecasts closest to that date within a limit of 90 days. If forecasts do 
not exist within that limit the company-year is not selected.
5.4.1.3 Return on equity
The implicit forecasts of earnings after year two for use in the terminal value term 
require an estimate of expected roe. Estimated roe is computed by dividing aggregate 
current-year income before extraordinary items for all company-years in the industry 
by aggregate previous year common book value for all company-years in the industry 
(Compustat: #18 divided by #60 for U.S. companies and Worldscope: Ws.inc.bef.extr. 
divided by Ws.03501 for French, German and U.K. companies).47 I assume that the 
company roe in the post-horizon period is equal to the average industry roe as in Lee, 
et al. (1999). Also similar to previous studies industry roe values are estimated as a 
moving average of the previous seven years of data (e.g. Gode and Mohanram, 2003). 
Specifically, I use data from the previous seven years up to the valuation date to 
compute the average roe for each of the following broad industry groups: basic 
(consisting of resources, basic and general industries and utilities), goods (consisting 
o f consumer goods industries), services (consisting of services, information and 
technology industries), and financials (consisting of financial industries). As in 
previous studies, to avoid extreme values and inconsistent value estimates, I impose 
that estimated roe for each company-year is equal or higher than the cost of equity 
capital (e.g. Gode and Mohanram, 2003). Negative book value observations are not 
considered in the estimation of the industry roe.
471 use the ratio o f the aggregate figures to avoid the potential influence o f extreme values.
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5.4.1.4 Cost o f  equity capital
The cost o f equity capital ( r ) used to discount future flows to the valuation date is 
based on a time-varying risk-free rate plus an industry beta applied to a 5% risk 
premium. This is a standard procedure in the valuation literature (e.g. Lee, et al., 
1999; Francis, et al., 2000).
r = r f  + $ x rp  (5.15)
where:
r f  = Country-specific risk-free rate at the valuation month. This is computed
as the 12-month moving average Treasury bond rate obtained from the 
International Monetary Fund;
P = Country-specific mean industry beta for each of the four industry
groups defined in section 5.4.1.3. Company betas are current betas as at 
31 December 2003 obtained from Datastream; 
rp = Equity risk premium, assumed to be 5%.
5.4.1.5 Dividend vavout ratio
Dividend payout ratio (dp) is computed by dividing aggregate common dividends for 
all company-years in the industry by aggregate net income for all company-years in 
the industry over the same period (Compustat: #21 divided by #172 for U.S. 
companies and Worldscope: Ws.05376 divided by Ws.01751 for French, German and 
U.K. companies). Expected payout ratios are proxied by the industry average dividend 
payout. Adopting a similar procedure to the one used for w e, I measure the average 
dividend payout for each of the four industry groups as the moving average of the 
previous seven years of data up to each valuation date. Companies experiencing
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negative earnings are included in the calculations to avoid bias towards profitable 
companies. Consistent with other studies (e.g. Lee, et al., 1999; Gode and Mohanram, 
2003), I winsorise estimated payout ratios to lie between 0 and 1. In order to avoid 
distortion due to companies making distribution to shareholders through share 
repurchases, I eliminate non-paying dividend companies as in prior studies (e.g. Lee, 
et al., 1999). According to Grullon and Michaely (2002), U.S. companies currently 
expend more on share repurchases than on dividend payments. Moreover, they show 
that share repurchase activity has experienced higher growth than dividends (26.1% 
versus 6.8% during the period 1980 to 2000). Given these findings, it is possible that 
U.S. companies in the sample showing no dividend payments are in fact engaged in 
payouts to shareholders through share repurchases. Including those companies in the 
computation of dividend payout ratios as if they did not distribute cash to shareholders 
would influence the estimated payout ratios downwards. Ideally, one should obtain a 
share repurchase payout ratio but, as pointed out for example in Lee, et al. (1999), it is 
difficult to determine the likelihood of the future occurrence of share repurchases.
5.4.2 Relationship between valuation errors and expected future total dirty surplus 
flow s
I explore the predictions that bias in valuation errors from accounting-based valuation 
models are negatively associated with signed expected future dirty surplus flows, and 
that inaccuracy in valuation errors is positively associated with the absolute value of 
expected future dirty surplus flows. As projections of dirty surplus flows are not 
available I use company-averages of current dirty surplus flows as a proxy. Using 
individual company-year observations could lead to extreme values of valuation errors 
and total dirty surplus flows occurring in particular years influencing the analysis. For
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this reason, I perform the analysis with company-average values computed using all 
available observations during the sample period 1994 to 2003. Company-average 
values are likely to be a better proxy for the company’s normal pattern in terms of 
valuation errors and total dirty surplus flows. Nevertheless, I test the sensitivity of the 
results to this procedure by repeating the analysis for the following situations: (1) 
using company-median values for valuation errors and total dirty surplus flows, (2) 
using individual company-year observations, and (3) using company-average total 
dirty surplus flows computed as the average of the previous three years up to the 
valuation date. Results of these robustness checks are reported in section 8.
I analyse the regression results of the following regression models, for signed 
and absolute valuation errors.
For signed valuation errors: AVEj = a 0 +$oATDSFi +ei . (5.16.i)
For absolute valuation errors: \AVEf\ = a 0 +Po \ATDSFj\ + £i9 (5.16.ii)
where:
AVEj = Signed and absolute company-average valuation error. Signed
valuation error is defined as (Vo - Po) /  Po- Absolute valuation error is 
defined as | Vo- Po\ /  Po- The variables are defined as follows: V0 is the 
value estimate obtained from the valuation model and P0 is the 
observed price per share at valuation time 0. Negative value estimates 
are set to zero;
ATDSFi = Signed and absolute company-average total dirty surplus flows (TDSF) 
scaled by market value at the beginning of the fiscal year (MV0). For 
U.S. companies MV0 is obtained from Compustat: closing price #199 x 
number of shares outstanding #25; for French, German and U.K. 
companies, MVo is obtained from Worldscope. Ws.08001,
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a 0 -  Regression intercept;
Po = Regression coefficient of ATDSF; ;
£/ = Error term.
For reasons explained in the next section, the analysis is performed separately on a 
large sample of U.K. and U.S. companies, and on a small sample of French, German, 
U.K. and U.S. companies. The method used for measuring total dirty surplus flows 
differs between (1) the large-sample study, for which algorithms based on machine- 
readable databases are used, and (2) the small-sample study, for which data on total 
dirty surplus flows are hand-collected from published financial statements. For the 
large-sample study, the algorithms used to measure total dirty surplus flows are as 
follows. For the U.K., TDSF = PYA - GW  + AR + CUR, where PYA denotes prior- 
year adjustments (Extel: ir_rsm), GW  denotes goodwill written-off, net o f write-backs 
(Extel: ir_gw), AR denotes asset revaluations (Extel: ir_rvl) and CUR denotes 
currency translation differences (Extel: ir_fx). For the U.S., TDSF = CUR + MSEC + 
PEN, where CUR denotes currency translation differences (Compustat: change in 
#230), MSEC  denotes adjustments for marketable securities (Compustat: change in 
#238) and PEN  denotes adjustments related to minimum pension liabilities (Compustat: 
#297 - #298, if  negative).48 As demonstrated in chapter 3, section 5, total dirty surplus 
flows obtained from algorithms applied to machine-readable data are likely to be 
subject to measurement error. Nevertheless, direct algorithms based on the summation 
of individual dirty surplus flows, are less inaccurate than indirect algorithms based on 
changes in shareholders’ funds. For this reason, I apply the first type of algorithm to 
compute total dirty surplus flows for the large-sample study. For the small-sample 
study, total dirty surplus flows are measured by direct reference to published financial
48 D e ta ils  on  a lg o r ith m -b a sed  ca lcu la tion s can be found in chapter
163
reports using the same data as in the study presented in chapter 3. Recall that for this 
sample total dirty surplus flows are computed as: TDSF = PYA - GW - GM  + AR + 
OTH, where GM  denotes the unrecognised issue of equity under merger accounting, 
and OTH  denotes other dirty surplus flows’, which includes currency translation 
differences, adjustments for marketable securities, consolidation adjustments, etc.49 
The remaining variables are as defined above.
5.5 Data and sample
I perform the empirical analysis separately on two samples: a large sample of U.K. 
and U.S. companies and a small sample of French, German, U.K. and U.S. companies. 
The use of two sets of observations represents a compromise between using a large 
sample o f international companies on the one hand and obtaining a reliable measure of 
dirty surplus flows on the other. As discussed in chapter 3, making use of the data 
provided by commercial databases to measure dirty surplus flows based on algorithms 
provides the researcher with a large sample and is also in line with the methodology 
used in previous studies. However, algorithm-based measures of dirty surplus flows 
can be very noisy, and result in substantial errors. Appendices 5.2 and 5.3 exemplify 
the type o f errors in algorithm-based estimates of dirty sample flows for two 
companies in both samples. The best way to assess accurately dirty surplus flows is to 
analyse directly the companies’ financial reports, which is only feasible for a 
relatively small number of cases. This approach ensures that dirty surplus flows are 
computed accurately but substantially decreases the sample size, thereby reducing the 
power o f the tests. For these reasons, I develop the analysis using two data sets. A 
large sample of U.K. and U.S companies during the period 1994 to 2003, for which
49 In se c tio n  8 , 1 rep eat the a n a ly sis  ex c lu d in g  the m erger-related item  (GM). C o n sisten t w ith  chapter  
the  ‘sp e c ia l item s w ith  an eq u ity  p ortio n ’ is not included  as a dirty surplus f lo w  in the ca se  o f  G erm an  
c o m p a n ie s .
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algorithms perform relatively well (in comparison with French and German 
companies), in capturing dirty surplus flows. A small sample of French, German, U.K. 
and U.S. companies with available data on true dirty surplus flows hand-collected 
from the published financial statements during the period 1994 to 2001 (as described 
in chapter 3).
The sample selection process is summarised in table 5.1. For the large sample,
I start by collecting all available one- and two-year-ahead earnings forecasts for U.K.
and U.S. companies between year 1994 and 2003 in the I/B/E/S files (U.K.: 318,458
and U.S.: 1,204,438 company-year observations). From these, I eliminate the
observations that fall into one of the following categories: (1) missing data; (2) ADR
and cross-listed companies and; (3) companies reporting under non-domestic GAAP.50
For the resulting sample, I select only two mean earnings forecasts for each valuation
date, corresponding to one- and two-year-ahead forecasts. From the available I/B/E/S
forecasts for one- and two-year- ahead, I choose the ones reported at the closest date
to the valuation date, within a 90-day interval. Next, I combine the I/B/E/S data with
accounting and market data collected from Worldscope (for the U.K.) and Compustat
(for the U.S.) The matching process results in 10,978 observations for the U.K. and
58,074 observations for the U.S., which produces 5,489 and 29,037 intrinsic value
estimates, respectively. From these, I eliminate observations falling in the most
extreme 2% of the distribution for valuation errors and total dirty surplus flows, which
resulted in 4,509 observations for the U.K. and 26,333 observations for the U.S. I then
compute company-averages for valuation errors and total dirty surplus flows using all
50 In th e  c a se  o f  U .K ., co m p a n ie s not reporting under U .K . G A A P  during the sa m p le  p eriod  are 
ty p ic a lly  c r o ss - lis te d  co m p a n ie s. B e fo re  2 0 0 5 , the year w h en  co m p a n ie s listed  in a E urop ean  U n io n  
s to c k  e x c h a n g e  are o b lig ed  to  report under international a ccou n tin g  standards, fe w  U .K . c o m p a n ie s  
sw itc h e d  to  in ternational a cco u n tin g  standards. C ross-listed  co m p a n ies can be id en tified  in the I/B /E /S  
f ile s  as I /B /E /S  p ro v id es in d ica tion  about the stock  ex ch a n g e  w here the shares are traded. A d d itio n a lly , 
I /B /E /S  a lso  id e n tif ie s  A D R  co m p a n ies, international acco u n tin g  standards fo llo w e r s  and U .S . G A A P  
fo llo w e r s  (u su a lly  ad d in g  an ind ication  to the c o m p a n y ’s nam e). I attem pt to con tro l for n o n -U .K . 
G A A P  c o m p a n ie s  b y  e lim in a tin g  the o n es  w ith  the ab ove in d ication s.
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available observations during the sample period. The final part of table 5.1 presents a 
frequency count of the number of years used to compute company-averages. The final 
number of company-average observations to carry out the analysis is 8,126 (1,212 for 
the U.K. and 6,914 for the U.S.).
For the small sample of French, German, U.K. and U.S. companies, I follow a 
similar process to that described for the large sample. Table 5.1 provides details on the 
number of observations in each step of the sample selection process. The number of 
value estimates obtained for the U.K. and the U.S. is the same as for the large sample 
(5,489 for the U.K. and 29,037 for the U.S.). For France and Germany, I obtain 1,978 
and 2,096 intrinsic values estimates, respectively. From these value estimates, I select 
only the ones corresponding to companies and years for which data on true total dirty 
surplus flows is available from chapter 3. This additional filter reduces the sample to 
784 company-year observations.51 After eliminating the 2% extremes of the 
distribution of valuation errors and total dirty surplus flows the number of 
observations is 714. From these, I compute company-specific averages using the 
available observations during the sample period. The final number of company- 
average observations used in the analysis for the small sample is 190 (France: 51, 
Germany: 46, the U.K.: 43 and the U.S.: 50).
Two further issues with respect to the data are worthy of note: adjustments in 
I/B/E/S earnings forecasts and currency uniformity. Earnings forecasts obtained from 
I/B/E/S are stock-split adjusted because I/B/E/S keeps their figures comparable over 
time. In order to use earnings forecasts produced on the same basis as book value 
reported in the financial statements, I undo the stock-split adjustments applying the 
cumulative adjustment factors computed from I/B/E/S adjustment factors. I also take
51 N o te  that b y  se le c tin g  o n ly  the co m p a n ies and years used p rev io u sly  in chapter 3 , I en su re that o n ly  
d o m e stic  G A A P  co m p a n ie s  are inclu d ed  in the sam p le  as that is a se lec tio n  criterion  in chapter
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into consideration that some earnings forecasts are reported on a diluted basis. 1 
convert diluted to basic earnings using I/B/E/S dilution factors. The data obtained in 
currencies other than Euros (i.e., from I/B/E/S and Compustat) are converted to Euros 
using the Euro-fixed rate (as established in the 1st of January 1999) for French Francs 
and Deutschmarks, and the average exchange rate from December 1993 to December 
2003 for pounds Sterling and US dollars.
I collect accounting data from Worldscope and Extel databases. I use 
Worldscope to obtain data on common book value, common net income and common 
dividends because this database provides ready-to-use items for common 
shareholders. I use Extel instead of Worldscope as the data source for algorithm-based 
measures o f dirty surplus flows as the later does not provide data on the flows or 
movements of the year but rather on the cumulative items on shareholders’ funds.
5.6 Results for a large sample of U.K. and U.S. companies
5.6.1 Summary statistics and tests
Table 5.2 reports summary statistics of the primary variables by country and industry. 
The means for net income, book value and market value are 71.24 million Euros, 
726.85 million Euros and 2,383.44 million Euros, respectively, for the pooled sample. 
U.S. companies report larger book values and net income and have higher market 
value than U.K. companies. Among the four industry groups, financial companies are 
associated with higher net income, book value and market value in both countries.
Summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis, yearly valuation errors 
and total dirty surplus are presented in table 5.3. The average values for return on 
equity (roe), cost of equity capital (r), and dividend payout ratio (dp) are 1 3 / o ,  1 1  ^
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and 5.3/0, respectively, for the pooled sample. Mean and median roe, r and dp are 
similar in both countries.
For the overall sample, the mean signed valuation error is 0.247. However, the 
median signed valuation error is -0.252, indicating the presence of extreme positive 
valuation errors, particularly in the U.S. sample. The median value is consistent with 
findings in Francis, et al. (2000) indicating that the models underestimate equity value 
as measured by share price. At the country level, median signed (absolute) valuation 
errors are —0.317 (0.554) for the U.K. and -0.240 (0.541) for the U.S. Findings for the 
U.S. are in line those reported by Francis, et al. (2000).
Signed total dirty surplus flows are negative on average (-0.001), consistent 
with the results reported in chapter 3. Also consistent with results in chapter 3, mean 
signed and absolute total dirty surplus flows are larger in the U.K. (-0.004 and 0.012) 
than in the U.S. (-0.001 and 0.004).:>2 Again similar to previous results, median values 
are very close to zero as a result of many companies reporting no dirty surplus flows. 
It is worth mentioning that while mean and median total dirty surplus flows are close 
to zero, dirty surplus flows can be very large for some individual companies. I also 
report total dirty surplus flows excluding the goodwill category. Statistics for the U.S. 
remain unchanged since goodwill write-offs are not permitted in that jurisdiction. For 
the U.K, the removal of goodwill from total dirty surplus flows increases the mean 
signed total dirty surplus flows and reduces mean absolute total dirty surplus flows, 
consistent with goodwill being negative on average. Overall, excluding goodwill has 
little effect in the mean and median values of total dirty surplus for the U.K. On 
average signed values remain negative (-0.002) and median values remain close to 
zero.
52 In ch ap ter  3 , I sh o w  that U .S . co m p a n ies can report larger total d irty surp lus f lo w s  w h en  m erger  
(p o o lin g -o f- in te r e s ts )  a cco u n tin g  is taken into con sid eration . H o w ev er , m erger a cco u n tin g  is not 
in c lu d ed  in th e se  co m p u ta tio n s as the a lgorithm  d o es not capture such  m o v em e n ts.
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Table 5.4 examines the link between company-average valuation errors and 
company-average total dirty surplus flows. Signed mean and median valuation errors 
and signed mean and median total dirty surplus flows are significantly different from 
zero in all cases except one.53 Median absolute valuation errors are larger in the U.K. 
than in the U.S., as are total dirty surplus flows but this pattern is not observable for 
the signed valuation errors. Statistical tests of the null hypothesis of equality of mean 
and median values of valuation errors and mean and median values of total dirty 
surplus flows across countries indicate significant cross-country differences. These 
results provide some indication that cross-country differences in dirty surplus flows 
might be associated with cross-country differences in valuation errors.
Table 5.5 provides similar statistics and tests as reported in table 5.4, by 
industry. I aim to analyse whether valuation errors and total dirty surplus flows follow 
a similar pattern across the four industry groups in each country. Signed and absolute 
company-average valuation errors appear to be larger for financial companies, 
particularly in the U.S. Company-average absolute total dirty surplus flows are also 
larger for financial companies, for both the U.S. and the U.K. Results for the U.S. 
sample are in line with the evidence presented in chapter 3 and in previous studies 
such as Dhaliwal, et. al. (1999) that dirty surplus accounting is more severe in the 
financial sector. Overall, results reported in table 5.5 suggest some industry effects in 
the relationship between valuation errors and total dirty surplus flows. Regarding 
cross-industry variation, tests of the null hypothesis of equality of mean and median 
values o f valuation errors and mean and median values of total dirty surplus flows 
across industry groups, indicate that mean and median valuation errors as well as 
mean and median total dirty surplus flows are significantly different across the four
53 I d o  n o t report tests  o f  the nu ll h y p o th esis  that the d istribution  o f  a b so lu te  v a lu ation  errors and  
a b so lu te  to ta l d irty surp lus f lo w s  is centred  on zero as ab so lu te v a lu es m ust be n o n -n eg a tiv e .
169
industry groups in each of the individual countries. Tests of cross-country differences 
in valuation errors and total dirty surplus flows for each industry group (reported in 
panel B o f table 5.5) reveal that for each industry there is some evidence of significant 
cross-country differences in both variables.
5.6.2 Relationship between valuation errors and total dirty surplus flows
In this section I test the relationship between valuation errors and total dirty surplus 
flows both in terms of bias (signed values) and inaccuracy (absolute values). Table 5.6 
presents results for the univariate regression analysis of the relationship between 
valuation errors and total dirty surplus using models (5.16.i) and (5.16.ii) above for 
the pooled sample and the individual countries. In terms of inaccuracy results reveal a 
positive and significant association between valuation errors and total dirty surplus 
flows. For the pooled sample, the coefficient of total dirty surplus flows is 8.285 
suggesting that the effect is both statistically and economically significant. These 
results are consistent with the predictions that the magnitude of total dirty surplus 
flows is positively associated with absolute valuation errors. In terms of bias, results 
indicate a statistically significant relationship between valuation errors and total dirty 
surplus flows. However, the coefficient on total dirty surplus flows, for the pooled 
sample, is 8.775, contradicting the prediction of a negative relationship.
On the country level, I find evidence of a statistically and economically 
significant positive relationship between absolute valuation errors and absolute total 
dirty surplus flows, in the case of the U.S. (the coefficient is 16.309). For the U.K., the 
relationship is positive but not statistically significant. As with the pooled sample, the 
relationship for signed valuation errors is significant but contrary to the predicted sign 
for both countries. Tests of cross-country differences in the coefficients on total dirty
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surplus flows reveal significant differences between the U.K. and the U.S. sample, in 
the case o f absolute valuation errors.54
I now repeat the same regression tests but excluding the goodwill item from 
total dirty surplus flows. The reason for this procedure is that goodwill (the most 
important dirty surplus flow in the U.K. during the sample period), although negative 
in sign, may be interpreted as a positive signal in that it is associated with growth 
opportunities. This may cause interference with the signed tests, because market 
participants might evaluate goodwill differently from other dirty surplus flows. 
Contrary to items like currency translation differences that have no repercussion in 
future periods, investors might perceive goodwill write-offs resulting from mergers 
and acquisitions as signalling future positive flows or future growth. Results, reported 
in table 5.7, are generally similar to the ones presented in table 5.6. The relationship 
between bias in valuation errors and signed total dirty surplus remains positive, for the 
U.K. Note that goodwill is non-existent in the U.S. and therefore it is not expected the 
coefficient of total dirty surplus flows to alter materially.55
In order to investigate the reasons underlying the relatively weak results, I 
perform some additional analysis. First, I apply the regression model to individual 
components of total dirty surplus flows to examine the possibility of results being 
influenced by particular dirty surplus flows categories. Results, reported in table 5.8 
for the U.K. and table 5.9 for the U.S. show no systematic evidence o f a negative 
association between signed valuation errors and signed individual dirty surplus flows
54 T e sts  o f  cro ss-co u n try  d ifferen ce s  are based  on the fo llo w in g  ex ten d ed  v ersio n  o f  m o d e l (5 .1 6 ) .  
AVEj  =  a Q + a . l U K  +  $QATDSFi + $ lUK. ATDSFi + z ii  w h ere U.K.  is a d u m m y  v a riab le  that ta k es a 
v a lu e  o f  o n e  i f  th e  c o m p a n y  b e lo n g s  to the U .K . and zero o therw ise . R eg re ss io n  resu lts for th is m o d e l  
are n o t rep orted , as th e y  are id en tica l to the on es reported in tab les 5 .6  and 5 .7  for the in d iv id u a l  
co u n tr ies .
55 T h e  d iffe r e n c e  in th e  c o e f f ic ie n ts  o f  total dirty surplus f lo w s  for the U .S . b e tw een  tab le  5 .6  and tab le  
5 .7  is en tire ly  due to  the  ch a n g e  in the num ber o f  ob servation s used  in the reg ress io n  te s ts , w h ich  is a 
c o n se q u e n c e  o f  th e  tr im m in g  p rocess.
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in both countries. For the U.K, the main contributor for the association between total 
dirty surplus flows and valuation errors is asset revaluations, both for bias and 
inaccuracy. For the U.S, such association is mostly due to the adjustments for 
marketable securities items, both for bias and inaccuracy.
Second, I inspect whether there are differences in the relationship between 
valuation errors and total dirty surplus flows across the sample period. I regress 
company-year valuation errors on company-average total dirty surplus for each year.56 
Maintaining total dirty surplus flows identical for each yearly company valuation error 
allows checking for variation in the valuation errors during the sample period. Results 
reported in table 5.10 show some mixed evidence. For the U.K., the significant 
positive relationship between signed valuation errors and signed total dirty surplus 
flows occurs only in the first two years of the sample. For absolute valuation errors, 
only for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 I do find a positive and significant relationship 
consistent with predictions. For the U.S., results are more in line with the predictions. 
The relationship for signed valuation errors is negative for years 1998 to 2001, but 
only statistically significant for fiscal year 1999. The relationship for absolute 
valuations errors is significantly positive in 1995 and after 1997. I repeat the yearly 
regressions using company-average total dirty surplus flows computed as the average 
of the previous three years with respect to the valuation date. This procedure ensures 
that I only use past information regarding total dirty surplus. Again, the results (not 
tabulated) are mixed and in line with the ones reported in table 5.10.
Finally, I perform other robustness tests but for reasons of economy of space, 
results are not tabulated. A summary of these tests is described in section 8.
5 6 1 drop o b ser v a tio n s  for year  2 0 0 3 , the last year in the sam p le , as there are re la tiv e ly  fe w  o b ser v a tio n s .
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5.6.2.1 Industry effects
Table 5.11 considers the possibility o f differences in the relationship between 
valuation errors and total dirty surplus flows across industry groups. Panel A presents 
regression results by industry group for the pooled sample and individual countries. 
Panel B reports tests o f equality o f coefficients o f total dirty surplus flows across all 
industry pairs.57
For the pooled sample and for signed valuation errors, results indicate a 
significant relationship between valuation errors and total dirty surplus flows for 
industry groups goods and financials. However, contrary to predictions, the 
corresponding regression coefficients are of positive sign- For absolute valuation 
errors, there is a positive and significant relationship in the case o f industry group 
basic.
For the U.K., results generally do not support the predictions. There is a 
significant relationship between valuation errors and o f total dirty surplus flows in the 
cases o f industry group basic, goods and sendees but only for signed valuation errors 
and o f contrary to the predicted sign. For the U.S., I find evidence consistent with the 
predictions in the case o f industry group basic for signed valuation errors.
Despite the weak regression results for individual industry groups, tests o f 
cross-industry differences in the relationship between valuation errors and total dirty 
surplus flows, reported in panel B of table 5.11, reveal significant differences between 
industry groups. Particularly, I find significant differences between financial and non-
5j T e s ts  o f  cro ss-in d u str y  d iffe r e n c e s  are b ased  on  the fo llo w in g  ex ten d ed  v ers io n  o f  m o d e ls  |5 .1 6 . i )  
and  ( 5 .1 6 .ii)  fo r  s ig n e d  and a b so lu te  va lu es:
AVE, =a0 +alBasic+a2Goods + a iServices + fyJATDSFl + f\ Basic. A TDSFs +0,Goods.ATDSF, +f%Senices..ATDSE +E. - 
w h e r e  Basic. Goods and Services are d u m m y  variab les that take a va lu e  o f  o n e  i f  th e  company b e lo n g s  
to  industryf g rou p  b a s ic  (reso u rc es, b asic  and gen era l in d ustries and u tilit ie s) , industry  grou p  g o o d s  
(c o n su m e r  g o o d s ) , industry  grou p  se r v ic e s  (se r v ic e s , information and tech n o logy '), r e sp e c t iv e ly , and  
z e r o  o th e r w ise . R e g r e ss io n  resu lts for th is  m o d e l are not report as theyr are id en tica l to the o n e s  reported  
in p a n el A o f  ta b le  5 . 11  for the in d iv id u a l industry groups.
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financial companies. These industry differences are driven by the U.S. sample where 
significant differences arise between financials and other industry groups in all cases 
except for industry goods for signed valuation errors.
In summary, regression tests of the relationship between valuation errors and 
total dirty surplus flows reveal that only in the case of U.S. companies the omission of 
dirty surplus flows from expected future flows might result in some inaccuracy in the 
RIVM and AEGM intrinsic value estimates. For U.S. companies, implementations of 
the accounting-based models that omit such flows may result in incorrect estimates of 
equity value. Further, because inaccuracy in the models’ intrinsic value estimates 
varies between financial and non-financial companies in the U.S., comparisons across 
these companies based on RIVM and AEGM estimates of equity value might result in 
errors. For U.K. companies, there is no clear evidence that the omission o f dirty 
surplus flows could cause problems in accounting-based estimates of equity value.
5.7 Results for a small sample of French, German, U.K. and U.S. companies
In this section I report results for a small sample of French, German U.K. and U.S. 
companies for which total dirty surplus flows are computed using data hand-collected 
from the companies’ published financial reports. The sample is previously used in 
chapter 3, which restricts the analysis to eighty companies per country’ during the 
period 1994 to 2001. The sample is further reduced by the non-availability of earnings 
forecasts in the I/B/E/S files. Given the relatively small sample size, the results 
discussed in this section should be interpreted with due caution.
174
5.7.1 Summary statistics and tests
Table 5.12 reports mean and median values of net income, book value and market 
value by country and industry. Consistent with statistics presented in table 5.2, U.S. 
companies are associated with the higher mean values for net income, book value and 
market value. Also in line with the summary statistics in table 5.2, financial 
companies are associated with the higher values of the three variables, in all countries.
Table 5.13 presents summary statistics of input variables used to obtain value 
intrinsic estimates, valuation errors, and total dirty surplus flows. Average return on 
equity (roe) for the pooled sample is approximately 12%. This rate is approximately 
13% for the U.K. and U.S. and approximately 11% for France and Germany. A 
similar ranking can be observed for the average cost of equity capital (r), which is 
approximately 11% in the U.K. and U.S. compared with 10% in France and Germany. 
The estimated values for average roe and r are similar to those reported in Chen, et al. 
(2004) for the pooled sample and for the individual countries. The average dividend 
payout ratio (dp) for the overall sample is 50%. French companies have the lowest 
average payout ratio (43%) whereas German, U.K. and U.S. companies pay out 
approximately 52% of earnings as dividends.
For the pooled sample, the mean signed valuation error is close to zero (0.001) 
but the median is -0.315. In the case of absolute valuation errors, the mean (median) 
is 0.660 (0.497). At the country level, summary statistics reveal some country 
variation in valuation errors. The mean signed valuation error is negative in France (- 
0.284) and Germany (-0.095), and positive in the U.K. (0.058) and the U.S. (0.221). 
For absolute valuation errors, mean values are higher in the U.S. (0.794), followed by 
the U.K. (0.736), Germany (0.548) and France (0.488). The results for the U.K and the 
U.S. are similar to those reported in table 5.3 for the large sample.
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Consistent with findings reported in chapter 3, statistics in table 5.13 show that 
the signed total dirty surplus flows are negative on average and in all countries with 
the exception of France where the average is zero. Also consistent with findings for 
the large sample, results reveal that, despite the relatively low value for the mean and 
median, total dirty surplus flows can be of large magnitude for individual companies. 
For the pooled sample, absolute total dirty surplus flows have a mean (median) value 
o f 0.017 (0.003). Again, I observe some cases with large absolute total dirty surplus. 
The magnitude of total dirty surplus flows varies across countries. Average absolute 
total dirty surplus flows are largest in the U.K. (0.030), followed by Germany (0.018), 
France (0.011) and the U.S. (0.010).58 Medians follow the same pattern. Mean signed 
(absolute) total dirty surplus flows excluding goodwill are slightly larger (smaller) that 
these values because goodwill is negative on average, as shown in chapter 3.
Mean and median values of company-average valuation errors and total dirty 
surplus flows are reported in table 5.14. Mean and median signed (absolute) valuation 
errors are 0.028 and -0.245 (0.696 and 0.551) for the pooled sample. For the 
individual countries, I find that valuation errors are significantly different from zero in 
all countries with the exception of the U.K.59 Panel B of table 5.14 reports tests of the 
null hypothesis of equality of mean rank of company-average signed and absolute 
valuation errors across pairs of countries based on a Kruskal-Wallis test. These tests 
do not show significant country variation in valuation errors.
58 F or th e  U .S .,  to ta l d irty  surp lus f lo w s  in clu d e the m erger (p o o lin g -o f-in te rests)  a cco u n tin g  ca te g o r y  
o f  d irty  su rp lu s f lo w s . A s  sh o w n  in chapter 3 , th is type o f  dirty surplus f lo w  can  b e  qu ite large, in 
particu lar for f in a n c ia l co m p a n ie s. T h e m ean  va lu es o f  s ig n ed  and ab so lu te  total d irty su rp lu s f lo w s  for  
th e  U .S .,  e x c lu d in g  the  m erger  acco u n tin g  item  are —0 .0 0 2  and 0 .0 0 7 , re sp ec tiv e ly . T h e  m ed ia n  v a lu e s  
do n o t a lter. O v era ll, th e  rank order o f  countries in term s o f  total dirty surplus f lo w s  rem ain s the sam e. 
N e v e r th e le s s , I rep eat the  a n a ly sis  ex c lu d in g  the m erger accou n tin g  category and ob ta in  sim ilar  resu lts
as d esc r ib ed  in se c tio n  8. . . . . . .
59 S im ila r ly  to  th e  la rg e -sa m p le  study  I do n ot test the null h y p o th esis  that the d istrib u tion  o f  a b so lu te
v a lu a tio n  errors and a b so lu te  to ta l dirty surplus f lo w s  is centred  on zero.
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Total dirty surplus flows are on average -0.009 for the pooled sample and are 
significantly different from zero, in accordance with the results for the large sample. 
The mean and median absolute total dirty surplus flows for the pooled sample are 
0.018 and 0.007, respectively. Statistics suggest larger median total dirty surplus flows 
(signed and absolute) in the U.K. (-0.004 and 0.021), followed by Germany (-0.003 
and 0.009), France (0.001 and 0.004) and the U.S. (0.000 and 0.003). Overall and for 
all countries, company-average total dirty surplus flows are not centred on zero and 
there is evidence of significant cross-country variation in signed and in absolute 
values.
Panel B of table 5.14, reports results of tests of the null hypothesis of equality 
in the mean rank of company-average total dirty surplus flows across pairs of 
countries. I find evidence of significant differences in absolute total dirty surplus 
flows for all pairs of countries except France/Germany. For signed total dirty surplus 
flows, only the pairs France/Germany and France/U.K. exhibit significant differences. 
Consistent with the results reported in panel A, I find no evidence of significant 
differences in company-average valuation errors for all pairs of countries.
Next, I examine cross-industry variation in company-average valuation errors 
and total dirty surplus flows. Table 5.15 panel A reports means and medians of 
company-average valuation errors and total dirty surplus flows by country and 
industry and tests of equality of values across industry groups. Panel B reports tests of 
equality of values across countries for a given industry group. Generally, median 
results suggest larger total dirty surplus flows for financial companies for all countries 
except Germany, where financial companies are associated with the lowest values 
among the four industry groups. Regarding valuation errors, results are mixed. For the 
U.S. financial companies have the largest mean and median values for signed and
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absolute valuation errors (signed: 1.153 and 1.103; absolute: 1.318 and 1.103). For 
Germany, financial companies exhibit larger mean and median absolute valuation 
errors (0.606 and 0.622) than non-financial companies. However, for the pooled 
sample, for France and for the U.K., financial companies do not reveal such pattern. In 
summary, results do not provide strong evidence of cross-industry differences in 
valuation errors and in total dirty surplus flows. In the case of valuation errors, I find 
systematic evidence of significant differences across the four industry groups only for 
France. For total dirty surplus flows, tests indicate significant industry differences for 
the U.S. but only for absolute values. In respect to cross-country variation for each 
industry group, tests of the null hypotheses of equality of mean and median company- 
average valuation errors and total dirty surplus flows across countries in each 
individual industry, reported in panel B of table 5.15, reveal significant differences 
across the four countries in signed and absolute valuation errors in the case of 
companies in the services sector. For signed total dirty surplus flows, I find significant 
cross-country differences for basic industry group. Finally, for absolute total dirty 
surplus flows there is some evidence of significant cross-country differences in all 
industry groups. Note however, that given the relatively small sample size, these 
findings should be taken with due caution.
5 .7.2 Relationship between valuation errors and dirty surplus flow s
Table 5.16 presents regression results of the relationship between valuation errors and 
total dirty surplus using models (5.16.i) and (5.16.ii). Panel A reports regression 
results for the pooled sample and the individual countries and panel B reports tests of
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the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients of total dirty surplus flows across pairs 
of countries.60
Results reveal a significant negative relationship between signed valuation 
errors and signed total dirty surplus flows, in accordance with the prediction, for the 
pooled sample, France and the U.S. However, only in the case of the U.S. is the 
relationship statistically and economically significant. Also only in the case of the 
U.S., do I find consistent evidence of a positive and significant relationship between 
absolute valuation errors and absolute total dirty surplus flows. Tests of cross-country 
differences in the relationship, reported in panel B, provide indication of differences 
between the U.S. and the other countries, both for signed and absolute valuation 
errors. Results for the small-sample study confirm the results for the large-sample 
study regarding inaccuracy in valuation errors for the U.S. sample. I repeat the 
regression analysis disregarding the goodwill category from total dirty surplus flows. 
Table 5.17 presents the results, which are in line with the ones presented in table 5.16. 
Only in the case of U.S. companies, do I find supportive evidence of a negative 
(positive) association between signed (absolute) valuation errors and signed (absolute) 
total dirty surplus flows.61
Similarly to the large-sample study, I do some supplementary tests reported in 
tables 5.18 and 5.19. First, I perform the regression analysis using individual 
categories o f dirty surplus flows. Results reported in table 5.18 provide some evidence 
consistent with the predictions, but only in the case of the U.S. For this country, the
60 Tests o f  cross-country differences are based on the following extended version o f the regression 
models (5.16.i) and (5.16.ii) for signed and absolute values:
AVEt = a 0 + a ]UK + a 2FR + a 3GE + %ATDSFl + $]UK.ATDSF, +(32FR.ATDSFt + $3GE.ATDSFt + s , , 
where U.K., FR and GE are dummy variables that take a value of one if the company belongs to the 
U.K., France, Germany, respectively, and zero otherwise. Regression results for this model are not 
report as they are identical to the ones reported in panel A of table 5.16 for the individual countries.
61 The coefficient o f total dirty surplus flows for the U.S. sample differs in tables 5.13 and 5.14 as a 
result o f the trimming process.
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coefficient of items other dirty surplus flows’ and merger accounting are significant 
and negative, for signed valuation errors. For absolute valuation errors, the coefficient 
of ‘other dirty surplus flows’ is significant and positive. Recall from chapter 3 that 
‘other dirty surplus flows’ include currency translation differences, adjustments for 
marketable securities, and pension adjustments. Regarding other countries, only the 
coefficient of prior-year adjustments for Germany for signed valuation errors, and the 
coefficient o f goodwill for France for absolute valuation errors are consistent with the 
predictions.
Second, I perform regression tests for each individual sample year. Results 
presented in table 5.19, show weak evidence of a relationship between valuation errors 
and total dirty surplus flows. Signed results for the pooled sample show that the 
coefficients of total dirty surplus flows are of the predicted sign (negative) in all years 
except 1994. However, the coefficients are not statistically significant. Absolute 
results for the pooled sample indicate a positive relationship for year 1997 and 
beyond, but the relationship is only statistically significant for year 2000. I do not 
report results for each individual country due to the relatively low number of 
observations per country-year.
5.7.2.1 Industry effects
Similar to the large-sample study, I test for cross-industry variation in the relationship 
between valuation errors and total dirty surplus flows. I perform the tests only for the 
pooled sample given the small number of country-industry observations. Table 5.20, 
panel A reports regression results for the individual industry groups and panel B 
presents tests of equality of coefficients of total dirty surplus flows across pairs of
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industries. Similar to the results for the large sample (table 5.11), I find no
systematic evidence of a negative association for signed valuation errors and positive 
association for absolute valuation errors across industry groups. Contrary to the large- 
sample results, where there are significant industry differences with respect to 
financial companies, for the small sample there is no conclusive evidence o f such 
cross-industry differences. Tests reported in panel B of table 5.20, indicate significant 
differences between industry groups basic/goods, and industry groups
goods/financials for signed valuation errors. For absolute valuation errors, differences 
arise in the pairs of industry groups goods/services and goods/financials.
In general, the results for the small sample confirm the limited evidence of a 
relationship between valuation errors and total dirty surplus flows found for the large- 
sample study. The findings in this section suggest that for U.S. companies, the 
omission o f expected future dirty surplus flows might interfere with the value 
estimates obtained from the RIVM and AEGM by causing bias and inaccuracy. 
However, for French, German and U.K. companies there is no clear evidence that 
omission of such flows could result in errors in the accounting-based estimates of 
equity value. This might have implications for international comparisons based on 
RIVM and AEGM intrinsic value estimates because the omission of dirty surplus 
flows from earnings forecasts used to obtain such estimates may affect U.S. 
companies but not non-U.S. ones.
5.8 Robustness checks
I test the sensitivity of results reported in the previous sections for both samples to 
variations in the methodology and find that these do not alter materially the findings
62 Tests o f cross-industry differences are performed as in section 5.6.2.1 for the large sample.
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and conclusions. A brief summary of the sensitivity tests follows (results not 
tabulated).
i) Terminal value terms with a linear fade rate to the industry mean roe: Akin to 
previous studies, I compute the terminal value term in expressions (5.13) and (5.14) 
allowing the company roe at the last period of explicit forecasts (two-year ahead) to 
fade linearly over four years (from year three to year six) to a target industry roe equal 
to its mean (e.g. Lee, et al., 1999; Chen, et al., 2004).
ii) Trimming criterion: I repeat the analysis using a less restrictive trimming criterion 
by eliminating observations falling into the most extreme 1% of the distribution of 
valuation errors and total dirty surplus flows.
iii) Elimination o f  influential observations: I re-estimate all regressions eliminating 
influential observations. These are defined using the Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980)
size-adjusted cutoff measure equal to 2 ^ p T n  , where n is the number of observations
and p  the number of regression parameters.
iv) Winsorising and trimming large valuation errors: I perform the regression analysis 
winsoring or trimming valuation errors above 100% in order to obtain a more normal­
like distribution of valuation errors. I do this for the regression analysis including and 
excluding goodwill from total dirty surplus flows.
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v) Rank regression. I apply Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions to the ranks of 
the observations instead of the corresponding values to check for the possibility that 
results are influenced by extreme observations.
vi) Exclusion o f  merger (pooling-of-interests) accounting fo r the U.S. sample: I 
consider the possibility of the results for the U.S. being influenced by large values of 
immediate write-offs of equity resulting from mergers accounted for using the 
pooling-of-interests method. I exclude this dirty surplus flow category when 
calculating total dirty surplus flows in the case of the small sample.
vii) Company-median values: I test the sensitivity of the method used to compute 
company-specific valuation errors and total dirty surplus flows by computing median 
values per company instead of average values.
viii) Company-average total dirty surplus flows o f the previous three years up to the 
valuation date: I repeat the regression analysis for yearly regressions using company- 
average total dirty surplus flows computed as the moving average of the previous 
three years up to the valuation date.
5.9 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the valuation implications of implementing accounting-based 
models using forecasts of earnings that disregard expected future dirty surplus flows. 
In particular, it investigates the relationship between dirty surplus flows and valuation 
errors from standard implementations of the RIVM and the AEGM. I show 
analytically that both models should yield identical intrinsic value estimates providing
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that there is consistency in the projections of accounting numbers used. I then explore 
empirically the association between bias and inaccuracy in valuation errors and total 
dirty surplus flows using both a large sample of U.K. and U.S. companies and a small 
sample o f French, German, U.K. and U.S. companies. For the large-sample study, I 
find evidence o f a positive relationship for absolute valuation errors (inaccuracy), in 
the case o f the U.S. For signed valuation errors (bias) and contrary to the predictions, I 
find no consistent evidence of a negative relationship in both countries. Results also 
indicate cross-country differences in the coefficients on total dirty surplus flows in the 
case o f absolute valuation errors, and cross-industry differences between financial 
companies and other industry groups within the U.S. sample.
For the small-sample study, which uses data on dirty surplus flows directly 
collected for financial statements, results confirm the predictions with respect to bias 
and inaccuracy only in the case of the U.S. Small-sample results also confirm the 
large-sample results of differences in the relationship between valuation errors and 
total dirty surplus flows between the U.S. and other countries.
Overall, the results provide some indication of an association between 
valuation errors and dirty surplus flows, in the case of U.S. companies. But taking all 
countries together, this study finds that association to be weak in line with previous 
studies. The findings in this chapter suggest that omission of dirty surplus flows from 
expected future flows might cause errors in the RIVM and AEGM intrinsic value 
estimates for U.S. companies. In particular, the omission of dirty surplus flows may 
cause problems regarding inaccuracy in the models’ estimates and that may vary 
between financial and non-financial companies within the U.S. Therefore, only in 
comparative analysis between financial companies and companies from other sectors 
in the U.S., and between U.S. and non-U.S. companies based on the models value
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estimates the omission of dirty surplus flows might lead to incorrect conclusions. 
There is no evidence in this chapter that omission of dirty surplus flows may interfere 
with accounting-based estimates of equity value in other contexts.
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Table 5.1 - Sample selection
France Germany U.K. U.S. All
Panel A: Sample selection process
1. IBES data on earnings forecasts
Initial sample with one- and two-year-ahead forecasts
for years 1994 to 2003 123,190 130,083 318,458 1,204,438 1,776,169
After eliminating missings, ADRs and non-domestic
GAAP companies 60,624 69,404 157,412 713,389 1,000,829
After selecting cases with two or more forecasts per
valuation date 5,702 6,120 19,072 81,854 112,748
2. Compustat and Worldscope accounting and market
data
Initial sample for years 1994 to 2003 15,430 13,310 51,060 245,355 325,155
After eliminating missing values, ADR and non-domestic
GAAP companies 7,967 6,944 18,695 192,672 226,:278
3. Intersection o f  usable IBES and Compustat/Worldscope
data 3,956 4,192 10,978 58,074 77,200
4. Value estimates obtained1’ 1,978 2,096 5,489 29,037 38,600
5. Large sample fo r  U.K. and U.S. companies during the
period 1994 to 2003c
After eliminating the 2% extreme observations for
valuation errors and total dirty surplus flows 4,509 26,333 30,842
6. Small sample fo r  French, German, U.K. and U.S.
Companies during the period 1994 to 2001d
Intersection of value estimates and TDSF data from
Chapter 3 172 150 203 259 784
After eliminating the 2% extreme observations for
valuation errors and total dirty surplus flows 167 141 171 235 714
Panel B: Frequency of number of years used to compute company-averages
Large sample fo r  U.K. and U.S. companies during the 
period 1994 to 2003°
Total number o f company-averages6: 1,212 6,914 8,126
10 years o f data 22 22
9 years of data 35 566 601
8 years o f data 54 383 437
7 years o f data 69 365 434
6 years o f data 105 417 522
5 years o f data 133 531 664
4 years o f data 125 804 929
3 years o f data 196 1,078 1,274
2 years o f data 203 1,243 1,446
1 year o f data 270 1,527 1,797
Small sample fo r  French, German, U.K. and U.S.
companies during the period 1994 to 200l d
Total number of company-averagesf: 51 46 43 50 190
8 years o f data 2 2 8 12
7 years o f data 2 2 3 9 16
6 years o f data 4 2 4 6 16
5 years of data 6 3 7 5 21
4 years o f data 7 10 9 4 30
3 years o f data 10 11 8 4 33
2 years of data 5 9 5 5 24
1 year of data 15 9 5 9 38
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Notes to table 5.1:
a. The table reports the number of observations in each stage of the sample selection process.
b. The number o f value estimates is half the number of observations available because each value estimate 
requires two observations, corresponding to forecasts o f flows one- and two-years ahead.
c. Sample for U.K. and U.S. companies during the period 1994 to 2003, for which total dirty surplus flows 
(:TDSF) are obtained using algorithms applied to database data.
d. Sample for French, German, U.K. and U.S. companies during the period 1994 to 2001, for which data on total 
dirty surplus flows (TDSF) used chapter 3 are available. The sample consists o f eighty companies for each 
country representing four industry and four size groups.
e. Number o f cases with 10 to 1 years of data to compute the averages per company of valuation errors and total 
dirty surplus flows.
f. Number o f  cases with 8 to 1 years of data to compute the averages per company o f valuation errors and total 
dirty surplus flows.




Number o f  
company-years Net income Book value Market value
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
All 34,526 71.24 9.83 726.85 123.34 2,383.44 301.01
Basic 18,474 69.77 9.68 747.33 129.06 2,565.01 324.63
Goods 3,777 64.61 11.74 509.21 123.69 1,740.29 249.99
Services 6,322 9.25 3.72 408.78 73.33 2,020.12 247.27
Financials 5,953 145.85 19.60 1,139.11 201.16 2,606.84 330.19
U.K. 5,489 57.63 9.28 717.46 79.66 1,786.98 191.51
Basic 2,693 50.46 10.85 847.41 93.64 2,190.16 227.45
Goods 843 47.12 9.01 367.96 65.02 781.03 131.40
Services 1,216 9.92 4.78 148.72 38.20 611.87 134.51
Financials 737 174.48 16.59 1,580.52 251.57 3,434.46 300.32
U.S. 29,037 73.82 9.99 728.62 132.90 2,496.60 326.71
Basic 15,781 73.06 9.46 730.26 135.80 2,629.13 345.30
Goods 2,934 69.63 13.06 549.84 146.34 2,013.84 297.20
Services 5,106 9.09 3.43 470.72 85.25 2,366.57 292.66
Financials 5,216 141.80 20.03 1,076.68 195.25 2,492.02 334.75
Notes to table 5.2:
a. The table reports statistics on primary variables (in million Euros) for a large sample o f U.K. and 
U.S. companies during the period 1994 to 2003. Variables are obtained at fiscal year-end. Book 
value is common book value. Net income is income before extraordinary items.
b. Data in US dollars are converted to euros using the average exchange rate from December 1993 to 
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Table 5.4 - Mean and median company-average valuation errors and company-
average total dirty surplus flows by country for the large sample









Signed Absolute Signed Absolute
All 8,126 Meanb 0.322* 0.934 -0 .0 0 1 * 0.005
Median0 -0.144 0.586 0 .0 0 0 * 0 . 0 0 1
U.K. 1 , 2 1 2 Meari 0.054* 0.716 -0.003* 0 . 0 1 1
Median0 -0.180* 0.593 0 .0 0 0 * 0.006
U.S. 6,914 Meanb 0.369* 0.972 0 .0 0 0 * 0.004
Median0 -0.137* 0.585 0 .0 0 0 * 0 . 0 0 0
p-value for differences Mean <0 . 0 0 1 0.004 <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1
across countries Mediane <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1
Notes to table 5.4:
a. The table reports statistics and tests on company-average valuation errors (A VE,) and of company- 
average total dirty surplus flows (ATDSF,) by country for a large sample of U.K. and U.S. 
companies. Averages are computed for company i over the available years in the period 1994  to 
2003. Valuation error is defined as ( F 0 -  P 0 ) / P 0 ,  where F 0  is the value estimate obtained from the 
valuation model and P0 is the observed price per share at the valuation time 0. Negative value 
estimates are set to zero. TDSF is total dirty surplus flows scaled by market value ( MV0 ) at the 
valuation time 0. For the U.K., TDSF = PYA - GW + AR + CUR, where PYA denotes prior-year 
adjustments, GW  denotes goodwill written off, AR denotes asset revaluations and CUR denotes 
currency translation differences. For the U.S., TDSF = CUR +  MSEC + PEN, where MSEC denotes 
adjustments for marketable securities and PEN denotes adjustments related to minimum pension 
liabilities. Observations that fall in the most extreme 2% of the distribution are eliminated.
b. Probability values based on a t-test of the null hypothesis of mean company-average valuation error 
(mean company-average total dirty surplus flows) equal to zero. Probability values of 0.05 (5%) or 
less are printed in bold type.
c. Probability values based on a signed-rank test of the null hypothesis that the distribution of 
company-average valuation errors (company-average total dirty surplus flows) is centred on zero. 
Probability values of 0.05 (5%) or less are printed in bold type.
d. Probability values based on a t-test o f the null hypothesis of equality o f mean company-average 
valuation errors (mean company-average total dirty surplus) across countries. Probability values of 
0.05 (5%) or less are printed in bold type.
e. Probability values based on a Kruskal-Wallis test of the null hypothesis o f equality o f mean rank of 
company-average valuation errors (mean rank of company-average total dirty surplus flows) across 
countries. Probability values o f 0.05 (5%) or less are printed in bold type.
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Table 5.5 - Mean and median company-average valuation errors and







valuation errors (A VE,)
Company-average TDSF 
(A TDSF,)
Signed Absolute Signed Absolute
Panel A: In d u stry  differences by country
All
Basic 4,062 Meanb -0.091* 0.611 -0 .0 0 1 * 0.005
Medianc -0.260* 0.508 0 .0 0 0 * 0 . 0 0 1
Goods 853 Meanb 0.447* 0.876 -0 .0 0 1 * 0.004
Medianc 0.153* 0.598 0 .0 0 0 * 0 . 0 0 0
Services 1,790 Meanb -0.196* 0.700 -0 .0 0 1 * 0.003
Medianc -0.422* 0.602 0 .0 0 0 * 0 . 0 0 0
Financials 1,421 Meanb 2.078* 2.188 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 1 0
Medianc 1.696* 1.711 0 . 0 0 0 0.004
p-value for differences Meand <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1
across industries Mediane <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1
U.K.
Basic 562 Meanb 0.181* 0.788 -0.004* 0 . 0 1 2
Medianc -0.058 0.618 -0 .0 0 1 * 0.009
Goods 189 Meanb 0.215* 0.706 -0.004* 0 . 0 1 1
Median0 -0.046 0.535 -0 .0 0 1 * 0.006
Services 307 Meanb -0.347* 0.618 -0.004* 0.009
Median -0.480* 0.605 -0 .0 0 1 * 0.003
Financials 154 Meanb 0.190* 0.660 0 . 0 0 2 0.017
Median0 -0.029 0.537 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 1 0
p-value for differences Meand <0 . 0 0 1 0.376 <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1
across industries Median <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 1 2 0 . 0 0 1
U.S.
Basic 3,500 Meanb -0.135* 0.582 -0 .0 0 1 * 0.004
Medianc -0.277* 0.492 0 .0 0 0 * 0 . 0 0 0
Goods 664 Meanb 0.513* 0.924 0 .0 0 0 * 0 . 0 0 2
Medianc 0.226* 0.623 0 .0 0 0 * 0 . 0 0 0
Services 1,483 Mean -0.164* 0.717 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 2
Medianc -0.409* 0.601 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
Financials 1,267 Meanb 2.307* 2.374 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 1 0
Medianc 2.030* 2.049 0 . 0 0 0 0.004
p-value for differences Meand <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1
across industries Median <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1
Panel B: C ross-country  d ifferences for each industry group
p-value for differences 
across countries for:
Basic M ear/ <0 . 0 0 1 0.008 <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1
Mediang 0.005 0.662 <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1
Goods Mear/ 0.047 0.246 <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1
Mediang 0.052 0.279 <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1
Services Mear/ 0.006 0.046 <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1
Mediarf 0.090 0.585 <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1
Financials M ear/ <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 2 0.114
Median8 <0 . 0 0 1 <0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 1 1 0.522
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Notes to table 5.5:
a. The table reports statistics and tests on company-average valuation errors {A  V E ,)  and on company- 
average total dirty surplus flows (A T D S F ,) by country and industry for a large sample of U.K. and 
U.S. companies during the period 1994 to 2003. Averages are computed for company / over the 
available years in the period 1994 to 2003. Valuation error is defined as ( r 0 -  P0) / P q , where J '0 is
the value estimate obtained from the valuation model and P0 is the observed price per share at the 
valuation time 0. Negative value estimates are set to zero. T D S F  is total dirty surplus flows scaled 
by market value ( M V 0 ) at the valuation time 0. For the U.K., T D S F  =  P Y A  -  G W  +  A R  + C U R ,
where P Y A  denotes prior-year adjustments, G W  denotes goodwill, A R  denotes asset revaluations 
and C U R  denotes currency translation differences. For the U.S., T D S F  =  C U R  + M S E C  +  P E N ,  
where M S E C  denotes adjustments for marketable securities and P E N  denotes adjustments related to 
minimum pension liabilities. Observations that fall in the most extreme 2 % o f the distribution are 
eliminated. Industry groups are denoted as: basic (resources, basic and general industries and 
utilities) goods (consumer goods), services (services, information and technology) and financials.
b. Probability values based on a t-test of the null hypothesis of mean company-average valuation 
error (mean company-average total dirty surplus flows) equal to zero. Probability values of 0.05 
(5%) or less are printed in bold type.
c. Probability values based on a signed-rank test o f the null hypothesis that the distribution of 
company-average valuation errors (company-average total dirty surplus flows) is centred on zero. 
Probability values of 0.05 (5%) or less are printed in bold type.
d. Probability values based on a F-test o f the null hypothesis of equality o f mean company-average 
valuation errors (mean company-average total dirty surplus) across industries in a given country. 
Probability values o f 0.05 (5%) or less are printed in bold type.
e. Probability values based on a Kruskal-Wallis test o f the null hypothesis of equality o f mean rank 
o f company-average valuation errors (mean rank of company-average total dirty surplus flows) 
across industries in a given country. Probability values of 0.05 (5%) or less are printed in bold 
type.
f. Probability values based on a F-test of the null hypothesis o f equality of mean company-average 
valuation errors (mean company-average total dirty surplus) across countries in a given industry. 
Probability values o f 0.05 (5%) or less are printed in bold type.
g. Probability values based on a Kruskal-Wallis test o f the null hypothesis o f equality o f mean rank 
o f company-average valuation errors (mean rank of company-average total dirty surplus flows) 
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Table 5.8 - Regression tests of the relationship between company-average
valuation errors and company-average individual dirty surplus flows items for the
large U.K. sample















































Notes to table 5.8:
a. The table reports the regression coefficients, t-statistics, probability values and R~ for the regression 
tests for a large sample of U.K. companies for the following model: 
AVEt = a Q+fioAPYAi+faAGWj + p2 /L4/?, + fi3ACUR, + s , . AVE, is the company-average valuation
error. Valuation error is defined as (Vq-Pq)/ Pq, where V0 is the value estimate obtained from the 
valuation model and P0 is the observed price per share at the valuation time 0. Negative value estimates 
are set to zero. APYAt is the company-average of prior-year adjustments. AGW, is the company- 
average o f  goodwill. AARi is the company-average of asset revaluations. ACUR, is the company- 
average o f  currency translation differences. Dirty surplus flows variables are scaled by market value at 
the beginning o f the fiscal year (MV0). Averages are computed for company i over the available years 
in the period 1994 to 2003. The term a 0 is the regression intercept. The term p0 is the regression 
coefficient o f  APYAi . The term ^  is the regression coefficient of AGW ,. The term p 2 is the regression 
coefficient o f  AARt . The term P3 is the regression coefficient of ACUR, . The term e, is an error term.
b. t-statistics within ( ) and probability values within [ ] are given beneath the regression coefficients. 
These are calculated using the heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator as proposed 
by W hite (1980). In the case of p0 , f t , P2 and p3 the t-statistics are in respect o f a two-sided test o f 
the null hypothesis that the regression coefficient is zero, t-statistics and probability values marked as 
bold indicates that one can reject at the 5 % level the null hypothesis that the coefficient p0 , P j, P2 and 
P3 is zero. In the case o f a 0 the t-statistics are in respect o f a two-sided test o f the null hypothesis that 
the intercept coefficient is zero.
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Table 5.9 - Regression tests of the relationship between company-average
valuation errors and company-average individual dirty surplus flows for the
large U.S. sample











Signed valuation errors 0.385 0.533 22.627 5.413 0.003
(20.986) (0.125) (2.794) (0.493)
[<0.001] [0.901] [0.005J [0.622]
Absolute valuation errors 0.945 -21.163 52.644 -14.082 0.044
(56.644) (-6.628) (10.439) (-1.543)
[<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [0.123]
Notes to table 5.9:
a. The table reports the regression coefficients, t-statistics, probability values and R2 for the regression 
tests for a large sample of U.S. companies for the following model: 
AVEi = a Q +^>QACURi +^AM SECt +^2APENi +&t . AVE, is the company-average valuation error.
Valuation error is defined as (V0 - / ,0 )/P 0 , where V0 is the value estimate obtained from the valuation 
model and P0 is the observed price per share at the valuation time 0. Negative value estimates are set to 
zero. ACUR, is the company-average of currency translation differences. AMSEC, is the company- 
average o f adjustments for marketable securities. APENl is the company-average o f adjustments 
related to minimum pension liabilities. Dirty surplus flows variables are scaled by market value at the 
beginning o f the fiscal year (MV0). Averages are computed for company i over the available years in 
the period 1994 to 2003. The term a 0 is the regression intercept. The term p0 is the regression 
coefficient o f ACUR, . The term is the regression coefficient o f AMSEC, .  The term (32 is the 
regression coefficient o f APENj . The term s( is an error term. Observations that fall in the most 
extreme 2 % o f the distribution are eliminated.
b. t-statistics within ( ) and probability values within [ ] are given beneath the regression coefficients. 
These are calculated using the heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator as proposed 
by W hite (1980). In the case o f (30 >Pi and P 2 t-statistics are in respect o f a two-sided test o f the 
null hypothesis that the regression coefficient is zero, t-statistics and probability values marked as bold 
indicates that one can reject at the 5 % level the null hypothesis that the coefficient (30 , (3] and p2 *s 
zero. In the case o f a 0the t-statistics are in respect o f a two-sided test o f the null hypothesis that the 
intercept coefficient is zero.
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Table 5.10 - Regression tests of the relationship between yearly company




Number o f  
observations











1994 2,856 -0.355 1.839 0 . 0 0 1 0.468 -3.504 0.013
(-50.213) (1.234) (86.653) (-6.539)
1995
[<0.001] [0.217] [<0.001] [<0.001]
3,134 -0.316 12.451 0.014 0.513 2 . 1 2 0 0.004
(-35.366) (5.340) (93.394) (3.243)
1996
[<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [0.001]
3,653 -0.342 5.063 0 . 0 0 2 0.501 -1.806 0 . 0 0 2
(-45.825) (2.794) (99.377) (-3.012)
[<0.001] [0.005] [<0.001] [0.003]
1997 3,828 -0.308 5.930 0 . 0 0 2 0.523 -0.146 0 . 0 0 0
(-36.144) (2.697) (98.978) (-0.190)
[<0.001] [0.007] [<0.001] [0.849]
1998 3,754 1.398 36.622 0 . 0 0 1 1.362 115.030 0.038
(20.173) (1.982) (20.778) (8.829)
[<0.001] [0.048] [<0.001] [<0.001 ]
1999 3,735 0.355 -9.665 0 . 0 0 1 0.909 24.558 0.019
(13.859) (-1.358) (43.975) (6.643)
[<0.001] [0.174] [<0.001] [<0.001]
2 0 0 0 3,334 0.793 3.259 0 . 0 0 0 1.069 32.679 0.018
(25.043) (0.369) (35.797) (6.830)
[<0.001] [0.712] [<0.001] [<0.001]
2 0 0 1 3,202 0.648 18.554 0 . 0 0 2 0.975 19.007 0.009
(22.814) (2.264) (36.154) (4.616)
[<0.001] [0.024] [<0.001] [<0.0011
2 0 0 2 3,113 1.171 44.364 0.005 1.359 31.278 0.009
(27.381) (3.754) (30.961) (4.274)
[<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001]
2 0 0
Table 5.10 (continued) - Regression tests of the relationship between yearly















1994 361 -0.385 4.159 0.027 0.438 0.730 0 . 0 0 1
(-22.412) (3.505) (22.168) (0.657)
[<0.001] [0.001] [<0.001] [0.511]
1995 441 -0.534 2.231 0 . 0 1 1 0.555 0.136 0 . 0 0 0
(-42.587) (2.416) (33.519) (0.146)
[<0.001] [0.016] [<0.001] [0.884]
1996 557 -0.538 0.392 0 . 0 0 0 0.578 -2.245 0 . 0 1 1
(-44.365) (0.423) (36.454) (-2.437)
[<0.001] [0.673] [<0.001] [0.015]
1997 594 -0.385 1.062 0 . 0 0 1 0.534 -3.229 0.018
(-20.817) (0.589) (34.838) (-3.384)
[<0.001] [0.556] [<0.001] [0.001]
1998 619 0.031 0.907 0 . 0 0 0 0.658 -0.319 0 . 0 0 0
(0.882) (0.235) (21.831) (-0.140)
[0.378] [0.814] [<0.001] [0.888]
1999 605 0.462 2.864 0 . 0 0 0 0.893 8.284 0.007
(8.259) (0.495) (15.077) (1.766)
[<0.001] [0.621] [<0.001] [0.078]
2 0 0 0 564 0.581 2.435 0 . 0 0 0 0.879 12.586 0.015
(10.162) (0.381) (16.957) (2.988)
[<0.001] [0.703] [<0.001] [0.003]
2 0 0 1 458 0.295 -0 . 2 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0.604 11.679 0.025
(6.173) (-0.032) (13.440) (2.859)
[<0.001] [0.974] [<0.001] [0.004]
2 0 0 2 463 0.074 6.382 0.007 0.491 2.468 0.003
(2.111) (1.489) (18.143) (1.157)
[0.035] [0.137] [<0.001] [0.248]
2 0 1
Table 5.10 (continued) - Regression tests of the relationship between yearly




Number o f  
observations












1994 2,491 -0.352 1.981 0 . 0 0 0 0.472 -5.359 0 . 0 2 1
(-46.662) (0.773) (83.711) (-8.036)
[<0.001] [0.440] [<0.001] [<0.001]
1995 2,690 -0.294 20.567 0.015 0.510 2.865 0.004
(-30.281) (4.579) (86.557) (3.061)
[<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [0.002]
1996 3,095 -0.321 1.316 0 . 0 0 0 0.498 -3.995 0.007
(-39.455) (0.350) (91.941) (-4.589)
[<0.001] [0.727] [<0.001] [<0.001]
1997 3,229 -0.306 4.267 0 . 0 0 1 0.522 0.774 0 . 0 0 0
(-33.267) (0.963) (90.978) (0.676)
[<0.001] [0.335] [<0.001] [0.499]
1998 3,134 1.549 -28.806 0 . 0 0 0 1.298 224.107 0.084
(19.570) (-0.740) (17.549) (10.897)
[<0.001] [0.459] [<0.001] [<0.001]
1999 3,115 0.325 -34.838 0.004 0.894 36.331 0.027
(11.705) (-2.875) (39.639) (6.687)
[<0.001] [0.004] [<0.001] [<0.001]
2 0 0 0 2,111 0.813 -21.251 0 . 0 0 1 1.093 44.480 0 . 0 2 1
(22.783) (-1.479) (31.956) (6.433)
[<0.001] [0.139] [<0.001] [<0.001]
2 0 0 1 2,741 0.680 -3.073 0 . 0 0 0 1.019 24.489 0.009
(21.548) (-0.232) (33.840) (4.531)
[<0.001] [0.817] [<0.001] [<0.001]
2 0 0 2 2,652 1.309 20.769 0 . 0 0 1 1.422 64.249 0.023
(27.373) (0.998) (29.212) (6.207)
[<0.001] [0.318] [<0.001] [<0.001]
2 0 2
Notes to table 5.10:
a. The table reports the regression coefficients, t-statistics, probability values and R: for the regression 
tests for a large sample of U.K. and U.S. companies for the following model: 
VEt = clq + $qATDSF1 + sj , obtained for each individual year during the period 1994 to 2002. 
Results for year 2003 are not reported given the small number of observations available to perform 
the regression tests. VEt is the company-year valuation error. Valuation error is defined as 
(V0 ~^o) / / ’ where VQ is the value estimate obtained from the valuation model and PQ is the observed 
price per share at the valuation time 0. Negative value estimates are set to zero. ATDSFI is the 
company-average, over the available years in the period 1994 to 2003, of total dirty surplus flows 
(TDSF) scaled by market value at the beginning of the fiscal year (MV0). For the U.K., TDSF -  PYA 
- GW + AR + CUR, where PYA denotes prior-year adjustments, GW  denotes goodwill, AR denotes 
asset revaluations and CUR denotes currency translation differences. For the U.S., TDSF = CUR + 
MSEC + PEN, where MSEC denotes adjustments for marketable securities and PEN denotes 
adjustments related to minimum pension liabilities. The term a 0 is the regression intercept. The 
termPo is the regression coefficient of ATDSFI . The term S; is an error term. Observations that fall 
in the most extreme 2 % of the distribution are eliminated for each year.
b. t-statistics within ( )  and probability values within [ ] are given beneath the regression coefficients. 
These are calculated using the heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator as proposed 
by W hite (1980). In the case of P0the t-statistics are in respect of a two-sided test of the null 
hypothesis that the regression coefficient is zero, t-statistics and probability values marked as bold 
indicates that one can reject at the 5% level the null hypothesis that the coefficients P0 is zero. In the 
case o f a 0 the t-statistics are in respect of a two-sided test o f the null hypothesis that the intercept 
coefficient is zero.
203
Table 5.11 - Regression tests of the relationship between company-average valuation
errors and company-average total dirty surplus flows by industry for the large
sample
Country Number o f Signed valuation errors Absolute valuation errors
Industry company- Intercept ATDSF, R2 Intercept ATDSF, R2
averages a  o Po a 0 Po
Panel A: Regression tests by country and industry
All
Basic 4,062 -0.096 -3.286 0 . 0 0 1 0.599 2.331 0 . 0 0 1
(-7.910) (-1.726) (63.490) (2.130)
[<0.001] [0.084] [<0.001] [0.033]
Goods 853 0.448 8.323 0.003 0.881 -3.753 0 . 0 0 1
(12.239) (2.321) (27.705) (-1.444)
[<0.001] [0.021] [<0.001] [0.149]
Services 1,790 -0.195 1.551 0 . 0 0 0 0.698 -0.042 0 . 0 0 0
(-9.812) (0.594) (44.283) (-0.021)
[<0.001] [0.552] [<0.001] [0.983]
Financials 1,421 2.088 9.920 0.005 2.361 -15.622 0.014
(39.659) (2.705) (37.622) (-4.375)
[<0.001] [0.007] [<0.001] [<0.001]
U.K.
Basic 562 0 . 2 0 2 7.465 0 . 0 1 2 0.805 -1.560 0 . 0 0 1
(4.382) (2.515) (19.929) (-0.808)
[<0.001] [0.012] [<0.001] [0.420]
Goods 189 0.244 7.582 0.015 0.705 -0.267 0 . 0 0 0
(3.670) (2.031) (12.131) (-0.087)
[<0.001] [0.044] [<0.001] [0.931]
Services 307 -0.329 3.010 0.005 0.602 1.743 0.004
(-10.006) (1.004) (27.134) (1.139)
[<0.001] [0.316] [<0.001] [0.256]
Financials 154 0.172 7.342 0.037 0.619 2.272 0.004
(2.443) (2.258) (6.878) (0.651)
[0.016] [0.025] [<0.001] [0.516]
U.S.
Basic 3,500 -0.142 -8.911 0.006 0.580 0.413 0 . 0 0 0
(-11.898) (-3.451) (60.402) (0.290)
[<0.001] [0.001] [<0.001] [0.771]
Goods 664 0.498 -5.973 0 . 0 0 0 0.904 5.444 0 . 0 0 1
(11.738) (-0.625) (24.796) (0.846)
[<0.001] [0.532] [<0.001] [0.398]
Services 1,483 -0.166 -7.381 0 . 0 0 1 0.710 2.373 0 . 0 0 0
(-7.300) (-1.548) (38.623) (0.522)
[<0.001] [0.122] [<0.001] [0.602]
Financials 1,267 2.313 13.960 0.009 2.503 -12.744 0.009
(42.161) (3.211) (37.831) (-3.052)
[<0.001] [0.001] [<0.001] [0.002]
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Table 5.11 (continued) - Regression tests of the relationship between company-
average valuation errors and company-average total dirty surplus flows by industry
for the large sample
P anel B: Tests o f cross-industry differences
Country Signed valuation errors Absolute valuation errors
Industry Goods Services Financials Goods Services Financials
All
Basic 0.004 0.134 0 . 0 0 1 0.031 0.296 <0 . 0 0 1
Goods 0.127 0.756 0.257 0.007
Services 0.063 <0 . 0 0 1
U.K.
Basic 0.980 0.291 0.978 0.722 0.180 0.337
Goods 0.340 0.961 0.559 0.585
Services 0.327 0.890
U.S.
Basic 0.766 0.778 <0 . 0 0 1 0.445 0.681 0.003
Goods 0.895 0.058 0.697 0.018
Services 0 . 0 0 1 0.014
Notes to table 5.11:
a. The table reports the regression coefficients, t-statistics, probability values, R2 and tests for a large 
sample o f U.K. and U.S. companies for the following model:
AVEi = a 0 +(3qATDSFi + e ( . AVE, is the company-average valuation error over the available years in 
the period 1994 to 2003. Valuation error is defined as (VQ - P 0) / P 0 , where V0 is the value estimate 
obtained from the valuation model andP0 is the observed price per share at the valuation time 0. Negative 
value estimates are set to zero. ATDSFt is the company-average, over the available years in the period 
1994 to 2003, o f total dirty surplus flows (TDSF) scaled by market value at the beginning o f the fiscal 
year (MV0). For the U.K., TDSF = PYA - GW + AR + CUR, where PYA denotes prior-year adjustments, 
GW  denotes goodwill, AR denotes asset revaluations and CUR denotes currency translation differences. 
For the U.S., TDSF = CUR + MSEC + PEN, where MSEC denotes adjustments for marketable securities 
and PEN  denotes adjustments related to minimum pension liabilities. The term a 0 is the regression 
intercept. The term P0 is the regression coefficient o f ATDSFt . The term s; is an error term.
b. Panel A reports regression results, t-statistics within ( ) and probability values within [ ] are given 
beneath the regression coefficients. These are calculated using the heteroskedasticity-consistent 
covariance matrix estimator as proposed by White (1980). In the case of |30 the t-statistics are in respect 
o f a two-sided test o f the null hypothesis that the regression coefficient is zero, t-statistics and probability 
values marked as bold indicates that one can reject at the 5% level the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients f30 is zero. In the case of a 0the t-statistics are in respect o f a two-sided test o f the null
hypothesis that the intercept coefficient is zero.
c. Panel B reports probability values based on a t-test of the null hypothesis o f equality o f coefficients o f 
ATDSFj across pairs o f industries. This is obtained by performing tests on the regression coefficients o f 
the model below. Probability values of 0.05 (5%) or less are printed in bold type. Probability values are 
calculated using the heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator as proposed by White 
(1980). The regression model is as follows:
A V E t =  a 0 +  a xBasic +  a 2G oods  +  a 3Services +  >^0ATDSFi ^ B a s ic .A T D S F ^ G o o d s .A T D S F ,  + W ,S e r v e s .  A TDSF, +  e, 
The 'terms a , , a 2 and ot3 are the regression coefficients of Basic, Goods and Services. Basic, Goods and
Services are dummy variables that take a value of one if the company belongs to industry group basic 
(resources, basic and general industries and utilities), industry group goods (consumer goods), industry 
group services (services, information and technology), respectively, and zero otherwise. The terms [3,,
(32 and p3 are the regression coefficients of ATDSF, interacted with the dummy variables.
d. Regression models are applied to the data reported in table 5.4.
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Table 5.12 - Summary statistics of primary variables for the small sample
---------------------------       (in millions Euros)
Country Number o f
IndustQL company-years Net income__________ Book value Market value
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
All 784 106.24 13.70 810.96 148.64 1,897.76 296.35
Basic 404 32.08 10.70 342.53 123.95 777.67 252.27
Goods 119 25.69 9.68 229.50 130.25 572.67 181.55
Services 91 23.59 8 . 8 8 119.88 57.46 591.85 190.70
Financials 170 386.39 72.66 2,723.65 657.69 6,235.33 1,082.41
France 172 101.52 10.70 966.39 96.65 1,721.39 249.58
Basic 1 2 2 50.83 10.51 509.14 99.46 869.01 182.97
Goods 1 2 18.54 7.63 245.40 42.48 606.53 132.33
Services 16 15.97 5.81 50.36 58.70 463.55 140.04
Financials 2 2 528.97 101.56 4,921.05 1,271.29 7,971.10 1,272.25
Germany 150 48.45 9.07 605.83 153.19 1,258.62 224.61
Basic 82 8.31 5.64 120.61 95.60 262.35 156.71
Goods 2 2 48.30 21.99 395.52 206.42 870.89 296.72
Services 11 8.19 4.08 101.95 24.45 322.47 123.92
Financials 35 155.24 91.01 2,033.21 1,089.88 4,130.69 2,714.96
U.K. 203 51.13 14.88 383.67 114.91 962.64 276.18
Basic 67 31.44 9.68 222.54 70.66 687.05 232.24
Goods 62 30.70 12.61 203.99 153.59 611.78 193.45
Services 25 6.31 2 . 1 1 59.46 15.85 225.53 43.48
Financials 49 126.80 67.88 996.76 463.87 2,159.48 886.18
U.S. 259 186.00 20.85 1,162.65 191.70 3,151.87 462.02
Basic 133 29.88 19.57 386.97 180.70 1,063.70 529.22
Goods 23 -5.72 9.34 131.16 112.41 164.33 130.58
Services 39 42.15 21.27 192.18 147.16 964.84 331.19
Financials 64 666.99 50.80 3,736.69 372.86 10,090.94 775.60
Notes to table 5.12:
a. The table reports statistics o f primary variables (in millions Euros) for a small sample o f French, 
German, U.K. and U.S. companies during the period 1994 to 2001. Variables are obtained at fiscal 
year-end. Book value is common book value. Net income is income before extraordinary items.
b. Data in US dollars obtained from Compustat are converted to euros using the average exchange rate 
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Table 5.15 - Mean and median company-average valuation errors and 








valuation errors (A VE)
Company-average 
TDSF (A TDSFi)
Signed Absolute Signed Absolute
P anel A: In d u stry  differences by country
All
Basic 94 Mean -0.041 0.657 -0.008* 0.017
Medianc -0.351* 0.524 0 .0 0 0 * 0.005
Goods 28 Mean 0.287* 0.788 -0.005 0.014
Medianc 0.304 0.726 -0 . 0 0 1 0.008
Services 24 Meanb -0.382* 0.630 -0 . 0 1 0 0.017
Medianc -0.582* 0.639 0 . 0 0 0 0.006
Financials 44 Mean 0.233 0.756 -0.013 0.025
Medianc -0.062 0.501 -0 . 0 0 1 0.008
p-value for differences Meand 0.127 0.596 0.961 0.837
across industries Median 0 . 0 0 1 0.268 0.649 0.437
France
Basic 30 Mean -0.418* 0.464 0.004 0.009
Medianc -0.445* 0.464 0 .0 0 1 * 0.005
Goods 5 Meanh 0.577 1 . 0 0 2 -0.003 0.003
Medianc 0.403 0.929 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 1
Services 6 Mean -0.747 0.747 -0.015 0 . 0 2 0
Median0 -0.732* 0.732 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 2
Financials 1 0 Meanb -0.129 0.287 0.004 0 . 0 1 1
Medianc -0.160 0.267 0 . 0 0 1 0.005
p-value for differences Meand <0 . 0 0 1 0.008 0.975 0.510
across industries Mediane <0 . 0 0 1 0.008 0.979 0.599
Germany
Basic 25 Meanb -0 . 1 0 2 0.586 -0.013 0.024
Medianc -0.338 0.537 -0.003* 0 . 0 1 0
Goods 6 Meanb -0.137 0.513 -0 . 0 1 2 0.017
Medianc -0.245 0.429 -0.007* 0.013
Services 3 Meanb 0 . 1 2 1 0.380 -0.009 0.014
Medianc -0.038 0.403 -0.013 0.016
Financials 1 2 Meanb -0.395* 0.606 -0.007*
0.008
Medianc -0.451 0.622 -0 .0 0 2 * 0.006
p-value for differences Meand 0.802 0.678 0.803
0.532
across industries Median6 0.158 0.206 0.966 0.414
2 1 2
Table 5.15 (continued) - Mean and median company-average valuation errors 













Signed Absolute Signed Absolute
U.K.
Basic 15 Meanb 0.584 1.027 -0.032* 0.042
Median0 0.385 0.740 -0.004* 0.031
Goods 1 2 Meanb 0.125 0.721 -0.005 0 . 0 2 1
Median0 0.233 0.713 -0 . 0 0 2 0.019
Services 6 Meanb -0.377 0.716 -0.016 0.034
Median0 -0.617 0.711 -0.004 0.017
Financials 1 0 Meanb 0.247 0.731 -0.029 0.054
Median0 0.028 0.436 -0.014 0.040
p-value for differences Meand 0.303 0.758 0.728 0.487
across industries Mediane 0.235 0.920 0.853 0.702
U.S.
Basic 24 Meanb 0 . 1 0 2 0.742 -0 .0 0 2 * 0.004
Median0 -0.227 0.466 -0 .0 0 1 * 0 . 0 0 2
Goods 5 Meanb 0.894 1.066 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 1
Median 0 . 8 8 8 1.051 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
Services 9 Meanb -0.308 0.580 -0.004 0.005
Median -0.528 0.601 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 2
Financials 1 2 Meanb 1.153* 1.318 -0 . 0 2 1 0.029
Median0 1.103* 1.103 -0.006 0.013
p-value for differences Mean 0.095 0.817 0.106 0.004
across industries Median 0.007 0.669 0.299 0.004
Panel B: C ross-country  differences for each industry group
p-value for differences 
across countries for:
Basic Meanf 0.128 0.377 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
Median? 0.420 0.691 0.039 0 . 0 0 0
Goods Mearf 0.136 0.831 0.318 0.085
Median? 0.085 0.817 0.077 0.005
Services Mean/ 0 . 0 2 1 0.013 0.307 0.031
Median? 0.038 0.040 0.746 0.018
Financials Mearf 0.054 0.415 0.263 0.006
Median? 0.009 0.364 0.606 0.058
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Notes to table 5.15:
a. The table reports statistics and tests on company-average valuation errors (A VE,) and of company- 
average total dirty surplus flows (ATDSF,) by country and industry. Averages are computed for 
company i over the available years in the period 1994 to 2001. Valuation error is defined as 
(fo > where V0 is the value estimate obtained from the valuation model and P0 is the
observed price per share at the valuation time 0. Negative value estimates are set to zero. TDSF is 
total dirty surplus flows obtained from published financial reports scaled by market value at the 
beginning o f  the fiscal year (MV0) (see chapter 3 for details on computing TDSE). Observations 
that fall in the most extreme 2% of the distribution are eliminated. Industry groups are denoted as: 
basic (resources, basic and general industries and utilities) goods (consumer goods), services 
(services, information and technology) and financials.
b. Probability values for a t-test of the null hypothesis that the mean company-average valuation 
error (mean company-average total dirty surplus flows) is zero. Probability' values of 0.05 (5%) or 
less are printed in bold type.
c. Probability values for a signed-rank test of the null hypothesis that the distribution of company- 
average valuation errors (company-average total dirty surplus flows) is centred on zero. 
Probability values of 0.05 (5%) or less are printed in bold type.
d. Probability values based on a F-test of the null hypothesis of equality of mean company-average 
valuation errors (mean company-average total dirty surplus) across industries in a given country. 
Probability values of 0.05 (5%) or less are printed in bold type.
e. Probability values based on a Kruskal-Wallis test of the null hypothesis of equality o f mean rank 
o f company-average valuation errors (mean rank of company-average total dirty surplus flows) 
across industries in a given country. Probability values of 0.05 (5%) or less are printed in bold 
type.
f. Probability values based on a F-test of the null hypothesis of equality of mean company-average 
valuation errors (mean company-average total dirty surplus) across countries in a given industry. 
Probability values of 0.05 (5%) or less are printed in bold type.
g. Probability values based on a Kruskal-Wallis test of the null hypothesis of equality o f mean rank 
o f company-average valuation errors (mean rank of company-average total dirty surplus flows) 
across countries in a given industry. Probability values of 0.05 (5%) or less are printed in bold 
type.
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Table 5.16 - Regression tests of the relationship between company-average
valuation errors and company-average total dirty surplus flows for the small
sample
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Panel B: Tests of cross-country differences
Country
Signed valuation errors Absolute valuation errors
France Germany U.S France Germany U.S
U.K. 0.174 0.365 <0.001 0.262 0 . 2 2 2 <0.001
France 0.555 0.003 0.912 0.002
Germany 0.001 0.001
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Notes to table 5.16:
a. The table reports the regression coefficients, t-statistics, probability values and R2 for the regression 
tests for a small sample of French, German, U.K. and U.S. companies for the following model: 
A V E t = a 0 + $ 0ATDSFl + s ( . AVEt is the company-average valuation error over the available years 
in the period 1994 to 2001. Valuation error is defined as (v0 -  Pq)/P0 , where F0 is the value estimate 
obtained from the valuation model and/g is the observed price per share at the valuation time 0 . 
Negative value estimates are set to zero. ATDSFt is the company-average, over the available years 
in the period 1994 to 2003, of total dirty surplus flows (TDSF) obtained from published financial 
reports scaled by market value at the beginning of the fiscal year (M V0) (see chapter 3 for details on 
computing TDSF). The term a 0 is the regression intercept. The term(30 is the regression coefficient 
o f A T D S F j. The term e( is an error term.
b. Panel A reports regression results, t-statistics within ( )  and probability values within [ ] are given 
beneath the regression coefficients. These are calculated using the heteroskedasticity-consistent 
covariance matrix estimator as proposed by White (1980). In the case of P0 the t-statistics are in 
respect o f a two-sided test of the null hypothesis that the regression coefficient is zero, t-statistics 
and probability values marked as bold indicates that one can reject at the 5% level the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients P0 is zero. In the case of a 0 the t-statistics are in respect o f a two- 
sided test o f the null hypothesis that the intercept coefficient is zero.
c. Panel B reports probability values based on a t-test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient o f 
A T D SF t is equal across pairs o f countries. This is obtained by performing tests on the regression 
coefficients o f the model below. Probability values of 0.05 (5%) or less are printed in bold type. 
Probability values are calculated using the heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator 
as proposed by White (1980). The regression model is as follows: 
A V E i =  a 0 +OLlU K  +  a 2FR + a 3GE + $0ATDSFi + ^UK.ATDSFt + $2FR.ATDSFi +P3GE. ATDSF, + s , . 
The terms , a 2 and a 3 are the regression coefficient of U.K., FR  and GE. U.K., FR  and GE  are 
dummy variables that take a value of one if the company belongs to the U.K., France, Germany, 
respectively, and zero otherwise. The terms Pl5 P2 and P3are the regression coefficient of ATDSFj
interacted with the dummy variable.
d. Regression models are applied to data reported in table 5.14, panel A.
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Table 5.17 Regression tests of the relationship between company-average
valuation errors and company-average total dirty surplus flows excluding
goodwill for the small sample
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P anel B: Tests o f cross-country differences
Signed valuation errors Absolute valuation errors









0 . 1 2 1 0.541
0.198
0 . 0 1 0
<0 . 0 0 1
<0 . 0 0 1
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Notes to table 5.17:
a. The table reports the regression coefficients, t-statistics, probability values and R~ for the regression 
tests for a small sample of French, German, U.K. and U.S. companies for the following model: 
AVEj = cc0 +(30 ATDSFj -t-s^. AVE, is the company-average valuation error over the available years 
in the period 1994 to 2001. Valuation error is defined as (f0 -  Pq)/Pq , where K0 is the value estimate 
obtained from the valuation model and F0 is the observed price per share at the valuation time 0 . 
Negative value estimates are set to zero. ATDSFI is the company-average, over the available years 
in the period 1994 to 2001, of total dirty surplus flows (TDSF) excluding goodwill obtained from 
published financial reports, scaled by market value at the beginning of the fiscal year (M V0) (see 
chapter 3 for details on computing TDSF). The term a 0 is the regression intercept. The term (30 is the 
regression coefficient o f ATDSFl . The term s/ is an error term.
b. Panel A reports regression results, t-statistics within ( )  and probability values within [ ] are given 
beneath the regression coefficients. These are calculated using the heteroskedasticity-consistent 
covariance matrix estimator as proposed by White (1980). In the case of p0 the t-statistics are in 
respect o f a two-sided test of the null hypothesis that the regression coefficient is zero, t-statistics 
and probability values marked as bold indicates that one can reject at the 5% level the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients P0 is zero. In the case of a 0 the t-statistics are in respect o f a two- 
sided test o f  the null hypothesis that the intercept coefficient is zero.
c. Panel B reports probability values based on a t-test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient of 
ATDSFj is equal across pairs of countries. This is obtained by performing tests on the regression
coefficients o f the model below. Probability values of 0.05 (5%) or less are printed in bold type. 
Probability values are calculated using the heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator 
as proposed by White (1980). The regression model is as follows: 
AVEj =  a 0 +  a lU K  +  a 2FR + a 3GE + %ATDSF, + ^U K . ATDSF, + $2FR. ATDSF, + $3GE. ATDSF, + s , . 
The terms , a 2 and a 3 are the regression coefficient of U.K., FR  and GE. U.K., FR  and G E  are 
dummy variables that take a value of one if the company belongs to the U.K., France, Germany, 
respectively, and zero otherwise. The terms Pj, P2 an^ P3 are the regression coefficient o f ATDSF, 
interacted with the dummy variable.
d. Regression models are applied to data reported in table 5.14, panel A.
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Table 5.18 - Regression tests of the relationship between company-average valuation








































































































































































Notes to table 5.18:
a. The table reports the regression coefficients, t-statistics, probability values and R: for the regression 
tests for a small sample of French, German, U.K. and U.S. companies for the following model: 
AVEj = clq + $QlAPYAi + PjAGWt + ^2-^GMj -\-$2AARt + paAOTH1 + s ( . AVEl is the company-average 
valuation error. Valuation error is defined as (F0 -  Pq)/P0 , where V0 is the value estimate obtained from 
the valuation model and/g is the observed price per share at the valuation time 0. Negative value 
estimates are set to zero. APYAt is the company-average of prior-year adjustments. AGWt is the 
company-average o f goodwill. AGMt is the company-average of unrecognised issue of equity under 
merger accounting. AARj is the company-average of asset revaluations. AOTHt is the company- 
average o f  ‘other dirty surplus flows’. Dirty surplus flows variables are obtained from published 
financial statements and they are scaled by market value at the beginning of the fiscal year (MV0) (see 
chapter 3 for details on dirty surplus flows). Averages are computed for company / over the available 
years in the period 1994 to 2001. The term ot0 is the regression intercept. The term p0 is the regression 
coefficient o f APYAt . The term Pj is the regression coefficient of AGWt . The term P 2 is the regression 
coefficient o f AGM t . The term P3 is the regression coefficient o f AAR, . The term P4 is the regression 
coefficient ofAO TH ^. The term s( is an error term. Observations that fall in the most extreme 2% of 
the distribution for are eliminated.
b. t-statistics within ( ) and probability values within [ ] are given beneath the regression coefficients. 
These are calculated using the heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator as proposed 
by W hite (1980). In the case of P0 , P j, P2 , P3 and P4 the t-statistics are in respect of a two-sided test of 
the null hypothesis that the regression coefficient is zero, t-statistics and probability values marked as 
bold indicates that one can reject at the 5% level the null hypothesis that the coefficient 
P o , P j, p2 , p3 and P4 is zero. In the case of a 0the t-statistics are in respect o f a two-sided test o f the 
null hypothesis that the intercept coefficient is zero.
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Table 5.19 - Regression tests of the relationship between yearly company















1994 62 -0.327 1.148 0.001 0.477 -1.954 0.015
(-6.067) (0.330) (11.191) (-0.920)
[<0.001] [0.743] [<0.001] [0.361]
1995 69 -0.385 -3.069 0.035 0.470 -0.903 0.008
(-8.333) (-1.133) (13.162) (-0.656)
[<0.001] [0.261] [<0.001] [0.514]
1996 93 -0.375 -0.724 0.002 0.424 -0.472 0.002
(-11.107) (-0.360) (13.496) (-0.359)
[<0.001] [0.720] [<0.001] [0.721]
1997 113 -0.362 -4.293 0.045 0.482 0.547 0.002
(-8.829) (-1.491) (16.410) (0.364)
[<0.001] [0.139] [<0.001] [0.717]
1998 115 0.565 -5.908 0.003 0.989 11.930 0.016
(2.430) (-0.386) (4.400) (0.951)
[0.017] [0.701] [<0.001] [0.344]
1999 105 0.268 -2.415 0.002 0.814 3.780 0.008
(1.922) (-0.369) (7.070) (0.893)
[0.057] [0.713] [<0.001] [0.374]
2000 82 0.418 -12.493 0.044 0.778 14.635 0.090
(2.406) (-1.445) (5.409) (2.068)
[0.018] [0.152] [<0.001] [0.042]
2001 85 0.411 -8.332 0.016 0.850 4.682 0.007
(2.396) (-1.215) (4.910) (0.822)
[0.019] [0.228] [<0.001 ] [0.413]
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Notes to table 5.19:
a. The table reports the regression coefficients, t-statistics, probability values and R~ for the regression 
tests for a small sample of French, German, U.K. and U.S. companies for the following model: 
VEj = a 0 +(30ATDSF' + s ( , obtained for each individual year during the period 1994 to 2001. VEt is 
the company-year valuation error. Valuation error is defined as ( K 0  - P q) /P q, where V0 is the value 
estimate obtained from the valuation model and P0 is the observed price per share at the valuation 
time 0. Negative value estimates are set to zero. ATDSFj is the company-average, over the available 
years in the period 1994 to 2001, of total dirty surplus flows (TDSF) obtained from published 
financial reports scaled by market value at the beginning of the fiscal year (MV0) (see chapter 3 for 
details on computing TDSF). The term a 0 is the regression intercept. The term P0 is the regression 
coefficient o f ATDSFl . The term s ( is an error term. Observations that fall in the most extreme 2% 
of the distribution are eliminated for each year.
b. t-statistics within ( )  and probability values within [ ] are given beneath the regression coefficients. 
These are calculated using the heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator as proposed 
by W hite (1980). In the case of (30 the t-statistics are in respect o f a two-sided test o f the null 
hypothesis that the regression coefficient is zero, t-statistics and probability values marked as bold 
indicates that one can reject at the 5% level the null hypothesis that the coefficients P0 is zero. In the 
case o f a 0 the t-statistics are in respect of a two-sided test of the null hypothesis that the intercept 
coefficient is zero.
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Table 5.20 - Regression tests of the relationship between company-average valuation
errors and company-average total dirty surplus flows by industry for the small
sample












Panel A: Regression tests by industry for the pooled sample
Basic 94 -0.052 -1.408 0.003 0.696 -2.269 0.013
(-0.583) (-1.008) (9.813) (-2.156)
[0.561] [0.316] [<0.001] 10.0341
Goods 28 0.360 13.818 0.079 0.910 -8.896 0.113
(2.560) (2.604) (7.990) (-2.181)
[0.017] [0.015] [<0.001] [0.038]
Services 24 -0.351 2.955 0.027 0.639 -0.513 0.005
(-2.884) (1.367) (13.096) (-0.586)
[0.009] [0.185] [<0.001] [0.564]
Financials 44 0.248 -0.156 0.000 0.676 3.479 0.050
(1.557) (-0.037) (6.522) (0.814)
[0.127] [0.971] [<0.001] [0.420]
Panel B: Tests of cross-industry differences for the pooled sample
Industry Signed valuation errors Absolute valuation errors
Goods Services Financials Goods Services Financials
Basic 0.006 0.090 0.778 0.116 0.200 0.192
Goods 0.058 0.039 0.045 0.036
Services 0.511 0.360
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Notes to table 5.20:
a. The table reports the regression coefficients, t-statistics, probability values, R2 and tests for a small 
sample o f French, German, U.K. and U.S. companies for the following 
model. AVEt = a 0 +[30/17’D,S'F’ + s ( . AVEl is the company-average valuation error over the available 
years in the period 1994 to 2001. Valuation error is defined as (f'o- ^o)/^o, where r0 is the value 
estimate obtained from the valuation model and P0 is the observed price per share at the valuation time 0. 
Negative value estimates are set to zero. ATDSFi is the company-average, over the available years in the 
period 1994 to 2001, o f total dirty surplus flows (TDSF) scaled by market value at the beginning of the 
fiscal year (MV9) (see chapter 3 for details on computing TDSF). The term a 0 is the regression intercept. 
The term (30 is the regression coefficient of ATDSF,. The term e, is an error term.
b. Panel A reports regression results for the pooled sample, t-statistics within ( ) and probability values 
within [ ] are given beneath the regression coefficients. These are calculated using the heteroskedasticity- 
consistent covariance matrix estimator as proposed by White (1980). In the case of (30 the t-statistics are 
in respect o f a two-sided test of the null hypothesis that the regression coefficient is zero, t-statistics and 
probability values marked as bold indicates that one can reject at the 5% level the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients (30 is zero. In the case of a 0 the t-statistics are in respect o f a two-sided test o f the null 
hypothesis that the intercept coefficient is zero.
c. Panel B reports probability values based on a t-test of the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients o f 
ATDSFj  across pairs o f industries for the pooled sample. This is obtained by performing tests on the 
regression coefficients o f the model below. Probability values of 0.05 (5%) or less are printed in bold 
type. Probability values are calculated using the heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix 
estimator as proposed by White (1980). The regression model is as follows:
A V E j = a 0 +  a ^ B a s ic  +  a 2G o o d s  +  a 3S e r v ic e s  +  $ 0A T D S F j B a s ic . A T D S F : + fi2G o o c ls .A T D S F , + ^ S e r v i c e s .  A T D S F I + £,- 
The terms a ! , a 2 and a 3 are the regression coefficients of Basic, Goods and Services. Basic, Goods and 
Services are dummy variables that assume a value of one if the company belongs to industry group basic 
(resources, basic and general industries and utilities), industry group goods (consumer goods), industry 
group services (services, information and technology), respectively, or a value of zero otherwise, for 
industry group financials. The terms (3j, (32 and p3 are the regression coefficients o f ATDSFt interacted
with the dummy variables.
d. Regression models are applied to the data reported in table 5.14, panel A.
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Appendix 5.1 - Equivalence between intrinsic value estimates from the RIVM 
and AEGM for the U.K. company AEA Tecnology Pic for the year 1997
Periods
Explicit earnings Implicit earnings
forecasts forecasts
1
A E G M  intrinsic value estimate:





g  = r o e { \ -  dp) 0.0600
bvpso 0.9311
bvpst t^>^ - b v p s t_x+xpst -d p s t 15.6623 32.6433 34.6026 36.6796
xpsxand xps2 31.9548 36.8352
xPst(t>2) = r o e x bvPst-i 4.2502 4.5053
dpst =dxpst 17.2236 19.8541 2.2908 2.4283
31.8477 35.0340 0.4962 0.5260
RIV M  intrinsic value estimate:
axps
Present value xpsa 28.5630 28.1799
j y  7.2594
™*mVM 64.9334vps0
277.8677
27.7068 -300.3288 0.2590 -41.2531
Present value zt (b) 24.8492 -241.5724
p y  3.7889
v p s A E O M  64.9334
Notes:
a. Variables are defined as in section 5.4.1 of the text. For easy o f notation values are rounded to four
decimal places.
( w + i  -  xps,) -  r(xpst+l -  dpst)
b. z t =
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Appendix 5.2 - Dirty surplus flows obtained from the algorithm and from the
financial statements for U.K. company Alliance & Leicester Pic for the year 2000
(in m illion  E uros)
Prior year Goodwill Asset Currency Total dirty
adjustments revaluations translation surplus
differences flows
PYA GW AR CUR = TDSF
P anel A: A lgorithm  TDSF = PYA - G W  + AR + CUR
Data from Extel 0 0 0 0 0
Panel B: F inancial statem ents
Data from the financial 
statements -10.720a -10.720
Notes:
a. According to the notes to the financial statements this movement refers to restatement o f previous 
years accounts as a result o f changes in the accounting policy for software and consultancy costs.
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Appendix 5.3 - Dirty surplus flows obtained from the algorithm and from the 
financial statements for U.S. company Louisiana-Pacific Corporation for the year
1997
(in m illion  E uros)
Currency Adjustments Pension Other Total dirty
translation for marketable adjustments comprehensive surplus
differences securities income0 flows
CUR MSEC PEN OTH = TDSF
P anel A: A lgorithm  TDSF = CUR + MSEC + PEN
Data from Compustat 0 0 -11.651 0 -11.651
Panel B: F inancial statem ents
Data from the
financial statements -13.078a 0 -7.150b 0.872a -19.356
Notes:
a. Item not captured by the database but reported in the company financial statements as part o f 
comprehensive income.





Given the paramount importance of accounting earnings as an indicator of 
performance and value-creation, any issue regarding the definition and disclosure of 
earnings is likely to cause concerns among regulators, scholars, investors, managers 
and other users of accounting information. Measurement and disclosure of earnings is 
the core issue in the current International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) project 
on Reporting Financial Performance, which is now a joint project with the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB). According to Cauwenberge and De Beelde 
(2005), the IASB decision on measurement and recognition of income will have 
significant consequences for financial analysis, financial performance measurement, 
and company valuation. However, income definition is not a recent topic in 
accounting. As far back as the 1930s regulators and researchers were intensively 
debating what transactions should be included in or excluded from accounting 
earnings (Paton, 1922; Littleton, 1940; Black, 1993; Linsmeier, et al., 1997; Johnson, 
et al., 1995; FASB, 1997 -  Statement o f Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 130: 
Reporting Comprehensive Income). The centre of the debate is an accounting practice 
that records certain gains and losses directly in the balance sheet. This is referred to as 
‘dirty surplus accounting’. Examples of such practice include goodwill write-offs, 
asset revaluations, foreign currency translation differences and consolidation 
adjustments, which are directly recorded as part of shareholders funds. The 
transactions responsible for dirty surplus accounting are know as dirty surplus flows . 
The question of whether to include or exclude dirty surplus flows from income might 
have important implications in accounting-based measures of value and performance, 
particularly if  such flows are of large magnitude and persist over periods of time 
(Stark, 1997). Further, because dirty surplus accounting varies across accounting
229
regimes, the peiformance measurement and valuation implications may vary 
accordingly (Frankel and Lee, 1999; Chen, et al., 2004). Often, the arguments in 
favour o f excluding dirty surplus flows from income are based on the usefulness of 
earnings for valuation. For example, Black (1993) argues that abnormal items such as 
dirty surplus flows reduce the predictive ability of earnings for future flows. Black 
defends a definition of earnings based on recurring items. A divergent position is 
advocated by Johnson, et al. (1995), who argue that income should include all items 
so that all information is provided to the users of financial information. This definition 
is known as the all-inclusive concept of income, or comprehensive income. Under 
comprehensive income, earnings are defined in accordance with the clean surplus 
relationship (CSR) meaning that all transactions except capital transactions are 
included in net income. In other words, if CSR holds there is no room for dirty surplus 
accounting practices. Over the years, standard-setters have favoured one or other 
concept. Nowadays, there seems to be a preference for the comprehensive income 
perspective expressed in some accounting standards (FASB - SFAS 130; IASB - 
Reporting Financial Performance Project), but in practice a hybrid solution is adopted 
in most countries.
I use the context of internationally permitted variation in CSR violations to 
analyse the level of dirty surplus accounting practices and its implications for 
performance measurement and equity valuation. My first study focuses on 
documenting the characteristics of dirty surplus flows in four countries: France, 
Germany, the U.K and the U.S. during the period 1993 to 2001. These four countries 
are economically important and provide a scenario with substantial variation in dirty 
surplus accounting. The first problem encountered in the study is access to reliable 
data on dirty surplus flows. Previous studies have applied simplified algorithms to
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machine-ieadable data from commercial databases like Compustat, Datastream and 
Global Vantage (Hand and Landsman, 1998; Dhaliwaf et a l, 1999; Wang, 2003). I 
test the reliability of algorithm-based measures of dirty surplus flows by comparing 
them with the companies’ financial statements and conclude that, in many cases, 
algorithm measures contain large errors. The failure of such ready-to-use measures is 
often the result of incorrect classification or non-availability of dirty surplus items in 
the databases. A typical example is the database items relating to capital movements 
in shareholders’ funds, which include both capital transactions and dirty surplus flows. 
The databases failure to provide accurate information is, in many cases, a consequence 
of opaque financial reporting on dirty surplus movements by the companies. This is 
particularly true in the case of French and German companies where clear accounting 
regulation on the disclosure of these items is virtually non-existent. Therefore, the data 
on dirty surplus flows used in the greater part of this thesis are hand-collected from 
companies’ published financial reports. This procedure ensures high data quality but 
reduces the feasible number of companies used in the analysis. The sample used 
comprises eighty companies from each of the four countries representing sixteen 
broad industry-size groupings.
Based on the unique set of data gathered from extensive analysis of the 
companies’ financial reports, I provide evidence that the distribution of various 
categories of dirty surplus flows is often not centred on zero. Dirty surplus flows are 
negative on average across the four countries and there is significant cross-country 
variation in such flows. Goodwill-related items are the most important source of dirty 
surplus accounting, although such items are being eliminated in some accounting 
regimes.
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My next analysis considers the implications of dirty surplus flows and cross­
country variation therein for performance measurement. Specifically, I aim to provide 
evidence on the impact of omitting dirty surplus flows from earnings numbers used to 
measure multi-period abnormal performance. I assess the potential implications based 
on a measure of abnormal performance developed in O’Hanlon and Peasnell (2002) 
and denoted Excess Value Created (EVC). EVC is an ex-post measure of performance 
equal to cumulative residual income, adjusted by opening and closing market-to-book 
premium. Because the link between EVC and residual income formulation relies on 
CSR, it provides a framework for observing the effect of using earnings numbers that 
disregard dirty surplus flows to measure abnormal performance. It is worthwhile 
mentioning that this framework is similar to using a residual-income type valuation 
model except that this later approach adopts an ex-ante perspective based on future 
flows. Using data obtained from the companies’ financial reports, I analyse the EVC 
error resulting from omission of dirty surplus flows, both in terms of bias (signed 
error) and inaccuracy (absolute error). Regarding bias, results indicate that the effect 
of omitting dirty surplus flows on the accounting-based measure of abnormal 
measurement is largely limited to goodwill-related flows. Regarding inaccuracy, 
results show that all categories of dirty surplus flows have some significant impact on 
EVC and there is cross-country variation in that effect. Hence, omission of dirty 
surplus flows in accounting-based measures of economic performance might result in 
inaccurate measures of performance. This is particularly relevant if such measures are 
used in the context of performance evaluation and contracting, as the measures may be 
inaccurate.
I continue the analysis of the implications of dirty surplus accounting by 
assessing the effect of omitting such flows on accounting-based valuation models.
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Specifically, I investigate the relationship between violations of CSR and valuation 
errors in the residual income valuation model (RIVM) and abnormal earnings growth 
model (AEGM). I start by demonstrating analytically that the RIVM and AEGM can 
be derived from a model that expresses company equity value as the present value of 
expected future dividends (PVED). I show that if there is consistency in projections of 
accounting numbers used in implementations of the RIVM and AEGM and CSR 
holds, the models yield identical intrinsic value estimates. Accordingly, the omission 
of expected future dirty surplus flows from the projections of accounting numbers 
should result in identical valuation error in both models. I derive an analytical 
expression of the valuation error in terms of omitted projected dividends. I then 
explore empirically the relationship between the valuation errors in the RIVM and 
AEGM and total dirty surplus flows, both in terms of bias (signed valuation errors) 
and inaccuracy (absolute valuation errors). I conduct the empirical analysis using two 
sets o f data: a large sample of U.K. and U.S. companies, where dirty surplus flows can 
be measured with relative reliability using algorithms applied to computer-readable 
data, and a small sample of French, German, U.K. and U.S. companies, where dirty 
surplus flows are directly obtained from the companies’ financial statements. The last 
sample is the same as that used in previous chapters of this thesis. For the large 
sample during the period 1994 to 2003, results indicate some evidence of a 
relationship but only in the case of the U.S. and in terms of inaccuracy. For the U.S, 
results also reveal significant cross-industry differences between financial companies 
and other industry groups. Results for the small sample during the period 1994 to 
2001 provide some supportive evidence of a relationship for the U.S. sample, both in 
terms of bias and inaccuracy. There is also evidence of significant differences in the 
relationship between U.S. and non-U.S. companies. Overall, the findings suggest that
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omission of dirty surplus flows from expected future flows might cause problems, 
particularly as regards accuracy, in the accounting-based estimates of equity value, but 
only for U.S. companies. Hence, using the models’ value estimates for comparisons 
between financial and non-financial companies within the U.S., and between U.S. and 
non-U.S. companies may lead to incorrect inferences. I find no systematic evidence of 
interferences with the models’ value estimates in other situations.
6.2 Contribution and limitations
The measurement and recognition of income is an important issue in financial 
reporting. Whether or not to include certain components of earnings in income is 
therefore a pertinent question, which has been occupying regulators and financial 
statement users for decades. One way to assess the implications of excluding or 
including dirty surplus flows is to investigate the effects of such items on measures of 
business performance and equity value. I believe that the studies presented in this 
thesis contribute to that objective. By providing evidence on the impact of omitting 
dirty surplus flows from net income in accounting-based measures of economic 
performance and equity value, this thesis sheds light on issues that preoccupy users of 
financial information, such as: What definition of income to adopt? Where to report 
the different components of income? How to report financial performance?
The results of this thesis are subject to a caveat regarding the particular period 
and the sample-country-companies used in the analysis. For a different time period, 
with markedly different economic circumstances, companies might perform 
differently and thus yield different realisations of accounting flows. Likewise, for a 
different sample of companies from the same countries or from different countries the 
analysis might produce different results.
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